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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the role of representations and intersubjectivity in explaining 
pretend play of young children. Its goal is to show that basic forms of pretending can 
be explained without recourse to mental representations. The thesis targets two 
aspects of pretence: imagining (underlying the ability to act as if), and guiding 
(underlying the ability to play in specific ways). It proposes an alternative account of 
pretence to cognitivist accounts that dominate in the literature. The alternative 
account is based on enactivism; it proposes to explain pretending through dynamic 
interactions of environmental affordances and animal effectivities in context. The 
thesis emphasises the role of social and environmental factors as well as cultural 
engagements in shaping the relevant context for pretence to occur. The thesis is an 
important contribution both to the literature on pretence as well as to philosophy of 
mind. While the topic of pretence is narrow, considering it through enactive lens 
involves considering some of the most debated issues, such as the applicability of 
mechanistic explanations to studying cognition. 
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Chapter 1. Stage Setting 
 
 
This chapter introduces the topic of pretence and sets the stage for other chapters. 
Section 1.1 clarifies why the focus of this thesis is both on representations and 
intersubjectivity in pretence, and explains the basic strategy of the thesis. Section 1.2 
explains the motivations behind targeting explanations based on mental 
representations and behind looking for enactivist alternatives. Section 1.3 explains 
why the target of this thesis is solely the explanation of basic acts of pretend play of 
young children, such as playing that a banana is a phone. Section 1.4 clarifies what 
mental representations are and clarifies how they will be understood throughout the 
thesis. Section 1.5 explains what will be involved in each consecutive chapters of the 
thesis. 
  
1.1 Introduction to the thesis topics 
  
As the title “Pretence: role of representations and intersubjectivity?” suggests, the 
focus of this thesis is twofold. Primarily, the thesis questions the role that 
representations – in particular mental representations – play in explaining how one 
engages in pretending. The thesis argues that mental representations need not be 
involved in the explanation of pretending; defending this possibility is the main 
purpose of the thesis. The second, additional aim of the thesis is to highlight the role 
of intersubjectivity, or social and environmental engagements (as emphasised by the 
enactive accounts of cognition) in the proposed initial sketch of an alternative 
explanation of pretending. Looking for an enactive account of pretence, which 
stresses the role of the others in shaping cognition, is a result of challenging the roles 
that mental representations are supposed to play in the explanatory account of 
pretence. The thesis contrasts the roles that representations and intersubjectivity play 
in explaining some aspects of pretending. It questions whether representations (in 
particular, mental representations) must do the required explanatory work, and 
whether or not intersubjective factors and norms can be involved in that same 
explanatory work. Hence, the broad nature of the title serves to capture exploration of 
viable alternatives to explaining some aspects of pretending.  
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 The basic strategy of the thesis is to first determine which jobs mental 
representations have been designated to perform in explaining pretending, and then to 
argue that either the job in question does not need doing (because, on close 
inspection, pretending does not actually involve it) or that the job does need doing but 
something other than mental representations can be posited to do it. For this purpose, 
the most developed and recent theories of pretence that posit mental representations in 
explaining pretence will be reviewed. The most developed proposals include, i.e., the 
cognitive models of Leslie (1987) and Nichols and Stich (2000, 2003), and the most 
recent models are those of Currie (2009) and van Leeuwen (2013). The thesis extracts 
what jobs mental representations are supposed to play and focuses on two exemplar 
jobs to analyse further (‘imagining’ and ‘guiding’). This analysis determines if it is 
credible that only mental representations can do those jobs, which is the commonly 
held view. The aim of this part of the analysis is to establish that, basing on the two 
cases, it is at least possible to explain pretending without positing mental 
representations. The thesis concludes with arguing that the mechanisms that posit 
mental representations are not the only mechanisms that can explain how pretending 
comes about. Something else can do the explanatory work in accounting for 
pretending, as, for example, affordances, which serve as the alternative posits to 
mental representations.  
 The thesis also provides an initial sketch of an alternative story of what 
explains pretending that involves how we relate to our bodies (embodiment), our 
environment (embeddedness) and one another (intersubjectivity). The last aspect 
(intersubjectivity) is looked at in more detail. The thesis considers special practices 
that involve other people, and looks at the extent to which they play a role in pretence. 
While it may be possible to give an intersubjective account of how pretending comes 
about that also involves mental representations, the cognitivist philosophers who 
propose explanations involving mental representations take them to operate wholly 
within individuals (e.g., Nichols and Stich, 2000, 2003). Thus, showing that mental 
representations need not be posited to explain pretence opens up a door for a truly 
intersubjective account of pretence.  
 The thesis proposes the beginnings of a possible alternative story – the 
Enactive Account of Pretend Play – providing an initial suggestion about how we 
might address the ‘how else are we to explain pretence without mental 
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representations?’ question. The initial sketch of the positive story includes the notion 
of affordances and the possibility of dynamical mechanisms, which play a role in 
explaining various aspects of pretence. Such story may, in light of new developments 
in the cognitive sciences, turn out to be a contender for the best explanation of 
pretence, although at this stage the alternative account is complex and requires further 
development. Proposing a developed theory of enactive and intersubjective 
pretending is not the goal of this thesis.1 The thesis will be successful if it can open 
the way for such work by establishing that mental representations are not necessary in 
explaining pretending, as something else can do their jobs. The thesis proposes that 
affordances can serve as the alternative explanatory posits that can play the relevant 
roles mental representations are supposed to play. Thus, it is not the purpose of this 
thesis to provide knockdown arguments against the existence of mental 
representations as such. It is not even to argue directly against the existing mental 
representational accounts of pretence. The aim is simply to establish the possibility 
proof that positing mental representations is not the only way to explain pretending. 
 This thesis is important because of its novelty; to-date, there is no available 
explanation of pretending that questions the role of mental representations in its 
explanatory role. I anticipate the need for such explanation given the emerging 
embodied, enactive and intersubjective trends in philosophy and cognitive science. 
This thesis is the first step towards developing such an account. If it is shown that 
pretending need not involve mental representations in its explanation, this has further 
implications for other related topics in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, such 
as understanding workings of cognition in general. In addition, that pretending might 
be understood without appeal to mental representations can make a difference to 
practical domains, such as to therapy that uses pretend play.  
  
1.2 Motivations 
                    
There are two main motivations behind looking at the role of representations and 
intersubjectivity in explaining pretence. First has to do with increasing challenges to 
                                                
1 To argue for a truly intersubjective explanation of pretending, I would have to compare the cognitivist 
accounts that posit mental representations with a developed alternative account, arguing that the latter 
better explains pretending in light of some accumulated evidence. While the analysis of this thesis 
prepares the ground for such work, providing a detailed alternative account of pretence is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
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the standard cognitivist accounts of cognition and emerging proposals of embodied 
and enactive cognition (Shapiro, 2007; Chemero, 2009; Hutto and Myin, 2013). 
Second has to do with renewed interest in intersubjective accounts of cognition (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2009; Gallagher 2009).  
 There are new arguments on the horizon that put standard views of mental 
representationalism in question. For example, Hutto and Myin (2013) challenge 
whether basic minds (such as those of non-linguistic young children) have mental 
contents to begin with. They argue that so far there is no naturalised account of 
mental content, and no satisfactory theory of informational content available that 
could explain mental contents in terms of informational contents. 2  The only 
articulated theory of such content that all naturalised theories of representation have 
attempted to build upon is the theory of informational content outlined by Dretske 
(1981), who identifies information with covariance, which logically precludes it from 
constituting content of the relevant kind (which is the truth-evaluable content, as will 
be explains in section 1.4 of this chapter). Hutto and Myin argue not only that other, 
richer and credible candidate notions of informational content have yet to be 
articulated, but also that it is likely that they will lack the requisite scientific 
credentials to do the work required by explanatory naturalism. On this basis, they cast 
doubt on the standard theories of mental representation and on the idea that basic 
cognition involves truth-conditional or other kinds of content. 
  Hutto and Myin’s reasons for rejecting contentful mental representations are 
highly debated, and it is not the intention of this thesis to support their argument. It is 
enough, however, that their arguments cast a shadow on the standard cognitivist 
approaches, thereby motivating exploration of possible non-representational accounts 
of aspects of cognition. Doubts about positing mental representations to explain 
cognition have already been raised by other scholars in the philosophical community 
(Ramsey, 2007; Chemero, 2009), and suggestions for alternative accounts of 
cognition are further supported by the intersubjective interaction approaches to social 
cognition (e.g., Gallagher, 2001). Looking for non-mental representational accounts 
of cognition can raise understandable scepticism, not in the least with regard to 
                                                
2 As they argue, “anything that deserves to be called content has special properties – e.g., truth, 
reference, implication – that make it logically distinct from and irreducible to mere covariance relations 
holding between states of affairs” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 67). The idea that covariance does not 
constitute content motivates their argument that there is no naturalized account of content other than 
correlation, which cannot do the job content has to do. 
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pretence. Considering the default framing of pretence in terms of mental 
representations, as will be shown in Chapter 2, many think non-represenationalism 
about pretence is a non-starter. For example, Spaulding (2010) lays down a challenge 
to Gallagher’s (2009) primary and secondary intersubjectivity stances to explain what 
is going on when a child pretends. Spaulding does not think that the embodied and 
enactive accounts of cognition can give an appropriate explanation of pretending. She 
follows Baron-Cohen (1995) in saying that  
 
(The) developed capacities for (pretence) require a developed capacity for mindreading. To 
fully understand these kinds of behaviors, one must be able to appreciate aspects of 
interactions that become apparent only after developing mindreading abilities, but that is not 
to say that prior to mastering mental state concepts children cannot even begin to engage in 
these behaviors” (2010, p.14).  
 
This claim distinguishes between “developed” capacities for pretence and potential 
underdeveloped one, as well as its “full” understanding and potentially its partical 
understanding. While it is not clear when “these kind of behaviours” (of the 
underdeveloped pretence) stop and genuine pretence starts, there is a logical space 
that would allow the proponents of the embodied, enactive and intersubjective 
cognition to accommodate young children to count as genuine pretenders (the logic of 
the position is clarified in section 1.3). Hence, this thesis will begin to meet 
Spaulding’s challenge.  
 The first motivation for this thesis is to propose an alternative account of 
pretence that does not posit mental representations has not yet been proposed or 
defended in the philosophical literature. Preliminary ecological account of pretence 
have been proposed in the recent past by psychologists, who proposed a de-
individualised account of pretence, contextualised in the worldly engagements and 
social interactions (see Szokolsky, 2006). However, the available ecological 
approaches do not address the question of mental representations; it is even possible 
that they could accommodate mental representations, as explicit reasons why mental 
representations are not needed have not been voiced. Moreover, inspired by the 
ecological psychologists, the second motivation for this thesis it to showcase the role 
of intersubjectivity in explaining pretending, when pretending is understood as acting 
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on affordances. The thesis will show that other people play an important role in 
pretence, forming the required context for pretence affordances to be acted upon.3  
 
1.3 Target: pretend play of children  
  
In evaluating the possibility of articulating an alternative explanation of pretence, this 
dissertation will focus mainly on young, pre-linguistic children’s engagement in 
pretend playing, taking banana-phone play to be a paradigm case of pretence. Other, 
adult or non-human pretence is also possible (Mitchell, 2002), but focusing on cases 
of pretence of young children is interesting for several reasons, and important for one 
big reason. It is interesting as human children are said to be the prototypical 
pretenders, and one might believe that “understanding children’s pretence is necessary 
to get some idea as to the phenomenon itself and its scope” (Mitchell, 2002, p. 4). 
Pretending is an activity that (most) children engage in on a routine basis. It is an 
example of a common interaction in child play; it varies between individuals and 
throughout child development. Pretence is an important subject of philosophical 
study, as, for example, it is often held to be indicative of having a Theory of Mind 
(see Baron-Cohen, 1995). There are developmental reasons for studying child 
pretence to get insight into the learning capacities of children. In clinical psychology, 
engaging in pretend play is deemed as one of the benchmarks of healthy development 
of social cognition, as we see underdeveloped spontaneous pretend play in children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD).  
 However, the main reason the thesis focuses on young children’s pretend play 
behaviour is for the following reason. While pretence has been commonly said to 
require ‘symbolic thinking’ or symbol-swapping of some kind, it is not clear whether 
18 month old children – the likely first genuine pretenders, as agreed on in various 
philosophical and psychological literature – can pretend without having mastered a 
public language. Object-substitution play (like the banana-phone play) of 18-month-
old children is particularly interesting as typically, such pretend activity is seen as a 
symbolic activity (Piaget, 1945/1962; Leslie, 1987; Nichols and Stich, 2000, 2003; 
Mitchell, 2002). Many in the field are inclined to speak of pretence as an activity of 
                                                
3 The pretence need not be social or group pretence; Chapter 7 will show clearly that even individual 
pretence is largely socially scaffolded, thereby arguing for the important role of intersubjectivity in 
pretence. 
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symbolic thinking; just as symbols stand in for something else (e.g., a flag stands for 
the country ‘X’), so pretence shows itself as requiring being able to treat one thing 
(e.g., a banana) as another (e.g., ‘a phone’). And for many, in turn, this seems to 
require being able to represent one thing as another. They rely on the Piagetian idea 
that pretence involves a ‘signifier’ and what is ‘signified’ (1945/1962), and this sets 
up the discussion about pretending in representational terms. 
 Therefore, it is necessary to look at the earliest forms of pretence. What makes 
examining the play of pre-linguistic children so important is that pretence seems to be 
constitutively representational (as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Given that 
young children are not full-blown language users and symbolisers, the consensus is 
that to be pretending is necessarily to be mentally representing. It is not surprising 
that scholars such as Leslie (1987) and Nichols and Stich (2003) phrase their research 
question as follows: “How is it possible for a child to think about the banana as a 
phone?” This way of framing the question already assumes the legitimacy of an 
intellectualist understanding of the nature of pretence. Yet, how can such imaginative, 
seemingly symbol-swapping, abilities be in place prior to mastery of public language, 
pertinent to symbolic (counterfactual, hypothetical) thinking? There is no indication 
that such young children know how to form symbols or have mastered external and 
public practices such as linguistic manipulation of concepts (the evidence is rather to 
the contrary). This, in turn, should preclude very young children without such 
capacities from being counted as genuine pretenders, unless we can account for the 
relevant symbol-swapping capacities that involve manipulation of representations to 
be taking place in the child’s cognitive architecture (Leslie 1987, Nichols and Stich 
2003). Cognitivists often posit mental machinery that takes care of the symbol 
swapping by means of mental representations. For example, Nichols and Stich (2003) 
famously hypothesised mental mechanisms to explain how pretence can be achieved. 
Others (Velleman, 2000; Currie, 2006; Doggett and Egan, 2007) turn to non-
propositional imagination to do that job. The standard view is that pretending is made 
possible by some sort of ability to represent alternative scenarios, and act upon these. 
However, as children are known to grasp false beliefs only at around the age of four 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), a closer look at pretence, which seems to show itself 
already at the infantile age of one and a half years, bears important implications. On 
the one hand, Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) violation of expectation test is said to 
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serve as evidence for infantile grasp of false-beliefs, which suggest support for the 
idea that meta-representational capacities might be in play even in early pretence. On 
the other hand, the young age of pretenders suggests implausibility that complex 
symbol-swapping mechanisms need to be in place prior to explicit use of language 
(Huttelnocher and Higgins, 1978).  
 We can propose a Logical Possibilities Table to capture these distinctions 
(Table 1). First possibility is that pretending necessarily requires representing (as it is 
a symbol-swapping activity), but ala Huttenlocher and Higgins (1978), only explicit 
language users can do the representing; in which case it would follow that young 
children who are non- or poor-language users (as children of the age of 18 months) 
could not be counted as genuine pretenders. At best, their behaviours can be counted 
as ‘proto-pretence’ behaviours. Second possibility is that pretending necessarily 
requires representing (as it is a symbol-swapping activity), but the symbol swapping 
can be done without explicit linguistic manipulations. This is where cognitive 
mechanisms such as decoupling mechanism (Leslie, 1987) or inference mechanism 
(Nichols and Stich, 2000, 2003) are introduced. These structures rely on mental 
representations. Most available positions on pretence propose to involve mental 
representational structures to account for the symbolic nature of pretending (as will be 
shown in Chapter 2). This possibility allows, however, for 18-month-old children to 
be counted as genuine pretenders. What has not yet been proposed is a third 
alternative. This is the logical possibility that pretending many not require 
representing (either linguistic or mental), but 18-month-old children can still be 
counted as genuine pretenders (indication for why we would want to count them as 
genuine pretenders is their behaviour that looks like pretence behaviour). This is 
where an enactive account of pretence can fill the void. This thesis specifically targets 
the second and third possibilities, arguing against the view that if young pre-verbal 
children are genuine pretenders, we need to posit mental representations in the 
explanation of their pretence. The thesis shelves the question whether banana-phone 
pretence play of 18-month-olds is in fact genuine pretence (assuming that it is), 
thereby, not addressing the first possibility.        
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Table 1. The Logical Possibilities Table 
 
 
 Moreover, there are different types of behaviours one can engage in that have 
been treated as ‘pretence’ behaviours. It is difficult to draw a sharp line between acts 
of pretence that require sophisticated cognitive capacities and ones that do not. What 
follows is that there is no clear agreement about which behaviours should count as 
‘genuine’ pretence behaviours. As such, classifying an act as genuine pretence 
depends on the theorists’ ideas about what is necessary for pretence to occur, such as 
whether the agent that is pretending has the right mental capacities. What these 
necessary capacities are, however, differs across the literature. For example, some 
theorists (Huttenlocher and Higgins, 1978; Rakoczy, 2005) support the idea that full-
blown linguistic capacities must be in place for a child to be considered a genuine 
pretender; as the former claim, “true evidence of pretence is when verbalization 
Is Pretence Necessarily 
Representational?  
Young children  
(non- or poor-language 
users) 
 
Option 1: Yes – Linguistic 
representations  
(Huttenlocher and Higgins, 
Davidson, [Rakoczy]) 
Denies the possibility of pretence  
(at best proto-pretence)  
Option 2: Yes – Mental 
representations  
(Fodor, Piaget, Leslie, Perner, 
Nichols & Stich, Harris & 
Kavanaugh, Lillard, Currrie)  
Allows for genuine pretence  
 
(thinking as if, acting as if, 
intentionally acting as if) 
Option 3: No Allows for genuine pretence  
!"#$%&'()"**$+$'$,-*(.&+'-(
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reveals a symbolic or pretence attitude prior to his/her act” (1978, p. 124). Explicit 
linguistic capacities and verbalisation are taken to be required to confirm engagement 
in a pretence act; without such confirmation, there seems to be no way of telling if the 
child is truly pretending. In some ways this approach is compelling; indeed there is no 
clear way of telling whether pretence is going on without the child clarifying that 
what he/she is doing is “not for real.” However, it is also questionable whether verbal 
confirmation of pretence must take place to reasonably treat someone as a pretender. 
Many pretenders that can speak simply do not bother to make such an explicit gesture 
(or do not want to make it), especially when they are using pretence for the purpose of 
deception. It might also be case that pretence requires symbolic manipulations, which 
can only take place with developed linguistic skills. Then, young children’s pretence 
becomes problematic, unless we accept that the symbol-swapping process occurs by 
means of mental representations. This is the second, accepted view, which the thesis 
questions.  
  This is why the focus of the thesis is on the earliest forms of what is taken to 
be genuine pretence, such as simple banana-phone object substitution play. It would 
be possible to analyse adult pretence as well, but as adults have developed language in 
place, it may seem easier to posit that their linguistic skills are the source of their 
pretence. With young children it is not clear whether representational or symbol-
swapping structures are in place. Therefore, it is crucial to take young children’s play 
behaviours as examples; analysing play of children takes away one possible 
explanation of their behaviour – that fully developed language is doing the relevant 
work – and so allows us to focus on the two other explanations: one involving mental 
representations in the cognitive mechanism of pretence, and its alternative, the wide, 
enactive and intersubjective mechanism of pretence. The alternative suggests that pre-
linguistic children can still be considered as genuine pretenders, but mental 
representations need not play the relevant roles.  
 
1.4 How to understand mental representations? 
 
As the main purpose of this thesis is to argue for the possibility of explaining pretence 
without positing mental representations, it is crucial to explain from the start what 
will be meant by ‘mental representations’. There are different ways to understand 
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what mental representations are.4 To quote Chemero (2009),    
                  
Mental representations are theoretical entities (…). That is, just as we might posit dark matter 
to explain observations in astronomy, we posit mental representations to explain observations 
of intelligent or adaptive behaviour. Mental representations, then, are parts of explanations of 
behaviour, and their existence is vindicated and their proposed properties are confirmed by 
the success of explanations that call upon them. The role of mental representations in 
explanations of adaptive behaviour is as causally potent, information-carrying vehicles. The 
representation plays a role in the causal economy of the agent, and, because it carries 
information about the environment, allows the behaviour it causes to be appropriate for the 
environment. Because representations are posited as theoretical entities and because they do 
explanatory work in virtue of the information they carry, a theory of representation needs to 
explain how something inside an agent could be about something outside the agent…” (p. 50) 
 
 The important qualities of mental representations are the following. Firstly, 
they are theoretical entities, posited for explanatory purposes. Secondly, they are 
nothing short of objects with semantic properties. They have contents, which fulfil 
some condition of satisfaction, whether truth, accuracy, correctness or the like, as the 
world is taken (or ‘claimed’) to be in a certain way that it might not be in. In short, 
mental representations have conditions of satisfaction.5 They are the vehicles of such 
truth-evaluable contents.6        
 This characterisation of mental representations accurately reflects the 
commitments of pretence theorists who posit mental representations. Leslie (1987), 
who endorses a Fodorian notion of mental representations, claims that  
                                                
4 This section does not aim at a comprehensive overview of theories of mental representations (nor 
would such a discussion be necessary). 
5 As Crawford (2010) explains, “Philosophers sometimes speak of the representational feature of our 
attitudes as their content and of that content or representation having a semantic evaluation. That is, 
since attitudes represent things beyond themselves, they can be evaluated with respect to whether these 
things beyond themselves are as they are represented to be. In other words, we can always ask whether 
the content of an attitude fits with reality. (…) If the content of my belief does match reality (…), then 
that content can be evaluated as true, and if it does not match, as false. The evaluation is a semantic one 
because it concerns the relation between the belief and the world just as the semantics of a language 
concerns the relation between the signs of the language and their meanings, that is, what they signify” 
(p. 90-91). 
6 There are many ways to understanding the vehicular nature of mental representations. For example, 
classical cognitivist theories understand mental representations as structured symbols in a ‘Language of 
Thought’ (Fodor, 1976). However, the vehicular nature of mental representations will be of no 
importance in this thesis, as the focus is strictly on the contents that mental representations carry.  
Hence, for purposes of clarity, non-contentful notions of mental representations (such as that of 
Wheeler, 2005), shall not be considered as ‘mental representations’ in this thesis.  
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The basic evolutionary and ecological point of internal representation must be to represent 
aspects of the world in an accurate, faithful, and literal way, in so far as this is possible for a 
given organism. (...) Primary representation is thus defined in terms of its direct semantic 
relation with the world. (...) [R]eference, truth, and existence are really relations holding 
between primary representations and the world (1987, p. 414).  
 
 This notion of mental representation underlies the commitments of other 
theorists of pretence aside Leslie. Importantly, even the so-called ‘behaviourists’ and 
‘intentionalists’ to pretence (whose accounts will be discussed in Chapter 2) show 
commitment to the existence of mental representations described in semantic terms. 
Even though they give mental representations a different, ‘weaker’ role in explaining 
pretence than Leslie does (on their account mental representations allow merely 
‘acting as if’ as opposed to counterfactual thinking), we can hold them as committed 
to the existence of semantic content of the mental representations posited in their 
explanatory mechanisms, even if they deny it at face value. For example, Harris and 
Kavanaugh (1993) claim that to successfully play pretence games, a child must ‘flag’, 
or act according to a rule (such as “this banana is not a phone”) and edit these rules to 
generate new flags, with “statements written on the various flags” (p. 66). Similarly, 
Currie (2004) allows for decentring of what is real from not real to occur through 
“tokened suppositional thought” (p. 233), and Rakoczy et al. (2005) claim that “in 
pretending to pour, the actor symbolizes that ‘there is water coming out of this 
container,’ he acts as if it was true” (p. 81). Thus, there is a clear indication that, 
explicitly intended or not, these theorists too commit to the notion of mental 
representations with semantic properties. Hence, the notion of mental representations 
that will be referred to throughout this thesis is of semantic content-bearing vehicles, 
which fulfil some condition of satisfaction. While other notions of mental 
representations without semantic contents have been proposed (see, for example, 
Wheeler, 2005), discussing contentful mental representations throughout this thesis is 
consistent with how the pretence theorists are using the term.   
 In making my case I will not cover all the places mental representations may 
appear in the explanatory proposals of pretending. Chapters 5 and 6 (which look at 
imagining and guiding roles in pretence, respectively) do not exhaust all the 
possibilities of the roles mental representations might play in pretence. For example, 
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the question of what motivates pretence (whether representationally-construed 
intention or desire) is not tackled in this thesis at all, though not because the question 
is unimportant. Similarly, how children (or people in general) recognise pretence of 
others may involve mental representations, but this too will not be dealt with in this 
thesis. While it may be crucial to know why children engage in pretend play to begin 
with, and how can they engage in pretence with others, these questions do not deal 
with the mechanism of an on-going pretence episode. The cognitive mechanisms that 
allegedly make acting as if and mental guidance possible (discussed in detail Chapters 
5 and 6, respectively) do share positing of mental representations to explain the basis 
of the occurrence of a pretence episode; to these realisers mental representations 
alternatives will be given. Thus, while the thesis does not examine all of the places 
mental representations can be posited in explaining pretence, the thesis aims to have 
done enough to show that some aspects of pretending can be accounted for without 
positing mental representations. 
 
1.5 Outline of the chapters 
 
Presently, I will explain how the arguments are structured in the rest of the chapters of 
this thesis. This is how the thesis unfolds: 
 Chapter 2 is a descriptive chapter that identifies the assumptions about the 
nature and mechanisms of pretence in cognitive theories of pretence. The chapter 
concentrates on three most prominent cognitivist theories of pretence 
(metarepresentational, behaviourist and intentional). The chapter brings forth the 
assumptions cognitive theorists make about what is needed to explain pretence and 
what role mental representations are thought to play in them. The chapter considers 
the explanatory character of the available proposals. It observes that mental 
representations serve both as essences of pretence and as explanatory posits in 
mechanisms of pretence. This double role of mental representations is a cause for 
confusion in thinking that an explanatory mechanism of pretence is justified to 
involve mental representations, even if pretending is essentially representational. 
Paying attention to whether cognitivist theorists of pretence are making constitutive 
claims about the very nature of pretence, or simply offering explanatory hypotheses 
about the mechanisms that are logically separate from pretence but causally enable it, 
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clarifies the rationale for the approach adopted in this thesis – namely, that of 
demonstrating that an explanatory account of pretending that does not posit mental 
representations can be offered.       
 Chapter 3 pauses to consider what type of explanation is an enactivist 
explanation, based on affordances instead of mental representations. As far as 
enactivist provide explanations, and not mere re-descriptions, enactivists give 
dynamical explanations, which are considered to be covering-law explanations. This 
type of explanation differs from the mechanical explanations, which cognitivists 
offer. To address the worry that enactivist explanations cannot threaten cognitivist 
explanations, the chapter shows that it is possible to consider dynamical explanations 
as mechanical explanations, when mechanisms are understood as wide and situated. 
The chapter concludes with showing that enactivists can give genuine alternative 
mechanistic explanations to cognitivist explanations, but should dynamical 
explanations be ultimately incompatible with mechanistic explanations, the 
affordance-based explanation given in this thesis will be telling either way. 
 Chapter 4 zooms in on the alternative explanatory posit of affordances. It 
explains how the term ‘affordance’ has been used in the literature, providing ontology 
of affordances. The chapter clarifies how to think of affordances with respect to 
explaining pretence. It proposes that Turvey’s (1992) conception of affordances (and 
introduction of effectivities that compliment affordances) best serves the purpose of 
explaining pretence.  
 The next two chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) examine in detail two of the main 
roles mental representations are proposed to play in pretence. Each of these chapters 
questions whether the role that mental representations are supposed to play is needed 
to begin with (these are the roles of enabling ‘acting as if’ and ‘guiding’ pretence). 
After showing that the answer is ‘yes’, the chapters look at whether something other 
than mental representations might play those roles. The chapters consider problems 
with the standard cognitive mechanisms, and show that alternatives are possible in 
each case. The alternatives have in common that they step away from positing mental 
representations but turn to affordances, environmental setting and social practices for 
the relevant explanations.      
 To elaborate, Chapter 5 examines the question “how do children manage to 
treat one thing as another?” Cognitivists posit cognitive mechanisms that are assumed 
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to underlie imaginative capacity to ‘act as if one thing was another’, such as 
‘decentring’, or imaginatively ‘seeing one thing as’ another (Currie, 2004). The 
alternative proposal is one of a sensory-motor account of imagination, whose 
principal explanatory concept is one of ‘affordance’. The chapter proposes to explain 
the imaginative role in pretence to be accounted for by the capacity to ‘see-
affordances-in’.  
 Chapter 6 deals with the question: “what guides pretence?” The standard 
cognitivist models assume the necessity of a mental representational mechanism that 
creates mental maps and follows rules – a mental guider of a sort (Nichols and Stich, 
2000, 2003; van Leeuwen, 2011). The alternative proposed in this chapter is that the 
guiding of pretence acts can be offloaded to affordances in the environment and to the 
social and narrative structures.  
 The concluding Chapter 7 discusses in detail how the explanatory posits of the 
alternative account (affordances, effectivities, social practices) interact to provide a 
coherent explanation of pretence. The chapter identifies various factors that play a 
role in explaining how affordances get to invite specific actions. It elaborates on the 
mutuality of environmental affordances and animal effectivities in explaining 
pretending. It further shows the roles cultural and social factors play in actualising 
pretence in a specific context. With the end of this chapter, the thesis that early forms 
of pretence can be explained without recourse to mental representations is secured.  
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Chapter 2. Standard Explanatory Models of Pretence 
 
 
This chapter looks at what is involved in the best explanation of pretence. The chapter 
distinguishes the different ways pretence is thought to be representational: sometimes 
it is thought to be essentially so, and sometimes it is thought to be so because mental 
representations are alleged to feature in the best explanations of pretence. To date, 
there are at least three developed and interestingly different theoretical accounts of 
pretence in the literature: metarepresentational (Leslie, 1987), behaviourist (Perner, 
1991; Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993, Nichols and Stich, 2000, 2003), and intentionalist 
(Rakoczy et al., 2004, 2005). These accounts form standard frameworks for 
understanding pretence and what best explains it (see Liao and Gendler, 2010). The 
frameworks feature both a theory about what pretence is (the models assume some 
pretence characteristics), and propose mechanisms to explain how pretence comes 
about.7 These models attribute specific functions to mental representations.  
 The chapter will unfold in the following way. First, the chapter explicates the 
ways in which mental representations figure in the main existing theories of pretence 
(as part of the essential make-up of pretence, and as part of the explanatory 
mechanisms of pretence). Section 2.1 focuses on the theoretical commitments about 
the nature of pretence in the main explanatory models of pretence. Section 2.2 focuses 
on mechanisms that the models posit in explaining how pretence is achieved. Then, it 
clarifies what roles representations are said to play in pretence across the standard 
explanatory models of pretence. Section 2.3 identifies the common explanatory roles 
that mental representations are supposed to play in these models, two of which are the 
role of imagining and the role of guiding. Finally, the chapter includes two 
observations about the relationship between characterising pretence as 
representational and positing mental representations in its best explanation. Section 
2.4 considers what is involved in the best explanation of pretence. It looks at reasons 
                                                
7 The term ‘model’ refers to scientific modeling, which is to be understood as “a scientific activity, the 
aim of which is to make a particular part or feature of the world easier to understand, define, quantify, 
visualize, or simulate by referencing it to existing and usually commonly accepted knowledge. It 
requires selecting and identifying relevant aspects of a situation in the real world and then using 
different types of models for different aims, such as conceptual models to better understand, 
operational models to operationalize, (…)” (Retrieved from Wikipedia on 9 July 2015, entry on 
‘Scientific modeling’). In line with this definition of models, my referring to the theory and the 
mechanism of the model can be considered as referring to a conceptual model and an operational 
model of the overarching model, respectively. 
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for thinking that pretence is representational and reasons why it might be thought that 
mental representations feature in the best explanation of pretence, arguing that these 
ought to be kept separate. It makes an observation that how pretence is characterised 
(representationally) influences how it is explained (with mental representations). It 
further argues that even if pretence can be regarded as representational, mental 
representations need not be posited as the best explanations of pretence. Ultimately, 
this chapter sets the stage for questioning the need to posit mental representations in 
explaining certain aspects of pretence, and opens the door to proposing alternative to 
mental representations explanations of pretence. 
 
2.1 Theories behind the pretence models (or what is assumed about pretence) 
 
a) The metarepresentational model 
 
Leslie (1987) proposes a highly intellectual account of pretence. His cognitive theory 
of pretence assumes pretence to be a mental state – one, which requires symbolic 
thinking.8 He asks: “How is it possible for a child to think about a banana as if it were 
a telephone…?" (1987, p. 412). Leslie’s is a theoretical account built upon the work 
of Piaget (1962), who defined pretend play as a type of symbolic play. Leslie claims 
that "pretend play …[is] a primitive manifestation of the ability to conceptualize 
mental states" (p. 424). To use Leslie’s example of pretence in play, if a child 
pretends that a banana is a phone by placing it to her ear and speaks to it, the child is 
said to play symbolically with the banana. Leslie further assumes the need for making 
a “deliberate distortion of reality” (1987, p. 412) and preserving “cognitive 
quarantine” (idem) by the pretender keeping the distinction between what is real and 
what is not real. Leslie further points to the parallels between pretence and the 
attribution of mental state expressions.9 He characterises three types of pretend play 
and three corresponding linguistic ‘deviances’ that occur in these forms of play. First 
is object-substitution play, where the deviant is reference. For example, in pretend 
                                                
8 He sees the symbolic nature of pretence as a precursor to a more elaborated mind-reading ability, 
where representational capacities are used in the wider context. Leslie places the capacity to pretend as 
necessarily prior to understanding other minds. 
9 He claims that there is a “striking similarity between these properties of pretend play and logical 
properties of sentences containing mental state terms (…) to explain why an isomorphism between 
mental state expressions and pretence exists, I shall do this by positing an underlying form of internal 
representation that possesses these semantic properties” (Leslie 1987, 416). 
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play, an object (banana) refers to another object (phone). Second is the attribution of 
pretend properties (“this towel is ‘wet’)”, where there is deviance with respect to the 
truth (the towel is actually dry). Third is pretend playing with imaginary objects 
(having an imaginary friend), where the deviance is with respect to the existence (of 
the friend). The most characteristic feature of Leslie’s model of pretence, which he 
considers to be a precursor of a fully developed Theory of Mind, is the requirement 
for workings of the concepts like ‘I’ and ‘pretend’, retained by the 
metarepresentational cognitive network.  
 
b) The behaviourist model 
 
The behaviourist model emerged as a direct response to Leslie’s model. 10  Its 
representatives (i.e., Perner, 1991; Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993; Lillard, 1994; 
Nichols and Stich, 2000, 2003) all agree that entertaining a concept ‘pretend’ and 
engaging in metarepresenting does not feature in the best explanations of pretence. 
The behaviourists in the debate on pretence claim that what is required to pretend is 
simply to be behaving appropriately to the situation were the situation real. The 
central claim of this account is that pretenders need only behave ‘as if’ a scenario 
obtained and have beliefs and desires about how to do so appropriately. The 
pretenders need not have beliefs about their own mental states (and metarepresent “I 
pretend…”), the concept ‘PRETEND’, or the need to conceptualise the mental states 
of others.  
 Still, their pretence seems to be a cognitively demanding task. For example, 
Nichols and Stich (2000) claim that “to pretend that p is (at least to a rough first 
approximation) to behave in a way that is similar to the way one would (or might) 
behave if p were the case,” where behaving as if p requires having a counterfactual 
state, or imagining a possible state, where something obtains, and then applying it to 
the actual behaviour (2000, p. 128). Having counterfactual states, in turn, requires an 
                                                
10 It should be kept in mind that while these accounts are called ‘behaviourist’, they share little to 
nothing with psychological behaviourism of Pavlov or Skinner, or logical behaviourism (Ryle, 1949). 
They still represent cognitivist frameworks of explanatory account, referring to beliefs and desires in 
their theories of cognition and using mental representations in their cognitive explanations. They have 
been called ‘behaviourist’ simply to highlight the contrast of their characterisation of pretence 
(‘behaving as if’) with Leslie’s metarepresentational characterisation (‘thinking as if’). 
 23 
“ability to make representations with a counterfactual attitude” (Liao and Gendler, 
2010, p. 6).  
 To take another example, on Perner’s (1991) suppositional account of 
pretence, the child supposes that X (that “the banana is a phone”), and then acts on 
that supposition. Perner speaks of pretend representations, which “are not 
representations of the world as it is but of the world as it might be" (1991, p. 59). 
Perner suggests that the content of belief representations is different from the content 
of pretence representations, which is similar to what Leslie proposes.11 He also seems 
to be suggesting a version of cognitive quarantining: “My suggestion for pretence is 
to mark off the pretend scenario as “nonreal” or “hypothetical” (…) The need for 
quarantine is served adequately by multiple models representing different situations 
(1991, p. 60-61).  
 Perner is a pretence behaviourist with a suppositional account of pretending, 
but one can also have a simulationist account of pretending. Simulationists such as 
Currie (1996, 1998) and Harris and Kavanaugh (1993), claim that behaving as if 
requires actual behaving modeled on the behaviours of other people appropriate to the 
pretend context. This stems from observing and imitating other people. The 
simulation is used to understand and predict other people’s actions. For example, 
Currie (1996) endorses the simulationist position, claiming that pretence is a type of 
‘mentally taking on a role’.12 
 Finally, another behaviourist about pretence, Lillard (1994), claims that the 
ability to pretend is strongly linked with an ability to reflect on pretence as a mental 
state. 13  She lists the necessary ingredients of pretence, which include, i.e., the 
pretender (an animate, mindful being), a reality, against which pretence contrasts (or 
at least the pretender must think that it does), a mental representation of the pretence 
                                                
11 Leslie also proposes to distinguish ‘pretence’ representations from ‘primary’ representations. They 
represent two different situations, hypothetical and real ones, respectively. 
12 When describing role-play, he claims: “It is natural to think that childhood games of pretense in 
which the actors play at  being pirates or bears are driven by the actors mentally taking on these roles 
and imagining being pirates or bears. In doing these things, the children simulate, to the best of their 
ability and within the compass of their relevant knowledge, the experience of being pirates or bears” 
(Currie 1996, p. 251). 
13 Lillard conducted to an experiment that used a troll Moe, who was described to children as hopping 
like a kangaroo, but who did not know what kangaroos are. The experiment has presumably shown that 
children understood that Moe could not have been pretending to be a kangaroo without knowing 
previously what a kangaroo is. The worry with the set-up of this experiment, however, is that it tested 
the children’s ability for verbally assessing the pretence of others. It also has assumed that having 
former knowledge of kangaroos is required to be able to pretend to be one, without giving 
justifications.   
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scenario in the pretender’s mind, and separately, a mental representation that is 
projected onto reality, as well as the pretender’s awareness of both the reality and the 
fact that the representation is projected onto the reality.14 Such model of pretence 
requires many representational factors and is also highly cognitively demanding. 
 
c) The intentionalist model 
 
Finally, there are the intentionalists about pretence who further stress the importance 
of intentions in determining pretence. They claim that the behaviourist account of 
pretence in its current form is not entirely satisfactory and complete; it misses the 
crucial role that intentions play in pretence. One of their arguments is that the 
behaviourist account is “coarse-grained and has many instances of non-pretense in its 
extension,” like, for example, an inability to distinguish pretending from trying.15 
Thus, instead of mere “behaving as if”, they speak of pretence as “acting as if with an 
appropriate intention”. The intentionalist account stresses not the intentionality, or 
aboutness of pretence acts (Brentano, 1874/1973), but it stresses the agent’s ‘having 
an intention’. As Searle, the father of this position, suggests, “One cannot truly be 
said to have pretended to do something unless one intended to pretend to do it” (1979, 
p. 325). Having an intention, in short, is essential to pretence; it is a necessary part of 
the cognitive make-up of pretenders. One must have an intention to pretend, or to act 
in ‘as-if’ fashion.  
 According to Rakoczy et al. (2004, 2005), pretence does not concern only the 
individual’s intentions regarding their own actions, but in a shared context, requires 
also ‘understanding the intention of the other’. Hence, their understanding of pretence 
extends to the social sphere, as pretence is necessarily social on their view. They 
perceive pretend play as an inherently social activity that entails prior understanding 
                                                
14 She lists additional features of pretence to be non-serious emotional tone that indicates the activity as 
fun, and being an actual activity, but these are, according to her, not constitutive of pretence like the 
former six (see Lillard in Lewis and Mitchell, 1994, pp. 212-214.) 
15 “In trying to write with a malfunctioning pen, for example, one performs behavior that would be 
appropriate if the pen were working. Accordingly, children would have one undifferentiated category 
of as-if behaviors comprising pretending and trying” (Rakoczy et al. 2004, p. 396). Rakoczy et al.’s 
(2004) study showed that children do distinguish between different forms of as-if-behaviours with 
different underlying intentions. Children can tell that “the intentions involved are radically different in 
the two cases: In trying, one wants to really perform the action, whereas in pretending, one does not” 
(p. 396). 
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of others as intentional agents.16 What follows from their account is that it is not 
individual imaginative capacities that give rise to pretence, but rather, pretence is 
derived from “a cultural imitative learning, supported by adult scaffolding” (2005, p. 
77-78). Rakoczy et al. (2005) make the following proposal about what pretence 
requires: “Armed with an understanding of intentional action, some nascent 
understanding of hypothetical and counterfactual possibilities and a basic proficiency 
with a natural language, children then come to understand and imitatively acquire 
pretending as a new intentional, non-serious action form” (p. 77). Rakoczy (2008) 
further proposes that pretence involves normative aspects, such as “given that an X 
counts as a Y in a certain context C, some acts with X in C are appropriate and others 
are inappropriate” (p. 1195).  
 While some intentionalists press for a more social account of pretence, other 
intentionalists, together with metarepresentationalists and behaviourists about 
pretence have are largely individualistic models of pretence (they refer to an 
individual pretending). Next section considers the mechanisms posited by their 
models. 
 
2.2 Mechanisms behind the models (or how the pretence works)  
   
a) Leslie’s decoupling mechanism 
  
To explain pretence, Leslie (1987) posited metarepresenting. On his account, to 
metarepresent in pretend contexts requires representing oneself as the actor who 
engages in representing the banana as a phone. This requires possession and exercise 
of the concept ‘PRETEND’. Arguably, the metarepresentational capacity is a 
subpersonal capacity of the actors, as the ‘PRETEND’ concept is provided through a 
Language of Thought (Fodor, 1976), a view that Leslie accepts.  
 Leslie proposed that acts of pretending are best explained by manipulation of 
representations of how things are pretended to be (pretence representations), which 
are distinct from representations of the real world (primary representations). Primary 
representations, on Leslie’s model, feature in everyday perception and cognition. 
                                                
16 Also see Varga (2011). Rakoczy et al. speak of shared intentionality, which might be confusing, as 
they do not mean that the representations are shared. Rather, they refer to some mutual capacity to 
understand each other’s intentions that drives the joint pretence. On that note, they may not consider 
the inherently individualistic example of the banana-phone play as genuine play. 
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Their main job is to provide a "literal and sober'" account of the world, and to 
represent accurately. The current perceptual situation (there being a banana) then will 
be represented, e.g., by tokening a sentence in the Language of Thought such as “that 
is a banana.”  
 Leslie tries to explain how perception of a real banana can invoke a “this is a 
phone” representation, in such a way that the latter is not taken seriously. Primary 
representations do not explain how children can engage in symbolic play like the 
banana-phone play. Here, the pretender is at risk of representational abuse. This is 
the danger of applying the signifier (“banana”) and another signifier (“phone”) to the 
very same object in a way that makes no sense. It is a conceptual problem, because 
the signifiers apply only to specific objects (e.g., “banana” only applies to an actual 
banana). According to Leslie, unless these representations are somehow kept apart, 
the pretenders are at risk of confusing the banana and its properties with those of a 
phone.  
 Of course, pretenders do not make this sort of mistake. For this reason, Leslie 
concluded that there must be a decoupling mechanism present in the cognitive 
architecture of those capable of pretence. The decoupling mechanism marks (or 
makes a copy of) the primary representation (‘this is a banana’) and decouples it into 
a pretence representation (‘this is a banana’*). According to Leslie, manipulations of 
pretence representations can be made this way (such as transforming ‘this is a 
banana’* to ‘this banana is a telephone’) without losing the original representation 
(‘this is a banana’). Decoupling allows ‘normal semantics’ to be suspended, and the 
pretence representation to be treated as a purely formal object.17 Moreover, Leslie’s 
decoupling mechanism requires a manipulator (sequence ‘I PRETEND’), which 
manipulates the expression (‘this is a banana’*), thereby, allowing for manipulation of 
content to be cut free from literal connotations. Then, an interpreter allows the 
decoupled expressions to be anchored to parts of primary representations and, 
                                                
17 To quote Leslie (1987, p. 417): “Suppose we start with a representation of the current perceptual 
situation, for example, this is a banana. This is decoupled to “this is a banana.” Because its normal 
semantics has been suspended, the expression can be manipulated freely without fear of abusing the 
normal representational system existing outside this context. So, for example, it will be possible to 
transform the expression “this is a banana” into “this banana is a telephone” while disregarding its 
interpretation. An expression like this banana is a telephone could not arise in primary representation. 
Such nonsense violates the basic design principle of primary representation that it represents in a literal 
fashion. Decoupling, however, allows such expressions to be treated and worked on as purely formal 
objects. (…) Pretend representations do not pose the problem of abuse precisely because their 
semantics are suspended.” 
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thereby, not refer to actual objects (idem, p. 418). Finally, inference rules are part of 
the decoupling mechanism, making inferences on the already decoupled input (“this 
toy elephant is ‘wet’; therefore, it needs ‘drying’). All of these operations are part of 
the same cognitive mechanism. 
           
b) Nichols and Stich’s inference mechanism  
 
Offering the ‘cognitive architecture underlying pretence’ (p. 125), Nichols and Stich 
(2000) posit an inference mechanism that incorporates a cluster of smaller 
mechanisms (e.g., Possible World Box and UpDater). Unlike Leslie, they do not posit 
special ‘pretence representations’, or mental representations with pretend contents, 
that do the explanatory work. Instead, they only speak of ‘initial premises’, which are 
akin to Leslie’s primary representations, that feature in the special structure of the 
cognitive mechanism called ‘Possible World Box’ that then takes care of the 
representational abuse.  
 Initial premise is an assumption that determines what is to be pretended (e.g., 
that the child is “going to make a phone call with the banana” or, in a restaurant play 
context, “that one person is a waiter and one a customer.” The content of the initial 
premise specifies the impending pretence play episode. The premise is a proposition, 
which represents a specific situation and which can be evaluated. Initial premises 
form scripts. Scripts are hypothetical scenarios (Funkhouser and Spaulding, 2009) or 
event representations (Mitchell, 2002), which detail the way in which certain 
situations typically unfold. Scripts have plans that guide action or sets of rules of what 
to do. According to Nichols and Stich, scripts “play an important role in guiding and 
constraining the description of a possible world which gets elaborated in the course of 
a pretense episode” (2002, p. 126-127). They provide general structure to pretence 
episodes, but need not themselves be accurate descriptions of the world. Moreover, on 
Nichols and Stich’s account, pretence involves a distinct type of attitude: supposing 
(alongside believing and desiring). The primary representations, which form initial 
premises, are what the pretender supposes about what the world would be like.  
 Then, the pretender’s “cognitive system must start generating thoughts and 
actions that would be appropriate if the pretense premise were true” (Nichols and 
Stich, 2000, p. 119). The initial premises enter the Possible Worlds Box (henceforth: 
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PWB), leaving the Belief Box with the true beliefs (e.g. “this is really a banana”) and 
the Desire Box (really wanting to play banana-phone) intact.18 The PWB contains 
tokens of primary representations, whose function is “not to represent the world as it 
is [domain of the Belief Box] or as we'd like it to be [domain of the Desire Box], but 
rather to represent what the world would be like given some set of assumptions that 
we may neither believe to be true nor want to be true” (2000, p. 122). In addition, 
Nichols and Stich posit an “Up-Dater” component of the overall mechanism, whose 
function is to ensure that the beliefs that go into the PWB remain fresh and intact. 
This is how Nichols and Stich (2000) explain tea party play:  
 
Early on in a typical episode of pretense, our theory maintains, one or more initial pretense 
premises are placed in the PWB workspace. So, for example, as a first approximation we 
might suppose that in Leslie's tea party pretense, the episode begins when a representation 
with the content We are going to have a tea party is placed in the PWB. What happens next is 
that the cognitive system starts to fill the PWB with an increasingly detailed description of 
what the world would be like if the initiating representation were true. Thus, in Leslie's tea 
party scenario, at the point in the pretense where Alan has just turned the green cup upside 
down has been added to the PWB, the child's cognitive system has to arrange to get The green 
cup is empty in there too” (p. 122).19         
 
 Thus, the PWB plays the same role as Leslie’s decoupling mechanism, which 
is to quarantine the pretence-initiating representations, and thereby avoid 
representational abuse and conceptual confusion (Nichols and Stich 2000, p. 136). 
This account is said to be simpler than Leslie’s as it does not require additional 
metarepresentational structures, and it provides a clear place for storing intact primary 
                                                
18 By a ‘box’, Nichols and Stich refer to a metaphor, or a “notational device for distinguishing 
representations that have systematically different functional or computational properties” (2000, p. 
136).  
19 In the original version of this paper, Nichols and Stich spoke of the banana-phone game: “Early on in 
a typical episode of pretense, our theory maintains, one or more initial pretense premises are placed in 
the PWB workspace. So, as a first approximation we might suppose that in the banana/telephone 
scenario the pretense initiating representation would be one with the content: [This banana is a 
telephone]. What happens next is that the cognitive system starts to fill the PWB with an increasingly 
detailed description of what the world would be like if the initiating representation were true. In the 
banana/telephone case, the PWB presumably comes to contain representations with contents like the 
following: People can use this thing [the banana] to talk to other people who are far away. In order to 
talk to people using this thing, you have to put one end near your ear and the other near your mouth. 
When someone wants to talk to you on this thing, it goes "ring, ring." etc.” (Unpublished, see 
http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research%20Group/Publications/ACTOP/actop.html). 
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representations (Belief Box). Only the relevant token primary representation that 
forms the initial premise has to be manipulated.  
 However, it is debatable whether Nichols and Stich’s model can claim to be 
superior to Leslie’s model in its economic value and simplicity. For example, Nichols 
and Stich do not explain why these and not other primary representations form the 
initial premise, or where the PWB came from. Even assuming, for argument’s sake, 
the existence of PWB, it is questionable how it could hold a detailed description of 
the entire world in which a banana would be a phone; there are presumably close to 
infinite descriptions that would fit the bill. In addition, this model fails to capture the 
sense in which the pretence is not serious (for example, it does not explain why 
children do not, in reality, expect someone to pick up on the other side of the 
‘banana’), unless more descriptions of the relevant kind are added. Thus, we have 
reasons to question whether the inference mechanism is simpler in any way from the 
decoupling mechanism.  
 
(c) The proposal of intentionalists and summary 
 
According to Rakoczy et al. (2005), for pretence act to occur one agent must 
understand another agent as an intentional agent. To do that, the agents must posit 
(full-blown) representations of social engagements, or dialogic cognitive 
representations (Rakoczy et al., 2005, p. 684). The cognitive representations 
underlying collaborative activities must contain at least two hierarchical levels: a 
higher one for the shared goal and a lower one for the joint intentions, with at least 
two sets of action plans in the joint intentions. The higher cognitive representations 
that are said to explain shared goals behind a pretence act (“representing myself and 
the other sharing a goal”, e.g., “playing doctors”) and lower cognitive representations 
that are said to explain initial joint attention (representing action plans or roles, e.g., “I 
will be a doctor and I’ll do X, you will be the patient and do Y”) (idem, p. 684). Thus, 
some structures on their model are mentioned, such as ‘action plans’ that the agents 
must have, on which dialogical representations are built.  
 To summarise, while I have not exhausted all possible explanatory models and 
explanations, it is clear that the main explanatory proposals posit mental 
representations, whose contents are said to do the required explanatory work. The 
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pretence mechanisms include contents that are propositions and have conditions of 
satisfaction. For example, the banana-phone play would not count as pretend play 
without the child being able to think counterfactual thoughts like ‘there is imaginary 
voice coming out of this banana’, regardless of whether additional metarepresenting is 
required or not.  
 As is especially clear in the models of Leslie and Nichols and Stich, mental 
representational contents and cognitive mechanisms are important in explaining how 
pretence occurs. According to Leslie, the primary representations manipulated in the 
decoupling mechanism explain pretence; ‘pretence representations’ allow thinking as 
if one thing were another. According to Nichols and Stich, the initial premises 
manipulated in the PWB component of the overall inference mechanism explain 
pretence, which they see as behaving as if one thing were another. In that respect, 
they provide cognitivist answers to the question of how pretence works. Whether their 
answers are satisfactory or not will not be fully assessed in this thesis, although there 
are reasons to be sceptical of them (as briefly mentioned in section 2.2 (b)).  
 So far, what has been addressed is how mental representations work. But what 
has not yet been properly addressed is why mental representations and cognitive 
structures were posited in the first place? If mental representational contents do the 
explanatory work, what work do they actually do? This will be addressed in the next 
section.  
 
2.3 Functions of mental representations in pretence (or why they were posited) 
 
To Leslie, the decoupled pretence representations play a crucial role in explaining 
how one can think of and act upon states of affairs that are not the case while being 
aware of what is the case. As summarised by Varga (2011), Leslie’s account explains 
the following aspects of pretence: object substitution (using an object as if it is 
something else, e.g., using a banana as a phone); attribution of false properties 
(ascribing a pretend property to something, e.g., pretending that the doll’s dry hair is 
wet); and making a reference to an absent object (the invention of an imaginary 
object, e.g., feeding the doll invisible cake, and referring to it as if it were present). 
Leslie claims to be providing a response to Huttenlocher and Higgins’ (1978) 
challenge, which is to explain the difference between mere functional play and 
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pretend play of children. Functional play demonstrates knowledge of conventional use 
of objects (banana as food), but in pretence play, the objects are used 
unconventionally (banana as phone) (Leslie 1987, p. 124). As explained, Leslie 
appeals to the decoupling mechanism, suggesting that the primary representations 
would be used in functional play and decoupled pretend representations are used in 
pretend play. Furthermore, this mechanism also explains how pretenders can 
distinguish between what is real and what is not real without getting confused (what I 
will call having ‘double knowledge’), as well as it explains why there are elaborations 
in pretence. Presumably, the ability to make inferences, an ability considered to be 
inherently representational, is invoked in the explanatory mechanism to explain how 
children follow-up on their pretence and remain in appropriate roles. Finally, apart 
from explaining individual pretence, Leslie builds on his model in order to try to 
explain how children can correctly respond to pretence games initiated by others.20 In 
acts of pretending with others, the crucial factor enabling pretence is, for Leslie, the 
pretender’s ability to “infer from what the other is literally doing to what he or she is 
pretending” (p. 423). 
 Mental representational structures that feature in the ‘behaviourist’ accounts of 
pretence are posited to explain pretence by addressing the question of how to get the 
pretence started; as mentioned, this is done by, e.g., the pretender’s initial premise, 
which the pretender must produce to initiate or frame a pretence act. Moreover, 
mental representations seem to be required to remain or persist in a pretend role, via 
inferential and non-inferential elaborations. Nichols and Stich claim that making an 
inference enables correct sorts of play. Inference is not only drawn from the initial 
premise (“I’m going to play phone”), but also from current perceptions that determine 
what kind of play would be allowed (the banana’s size and shape), the agent’s 
background knowledge (that’s how phones are held) and memory of what has already 
happened in the game (relevant to more elaborate games). To stay in the pretence 
game, the actor must draw on all of these inferences, and supposedly, keep them in 
mind at all times. In addition, the mental representations of the initial premises and 
                                                
20 Leslie claims that to understand pretending in others, “It would be useful for the infant to have some 
way of marking information from pretend contexts to distinguish it from information from serious 
contexts. It would be more useful if the infant had some way of representing that someone was 
pretending, what the pretend was, and how the pretend related to the literal acts. If an infant could do 
all this, he or she might be able to join in the fun and elaborate on the pretense begun by someone else” 
(1987, p. 516). 
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inferences implicate demonstratives (such as ‘that’ and ‘this’), which apparently 
allow the pretender to constantly refer to the object of the game as part of the pretence 
act. Furthermore, mental representations allow the actor to stay in pretence as they 
draw the pretence boundaries with scripts. Finally, mental representations are also 
posited to explain how context-appropriate play is produced, which is by being part 
of the right sort of propositional knowledge (“that is how we make phone calls”).  
 There are many other roles that mental representations play in pretence that 
are not discussed by Leslie and Nichols and Stich, but which are important to other 
pretence theorists. It is worth mentioning additional functions such as the strategy-
testing function, motivating function and normative function. I will explain these in 
order. According to Currie (1995), the function of the mechanisms underlying 
imagination (which is also relevant for pretence) is strategy-testing, which is running 
a simulation of possible courses of action. 21  Mental representations underlying 
hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning allow the actor to engage in this form of 
trial-and-error before taking on a course of pretend action. Moreover, Currie explains 
how agents decide whether and how to proceed in the pretence act: they evaluate the 
initial premise as “fun/not fun” or “good/not good” and calculate “if fun, then 
proceed”, “if scary, do not proceed”, thereby playing the motivating role. Rakoczy et 
al. (2005) also give the mental representational structures a motivating function. They 
explain how children can engage in joint pretence and follow the stipulations of the 
other, thereby, playing according to some unspoken rules of the game. Rakoczy et al. 
claim that since children play appropriately in specific pretence scenarios, the relevant 
rules must somehow be represented. They explain how children can make and follow 
rules when playing. They either need to represent the common inference rules (e.g., 
when ‘water’ is poured on the toy elephant, it is now ‘wet’), or their own rules (e.g., 
‘this rock will now signify a cake’). Overall, while there are three distinct models of 
pretence in the literature, they are united in at least one interesting way. All of them 
commit to some form of mental representationalism. Whether or not they regard 
pretence as representational by its very nature, they all posit mental representations of 
some or other kind as playing substantive roles in the best explanation of pretence.
 To summarise, what this section will do is bring out the many and varied 
                                                
21 “Strategy testing," Currie writes, "is, on my hypothesis, the proper function of the imagination: the 
function appeal to which explains why we have the faculty of imagination (…) Daydreaming and 
fantasy, along with imaginative involvement with fictions, are made possible by a system that already 
exists for other purposes: the running of simulations" (Currie 1995, p. 158). 
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things mental representations might be doing in pretence, without tying them back to 
the specific explanatory proposals. It will group and discriminate the various 
functions that mental representations are hypothesised to play in explaining 
pretence.22 Below is a list of questions (taken from the accounts described above) that 
the cognitivist theories of pretence we have looked at hold: 
 
i. How do children think of or use an object “as if” it is something else? In short, how 
 do children play in an imaginative way?          
ii. How do children get pretence started, remain or persist in a pretend role, 
 follow-up or elaborate on their pretence, produce context-appropriate play or 
 play in a structured way? In short, what guides children in pretend play?  
iii. How can children not lose track of reality, hold a distinction between what is real 
 and what is not real, switch between pretence and reality, and why they are not 
 confused by pretence?23 In short, how do children know what is real and what 
 is pretend? 
iv. Why do children choose to engage in pretence in the first place? Why do children 
 choose one pretence act over another? In short, what motivates pretence? 
v. How do children participate in joint or shared pretence and follow the stipulations 
 initiated by the others? In short, how do children engage in joint pretence? 
 
 The capacities invoked to answer these questions are (respectively):  
 
i. Imagining. Imagination is generally said to be representational (see Gendler, 2011). 
 It is said to, i.e., enable counterfactual thinking or simulating perspectives.  
ii. Forming and following Mental Plans and Models. They are said to allow rule-
 following in a game, as well as development of and partaking in more 
 complex pretence. 
iii. Double-Knowledge. This capacity of knowing what is real and what is not real is 
 said to be required to not confuse pretence with reality. 
                                                
22 This task is important to the thesis, as it will show which functions the alternative account will be 
targeting to explain, albeit without positing mental representations. 
23 This question presupposes there is something to be confused about in the first place. It might stem 
from the assumption that there are two worlds, the pretend world and the real world, that creates the 
gap in the first place. 
 34 
iv. Intrinsic Motivation. It drives the child to engage in specific kinds of pretence 
 activities inside the play context.  
v. Having a Theory of Mind. These allow understanding others as intentional agents 
 in order to begin and continue joint pretence. 
 
 These capacities, according to the pretence models, can all be explained by 
positing mental representational structures. However, non-representational structures 
could be introduced to answer the same questions. It may be that some of these 
capacities need not be played or posited in pretence altogether.   
 This thesis will target the first two questions and capacities in detail. It will 
propose that non-mental representational structures such as affordances can explain 
‘how children play in an imaginative way’ (Chapter 5) and ‘what guides pretend play’ 
(Chapter 6). In those chapters, it will be explained why these functions should be 
addressed by an explanatory account of the pretending of pre-verbal children.24  
 
2.4 What is involved in the best explanation of pretence?  
 
This final section engages in a discussion about the theoretical commitments behind 
different philosophical frameworks that can be used to explain mental phenomena like 
pretence. The frameworks are cognitivism and enactivism. Cognitivism is the 
framework that the three available explanatory models of pretence use (even, as it was 
clarified, the so-called ‘behaviourists’ to pretence). Also, to date, there is no 
explanatory model of pretence that is based on the enactive framework. This section 
targets the theoretical commitments of pretence theorists to positing mental 
representations.  
 In the mentioned models, mental representations feature both as essences of 
pretence and as explanatory posits of pretence. How they featured in the mechanism 
was clearly shown in section 2.2. What this section will do is further explicate how 
mental representations feature in underlying theoretical assumptions about what 
pretence is, which shape the explanatory mechanism. The section makes two 
                                                
24 I will not engage in analysing the other functions and subsequent capacities in detail mainly for the 
reason of limited space. However, in the thesis the reader will find that the alternative proposal that 
will be put in place (Chapter 7) could address some of the other aspects of pretence as well, such as 
‘knowing what is real from not real’, what motivates pretence, and how pretence can be played 
together. 
 35 
observations: (1) characterising pretence as representational influences positing 
mental representations in its explanation, which is not necessary, and (2) even if 
pretence is essentially representational, mental representations need not feature in the 
best explanation of pretence. Clarifying this makes a difference to the rest of the 
thesis, where it will be shown that alternative explanations to ones that posit mental 
representations can be given to explain pretence, blocking any arguments that the 
alternative may fail on the account of pretence being essentially representational in 
the first place. The simple point is that even if pretending overall is representing, still 
the mechanisms that enable pretending need not involve mental representations, 
opening up the space for something else to take on their functions.   
 There are different approaches one can take to investigating cognition in 
philosophy of mind. That applies to investigating pretence as well. On the one hand, 
one can seek to know what pretence is and focus on its nature. That is a question of 
determining its essence. On the other hand, one can ask what best explains pretence. 
There is a common view in the present literature on pretence that mental 
representations are involved in both the definition of pretence, and in the make-up of 
the explanatory mechanisms of pretence. However, we should draw a distinction 
between phenomena being representational and their being implemented by 
representational mechanisms, as for pretence. 
 Most theorists who investigate pretence (including the ones mentioned in 
earlier sections) begin by assuming that pretence is representational in nature. Across 
philosophical and psychological literatures, there are many conceptions of pretence or 
characterisations of what is involved in pretence. The features of pretence that are 
said to figure in its explanation across the theories are said to be, in no particular 
order, possession of conceptual knowledge, having knowledge of what is real and not 
real, imagination, intentionality, being in the right mental state, having mental 
attitudes that are ‘belief-like’, shifting perspectives, mapping and following rules, 
symbolic thinking, or meta-communicating (Piaget, 1945/1962; Leslie, 1987; Harris 
and Kavanaugh, 1993; Lillard, 1994; Mitchell, 2002; Nichols and Stich, 2000, 2003). 
Pretence has been traditionally thought of as requiring representational capacities, 
such as, i.e., thinking, imaginations, symbolism, belief-/desire-like states, concepts or 
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knowledge of what is real and not real (called ‘double knowledge’). 25  Then, thinking 
that pretence is representing allegedly justifies the presence of mental plans or models 
(mental representations in the mechanisms) in its the explanation: “The capacity to 
utilize such internal models of previous experience is considered to be the foundation 
of the capacity to engage in mental representation, and hence pretending” (McCune 
and Agayoff, 2002, p. 44). Similar views are held about the mental representational 
nature of the pretender’s capacity to know the distinction between the real and the not 
real in pretence, and the capacity to imagine. In short, pretence theorists make an 
assumption about the nature of pretence, construing the explanandum in 
representational terms. Then, their primary goal is to provide the best explanations of 
pretence, where they posit mental representations.  
 By now, it should be apparent that mental representations get to come into the 
story through both doors: as essences and as explanatory posits of implementation 
mechanisms. The pretence theorists in question are not analytic philosophers; on the 
contrary, they engage in cognitive science, claiming to be offering substantial 
explanations of how pretence comes about. To that aim they posit mental 
representations of some kind to figure in their best explanations of how pretending is 
accomplished (as seen in section 2.2). However, they also assume that pretending is a 
species of mentally representing. As Ramsey (2007) points out, “the distinction 
between theories that posit representations and theories that try to explain 
representation is not as sharp as one might assume. A large number of cognitive 
models – indeed, perhaps the majority – do a little of both” (p. 36). 
 This leads to the first observation:  
 
 1: Characterising pretence as representational influences positing mental 
 representations in its explanation. 
 
 Simply put, how one thinks about the topic influences how one proposes to 
explain it. In the case of pretence, being attracted to characterise pretence as 
                                                
25 Double Knowledge is described as having to  “entertain two representations of a single situation, one 
literal/veridical/real and the other nonliteral/distorted/pretend/imaginary, simultaneously, without 
confusion, and deliberately” (Russon, 2002, p. 237). Imagination is described as implying “some 
displacement from the reality plane and thus meaning transformations relative to the meaning that the 
actions and the objects involved would have were they considered “literally” (Veneziano, 2002, p. 60), 
where meaning transformations can be understood as manipulations of representational contents. 
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essentially a representational phenomenon leads scholars to think that one needs to 
explain pretence by positing mental representations. The tendency to characterise the 
explanatory posits in line with the analytic posits about essences is not justified, and 
leaves hostages to the fortune of how one characterises the phenomenon in the first 
place. For example, should one characterise pretence differently (as, a set of 
dispositions or behaviours), then one would presumably not seek out mental 
representations to explain it, but suggest other dispositional or behavioural 
explanations. 
 Nonetheless, even if a phenomenon is taken to be representational in nature, 
this does not justify positing mental representations to figure in its best explanation. 
This leads to the second observation:       
           
 2) Mental representations need not figure in the best explanation of 
 pretence even if pretence is representational in essence.  
 
 Simply put, even if it turned out to be true that pretence is essentially 
representational, still one could propose to explain it without positing mental 
representations. One should not assume that pretence being representational requires 
its mechanisms to be representational. Even if some phenomenon is essentially 
representational, it need not use mental representations in explanations of how the 
phenomenon arises. Consider linguistic practice as an example. Language can be said 
to be a representational activity, in essence. To use language, in all its forms, is at root 
to represent how things are, one way or another. However, being able to use language 
does not necessitate positing a mental representational mechanism.  
 Pretence may be similarly characterised as a representational activity, as is 
linguistic activity. By representational in nature, I mean having the quality of 
referring or symbolising, which many theorists accept about pretence (Piaget, 1962; 
Huttenlocher and Higgins, 1978; Rakoczy et al., 2005; see section 1.2 in Chapter 1). 
We see such characterisation plenty in the literature, where pretending is understood 
as symbolising (e.g., Lillard, 1994): in pretence, something stands for or symbolizes 
something else, so in that respect it is representing something else. The main point is 
that we can separate the question of whether one needs to posit mental representations 
to implement pretence, even if it seen as a representational activity. Even if when 
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we’re pretending, we’re representing, what enables us to pretend (or represent) need 
not involve mental representations. That would be analogous to saying that a house 
has to be made out of little houses; it is simply an unnecessary move. Just as with 
language, it is logically possible for pretence to be essentially representational, while 
mental representations need not be posited in its best explanation. What follows from 
this argument is that non-mental representational explanation of pretence can be given 
even if pretence is essentially representational.  
 
Conclusion 
                      
This chapter has shown that, to date, mental representations are posited in the best 
explanations of pretence. The available explanatory models of pretence 
(metarepresentational, behaviourist, intentionalist) are all cognitivist models. They 
assume pretence to be a representational activity, and use mental representations to do 
the relevant explanatory work in pretence mechanisms they propose. The target of this 
thesis is showing that mental representations need not be posited in the best 
explanation of pretence.  
 This chapter plays an important role in securing this target for two reasons. 
First, it shows the status quo of available explanatory models of pretence, which all 
use mental representations in their explanations. This clarifies what competition a 
non-mental representational explanation of pretence, the target of this thesis, is facing. 
Second, this chapter opens up the door for defending the view that such non-mental 
representational explanation of pretence, if achieved, can explain pretending 
regardless of how pretending is conceptualised. That is because whether some 
phenomenon P is representational or not, it does not follow that mental 
representations figure in the best explanation of P. In fact, there may be no mental 
representations involved in the implementation, even if the activity itself is 
metaphysically representational.  
 The chapter brackets any potential challenges from cognitivist interlocutors 
about the need to posit mental representations in best explanations of cognitive 
phenomena. It opens the door for pretence to be reconceptualised without positing 
mental representations in its essence, as mental representations are to play an 
explanatory role. Thus, the chapter allows bracketing further analytic or conceptual 
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arguments about the nature of pretence, and focus solely on what features in the best 
explanations of pretence, as well as how such explanations will look without positing 
mental representations.  
 Having secured the focus of the thesis, the next chapter looks at the kinds of 
explanations cognitivists propose. As clarified in section 2.2, available explanatory 
models of pretence posit mental representations in mechanisms of pretence, and in 2.3 
it was clarified that mental representations were posited play specific functions in 
pretence. The next chapter clarifies what kind of explanation enactivists can propose 
that do not posit mental representations.  
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Chapter 3. The Nature of the Enactive Explanation  
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify what type of explanation an enactivist may 
provide in response to the explanations provided by cognitivists. Cognitivists give 
mechanistic explanations of cognitive phenomena, including pretence, and such 
explanations make use of mental representations. This chapter is a prelude that will 
show what an enactivist explanation can look like, and whether it can also be 
mechanistic. The thesis aims to provide an affordance-based explanation in terms of a 
dynamical story. This chapter shows that even dynamical explanations could be 
construed as mechanical explanations, when understood in a wide sense.  
 Considering the nature of the enactivist explanation is important for the thesis 
as it opens up the possibility of interpreting the novel proposal of a non-mental 
representational explanation of pretence, provided in subsequent chapters, as a 
genuine alternative explanation of pretence to the explanations provided so far. The 
chapter addresses the commitments behind different philosophical frameworks 
(cognitivism and enactivism) with regard to their explanatory methodologies. It shows 
that these philosophical frameworks make use of different conceptual tools (mental 
representations and affordances, respectively), which has implications for what 
methods of explanation of cognitive phenomena they typically rely on (mechanistic 
explanations or covering law explanations, respectively). However, to secure the 
claim that a possible non-representational explanation of pretence provides a genuine 
counter proposal to representational explanation, it is important to show that 
enactivists could be seen as providing the same explanatory method as cognitivists, 
which is to refer to a mechanistic explanation. This has to do with understanding what 
the criteria are of mechanistic explanations. The chapter shows that enactivists can 
provide genuine rival explanations of phenomena like pretence, as the dynamical and 
affordance-based explanatory structure of enactivist explanations can count as a 
species of mechanistic explanations, in which there is no reason to think that mental 
representations figure as proper parts. Such a structure is a wide and situated 
mechanism, which incorporates both the animal and the environment as components 
of its explanatory mechanism.  
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 This chapter is part of the larger argument of the thesis. It sets the stage for 
developing the affordance-based explanatory structure and applying it to pretence in 
succeeding chapters. It clarifies that while the enactive explanation of pretence will be 
complex and multi-faceted, it need not posit mental representational structures, yet it 
still should be considered as a genuine alternative explanation of pretence (as opposed 
to a mere ‘re-description’) that stands in sharp contrast to mental representational 
explanations of pretence proposed by cognitivists. The chapter clarifies the 
background dialectic of the thesis. It also connects to other bigger debates, such as on 
the nature of mechanistic explanations (see Chemero and Silberstein, 2008), and it 
situates the discussion about pretence in these debates. It clarifies the sense of the 
alternative proposal. This chapter does not yet address the enactivist non-
representational explanation of pretence, and does not engage with specific aspects of 
pretence at all. Instead, it aims to bracket general worries about providing such 
alternative explanations. This chapter is crucial in clarifying the differences between 
types of explanations currently provided by enactivists. It also shows what types of 
explanations could be provided by enactivists, and discusses whether they could count 
as mechanistic explanations understood in a broad way.  
 The steps in the analysis of this chapter are the following. Firstly, section 3.1 
clarifies that enactivists usually propose covering law explanations of cognitive 
phenomena unlike cognitivists, who provide mechanistic explanations. Section 3.2 
discusses the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in general. Section 
3.3 addresses the worries of enactivists concerning mechanistic explanations of 
cognitive phenomena. Section 3.4 proposes alternative conceptions of mechanistic 
explanations (Zednik, 2011; Bechtel, 2009) and introduces the concept of a wide and 
situated mechanism. It further argues that the notion of wide and situated mechanism 
is compatible with enactivist explanations and could be endorsed by enactivism. 
Finally, section 3.5 addresses some of the worries concerning dynamical explanations 
as wide mechanistic explanations. The chapter concludes with showing that 
dynamical explanations could be understood as mechanistic explanations, but even if 
they ultimately are not mechanical, the explanations provided by enactivists about 
pretence will be illuminating either way.  
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3.1 Enactivist explanations in light of cognitivist explanations 
 
Enactivism contrasts cognitivism both on its theoretical commitment to positing 
mental representations, and as concerns methodological strategies for studying 
cognition. Many E-theorists, such as radical enactivists, do not seek to explain 
cognition at all, but re-describe it ala Wittgenstein (1953) (see Hutto and Myin, 
2013). Other E-theorists such as embodied cognition theorists and ecological 
psychologists, who do attempt to explain cognitive phenomena, rely not on 
mechanistic explanations, but on providing covering law explanations (Varela et al., 
1991; Chemero, 2009). 26  The target of this section is to showcase the methodological 
commitments of enactivists in light of the ones of cognitivists, examples of whose 
methods we have seen in the previous chapter. This section further clarifies the 
commitments of both groups of theorists. On the one hand, cognitivists have been 
following Marr (1982) in providing scientific explanations. They propose to study 
cognition mechanistically, which entails a reductionist approach to get to the 
components of cognition, such as underlying mental representational structures.27 On 
the other hand, enactivists, when engaging in providing explanations, provide only 
covering law explanations such as dynamical explanations. This section describes in 
more detail the enactivist approach to studying cognitive phenomena, opening up the 
space for understanding enactivist explanations mechanistically in later sections.  
 Cognitivists follow Marr’s (1982) explanatory trichotomy. These are different 
levels on which we can explain a phenomenon. Marr and Poggio’s (1976) paper is 
famous for introducing a differentiation between levels of explanation, originally 
applied to perception. They approached perception from a computational standpoint, 
treating it as an information processing system. As such, they distinguished three 
levels of abstraction in analysing perception: 
                                                
26 For the purposes of the argument in this chapter, the distinction within the E-theorist camp, such as 
between enactivists, radical enactivists, radical embodied cognition scientists and ecological 
psychologists need not be made, as they all importantly contrast with cognitivists in the same way. As 
Chemero (2009) clarifies, “Ecological psychology’s core concepts—perception for action, direct 
perception, affordances, environmental information—form the core of the embodied cognition 
movement” (p. 86), and he defines “radical embodied cognitive science as the scientific study of 
perception, cognition, and action as necessarily embodied phenomena, using explanatory tools that do 
not posit mental representations” (p. 28-29). Hence, for simplicity’s sake, I will refer to all e-theorists 
as ‘enactivists’, as not positing mental representations is the key feature of enactivism, and in this 
thesis, this is the most important feature of e-theories. 
27  The cognitive architecture with posited mental representations often forms the explanatory 
mechanism underlying the cognitive phenomena, as seen in Chapter 2. 
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1. Computational level: What the system does and why it does these things, 
2. Algorithmic level: How the system does what it does, 
3. Physical level: How the system is physically realised (neuronal structures).28 
 
 Since Marr’s consequent paper (1982), the three levels of explanation have 
become popular in many fields. Following Marr’s methodology results in breaking 
down even complex cognitive phenomena like ‘mindreading’ to simpler components 
in order to explain them. For example, Nichols and Stich propose to explain 
‘mindreading’ with a cognitive mechanism. They write that the goal of their theory is 
to “try to explain mindreading (or some other complex cognitive capacity) by positing 
functionally characterised underlying mechanisms with capacities that are simpler 
than the capacity they are trying to explain” (2003, p. 10-11). This explanatory 
hierarchy is also endorsed in different fields; aside from perception and cognition, it 
has even been applied to understanding social cognition, such as empathy (see, for 
example, Gallese, 2001).29  
 Cognitivists typically explain how the system works by positing mechanistic 
structures on the algorithmic level, and the algorithmic level is the level of 
explanation where mental representations are most often posited (although mental 
representations are known to feature in the computational levels as well, as essential 
to the phenomenon). Enactivists, however, have an entirely different approach to 
studying cognitive phenomena. The next part discusses the main theoretical and 
methodological commitments that are shared by most enactivists.  
                                                
28 Stich and Nichols (2003), who make use of this distinction, clarify: “Marr’s highest level, which he 
perhaps misleadingly called the computational level, presents an analysis of the cognitive capacity to 
be explained. The analysis given an explicit account of what the system underlying the capacity does 
and decomposes the system into a set of simpler subsystems. (…) At Marr’s second level, which he 
calls the algorithmic level, the theory provides formal procedures or algorithms for accomplishing each 
of the tasks into which the initial target task or capacity has been decomposed. The third, or physical 
implementation, level explains how the algorithms are actually executed by some real physical system 
– typically some part of the brain. On Marr’s view, the three levels are largely independent of one 
another (p. 10)”. 
29 Although Gallese (2001) does not explicitly refer to Marr’s explanatory distinctions, it is clear in his 
work that he considers that there are such different levels of understanding empathy: the experience or 
phenomenology of empathy (what we could call the computational level); the mechanism of simulation 
and action representation (the algorithmic level), and the firing of mirror neurons in the brain (the 
physical level). 
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 Enactivists disagree with cognitivists on several points. Firstly, according to 
enactivists, cognition is not first and foremost representation, with respect to both the 
essence of cognition and its implementation. As Varela et al. (1991) claim,  
 
(Enactivism) questions the centrality of the notion that cognition is fundamentally 
representation. Behind this notion stand three fundamental assumptions. The first is that we 
inhabit a world with particular properties, such as length, color, movement, sound, etc. The 
second is that we pick up or recover these properties by internally representing them. (…) We 
propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is 
not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a 
world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world 
performs (p. 9). 
 
 Secondly, enactivism proposes the study of living organisms, and describes 
autopoietic systems in their environments (Varela at al., 1991; De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo, 2009). In this respect, enactivism is modelled on ecology, and ecological 
approaches stress the dynamic relation between organisms and their environments. 
That is a sharp methodological contrast to the cognitivist approaches, which focus on 
manipulation of mental representations or representational mapping in the 
implementation of cognition. Enactivism also stresses the activity of the animals in 
their environments (Hutto and Myin, 2013). It considers the animal in its context, 
focusing on the role of the objects and other animals in this context in shaping the 
animal cognition (Froese et al., 2012; De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2009). The outcome 
of taking an enactive approach to cognition is that it finds mentality in the interactions 
between organisms and environments, not in encapsulated mental representations. It 
can be concluded that enactivist explanations of cognitive engagements will not posit 
mental representations, but rather will focus on dynamic interactions of the animals 
with their environments, which shape the animal cognition.  
 In general, enactivists do not provide mechanistic explanations because living 
things are importantly unlike machines (though, as will be argued below, their 
rejection of mechanistic explanations may be premature). Instead, they propose 
covering law explanations. Covering law explanation (Kelso, 1995) “relies on a 
lawlike regularity to deduce properties of the target phenomenon” (in Zednik, 2011, p. 
242). In The Embodied Mind, Varela et al. claim that  
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(The) overall concern of the enactive approach to perception is not to determine how some 
perceiver-independent world is to be recovered; it is, rather, to determine the common 
principles or lawful linkages between sensory and motor systems that explain how action can 
be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent world (idem, p. 173). 
 
 An example of covering law explanation outside philosophy and cognitive 
science is the law of gravity. It provides us with a principle of why objects fall to the 
ground, explaining this phenomenon without having to posit an underlying 
mechanism in the object (although the explanation will advert to the mass of the 
object, determined by its parts, their nature and configuration).30  
 Dynamical explanation, thus, is said to be a case of covering-law explanation. 
As Chemero (2009) claims, “radical embodied cognitive science uses dynamical 
systems theory to explain cognition” (p. 199). Therefore, it may seem that providing a 
mechanistic explanation is not compatible with it. As he suggests, “it might seem that 
dynamical cognitive science—at least the dynamical cognitive science of radical 
embodied cognitive scientists who do not posit mental representations—is like 
phenomenological physics in that it posits no underlying mechanism for cognition. It 
is essentially a phenomenological psychology: it is successful when it provides 
equations that capture observed behaviour” (p. 80-81).  
 Clearly, there seem to be two different kinds of explanatory projects 
occurring. This could be considered as a slight problem for a non-representational 
alternative explanation of pretence, as it can be easily argued that enactivists and 
cognitivists are engaging in different work, and in virtue of that, they do not provide a 
threat and need not be in each other’s way (Aizawa, 2014). However, that conclusion 
also seems principally unfitting for those enactivists who do provide an explanation. 
The strong contrast between the theoretical and methodological commitments 
motivated enactivists to counter cognitivist proposals, not just provide different 
characterisation of the phenomena. Moreover, enactivists should not only want to 
provide a different story to that of cognitivists, but one that substantially rivals it. This 
                                                
30 However, it may be observed that once one counts the wider context as including two objects and a 
force (the earth, the falling object, gravity), this looks like a mechanism in the relevant sense. In that 
case, the ‘covering law’ explanation could describe a mechanism. Considerations along these lines 
motivate Zednik’s (2011) proposal that covering law explanations are in the end compatible with 
mechanistic explanations (as will be discussed below).  
 46 
motivates the question: if mechanistic explanations are the right way to explain 
cognitive phenomena (and that is a big if), could enactivists propose a mechanistic 
alternative explanation of cognition in order to give a contrasting explanation of 
cognition? This chapter will propose to answer ‘yes’ to this question; enactivists 
could be said to provide explanations that are mechanistic explanations, albeit when 
mechanism is understood in a proper broader sense. Thus, first, it is imperative to 
clarify what is actually meant by a mechanism and a mechanistic explanation.  
 
3.2 Mechanisms and mechanistic explanations 
 
It is useful to begin with the most influential conception of a mechanism in 
contemporary philosophy of science:  
 
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component 
operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism, manifested 
in patterns of change over time in properties of its parts and operations, is responsible for one 
or more phenomena” (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2010, p. 323; see also Machamer et al., 2000; 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007).  
 
 Mechanisms have typically two explanatory heuristics: decomposition and 
location (Bechtel and Richardson 1993, Craver 2007, Zednik 2011). Location refers 
to the idea that mechanisms typically occupy some space in time. Decomposition can 
be structural and functional. “Structural decomposition involves breaking a complex 
system down into a collection of simpler subsystems or parts. (…) Functional 
decomposition involves re-describing the behavioral phenomenon as a series or 
organised collection of simpler behaviors or operations” (Zednik 2011, p. 240-241). 
Those operations are working parts of the system and are realised in the system from 
which the target phenomenon arises.  
 This shapes what is to be considered as a mechanistic explanation. According 
to Zednik (2011), “mechanistic explanation consists of describing the particular 
organized collection of parts and operations that is responsible for the behavioural 
regularity being explained” (p. 240). Furthermore, mechanistic explanation is “a form 
of reductive explanation; phenomena manifested at one level of organization are 
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explained in terms of component parts and operations at lower level(s) of organization 
(Machamer et al., 2000; Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008)” (idem, p. 261).31  
 Considering these characteristics, it may be clear why talk of mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanations has been applied in philosophy by cognitivists. Withagen et 
al. (2012) point to Descartes (1641/2007) as the exemplar promoter of applying 
mechanistic methodology in philosophy. They claim, “Ever since the mechanization 
of the worldview (…), philosophers and later psychologists have generally tried to 
understand mind and behaviour in mechanistic terms” (p. 250). With regard to 
decomposability, Dennett (1993) famously discusses the method of breaking the 
phenomenon into smaller ‘component’ mechanisms that are ‘stupid’, and therefore, 
have lesser functions, in his version of homuncular functionalism. In short, 
decomposition has to do with ‘breaking down’ the phenomenon to aspects or 
component parts in order to facilitate its explanation by targeting its smaller 
component parts. The idea is that scientists can ‘get beneath’ the phenomenon to 
explain it better, as well as interpret and put together the component parts to make 
better predictions about when the phenomenon would resurface.32  
 Decomposability seems to fit with cognitivist explanatory strategies, which 
break down the phenomena they study (e.g., cognition) into smaller component parts 
(e.g., mental representational structures).33 Cognitivists also appeal to the location 
heuristic of the mechanism. The idea is that the cognitive mechanism reflects some 
sort of internal processing, which is often said to be located in the brain. Hence, it 
would look like mechanistic explanations have a good fit with cognitivist types of 
explanations.  
 Ramsey (2007), however, cautions against considering mechanistic 
explanations of cognitive phenomena as necessarily representational. He argues that 
                                                
31 Other, yet similar, definitions include Bechtel’s (2009): “mechanism is understood as an organized 
set of parts that perform different operations which are orchestrated so as to realize in the appropriate 
context the phenomenon in question. The explanation itself consists of representing the mechanism and 
showing how it realizes the phenomenon (often by simulating its functioning)” (p. 544).  
32 For example, Aizawa (2014) says that mechanistic explanations “explain the behaviour of a whole 
organism primarily by appeal to the behaviour of one of its components” (p. 24). “The idea is that 
entities do things in virtue of their parts doing qualitatively distinct things” (p. 33), and in mechanistic 
explanations, “higher level properties are realized by properties of lower level individuals” (p. 34). 
33 This seems to follow Marr’s explanatory hierarchy, but it does not. Marr suggested that his levels of 
classification are to be treated independently of one another. Thus, the structure of the mechanism of 
the algorithmic level should not make a difference to the description of the phenomenon on the highest 
computational level. However, this is the one key point that many decide not to follow Marr on, 
assuming that the findings about one level will make a difference on the findings about the other (see, 
for example, Nichols and Stich (2000), p. 11). 
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even if we speak of an internally localised cognitive mechanism, it need not be mental 
representational: 
 
(Try) to imagine what a non-representational account of some cognitive capacity or process 
might look like. (…). Presumably, at the very least, it would need to propose some sort of 
internal processing architecture that gives rise to the capacity in question. The account would 
perhaps invoke purely mechanical operations that, like most mechanical processes, require 
internal states or devices that in their proper functioning go into particular states when the 
system is presented with specific sorts of input. But now notice that in the current climate, 
such an account would turn out to be a representational theory after all. If it proposes 
particular internal states that are responses to particular inputs, then, given one popular 
conception of representation, these would qualify as representing those inputs (idem, p. 3) 
 
 Hence, there is no good reason to think of the cognitive mechanism as 
necessarily representational. Ramsey cautions against counting mere correlations 
between internal states and inputs as amounting to a satisfying notion of mental 
representation. Thus, Ramsey’s point opens the door for non-mental representational 
explanations to be counted as mechanistic. 
 Having said this, there still seems to be a better fit between mechanistic 
explanations and cognitivist explanations, even if mechanistic explanations do not 
commit to mental representationalism. Below I will consider some of the worries 
enactivists have with mechanistic explanations.    
 
3.3 Enactivist worries concerning mechanistic explanations 
 
On the surface of it, both heuristics of mechanisms do not seem to fit the enactivist 
framework, making mechanistic explanations unlikely to be appropriated by 
enactivists at face value. With regard to the decompositionality heuristic, enactivists 
would not study cognition by breaking it down to component parts in virtue of 
following the principle of Gestalt psychology, namely, that the properties of the parts 
are not the properties of the wholes. As enactivists are interested in studying cognition 
holistically through a dynamic interaction of the animal with its environment, they 
would argue against the method of singling out properties of cognition and studying 
those independently of cognition as a whole. Moreover, decomposition of phenomena 
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(and looking for underlying mechanisms) may not be best applicable to studying 
complex social phenomena (Leuridan, 2012), and hierarchical decomposition may 
even result in contradictions.34  
 There is also a clear worry with the location heuristic. If there is a specific 
location of the cognitive process, it is natural to locate it in the brain. For example, 
computational models “specify the component operations of a mechanism that are 
then (in ideal cases) localised in neurobiological component parts” (Zednik 2011, p. 
241). Location may imply internalisation of the cognitive processes, such as by 
encapsulation of the cognitive processes in a representational structure, most often 
found in the brain and realised by neural structures alone. As localisation of the 
mechanism suggests its internalisation (and, possibly, representationalism), it is not 
compatible with the non-representationalism and worldly interactionism of the 
enactive accounts.  
 However, these heuristics are actually not problematic for potential enactive 
explanations. One can speak of components on the enactive account: these would be 
the animal (or animal effectivities) and its environment (or environmental 
affordances), as well as situational factors that shape the context an animal found 
itself in (such as other animals), forming a wide-mechanism.35 Also, the location 
heuristic is not threatening, considering the argument for the extended mind (Clark 
and Chalmers, 1997) that many enactivists endorse. Locating the mechanism is not a 
problem, as one can locate it between the animal and the world.36 Thus, the heuristics 
of mechanisms on their own should not be threatening for enactivists.  
                                                
34 For example, Fuchs (2014) proposes to explain autism and schizophrenia through a hierarchical 
decomposition of intersubjectivity. He says that autism is best conceived of as a disorder of primary 
intersubjectivity, and as a result, “the later development of higher-order capacities such as perspective-
taking and language acquisition is impaired as well” (2014, p. 6). This is a problem for explaining 
‘morbid rationalization’ in autism, which is the ability of autistics to compensate for the lack of 
primary, embodied understanding by engaging in ‘Theory of Mind’. Presumably, Theory of Mind 
capacity would require perspective-taking and language acquisition to already be in place. Hence, 
autistics should not have the capacities to compensate for their lack of primary intersubjectivity, if 
these capacities are necessarily preceded by primary intersubjectivity. For full argument, see Rucinska 
(2015). 
35 The concept of effectivities and affordances is explained in more detail in Chapter 4. How other 
animals/people can shape the relevant contexts is targeted in Chapter 7.  
36 Localising the mechanism may be more problematic that locating it, as that suggests a location 
somewhere short of the animal-world combination as being where the ‘real’ action happens. However, 
even if there is a significant difference between localising and locating, there is no reason to assume 
that the location heuristic must speak to the former and not to the latter. Moreover, even if the 
mechanism were to be localised only within the animal, following Ramsey (2007), there is no reason to 
suppose it would have to involve mental representations.  
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 However, there is a further worry of enactivists about applying mechanistic 
explanations to understand cognitive phenomena in general. The worry has to do with 
positing inputs and outputs that mechanisms usually mediate. It is the cognitivist 
approach to understanding cognition that pertains to an input-output relation between 
the mind and behaviour, whereas the ecological approach as appropriated by 
enactivists stresses the dynamic relation between the organism and its environment, 
where there is no longer a clear divide between inputs and outputs; the behaviour of 
real physical systems may be exhibiting non-linear effects (Chemero and Silberstein, 
2008). This pertains to the type of explanation to be offered. As explained in 3.1, 
enactivism proposes the study of living organisms and describes autopoietic systems 
in their environments. What follows is that relying on dynamicism seems to be 
incompatible with mechanistic explanations, where mechanisms are provided with 
inputs and produce outputs in a linear fashion. Varela at al.’s (1991) comparison of 
the autonomous systems with mechanical systems shows why rarely can an operation 
of an organism be specified through input/output relations:  
 
Such autonomous systems stand in sharp contrast to systems whose coupling with the 
environment is specified through input/output relations. (…) Under very restricted 
circumstances can we speak as if we could specify the operation of a cell or an organism 
through input/output relations. In general, though, the meaning of this or that interaction for a 
living system is not prescribed from outside but is the result of the organization and history of 
the system itself (idem, p.157). 
 
 Similarly, Withagen et al.’s (2012) explanation of why Gibson’s ecological 
psychology tried to do without mechanisms is that they wanted to step away from 
understanding behaviour “in terms of a chain of causes and effects”, as merely 
responding to stimuli (p. 250). Withagen et al. clarify Gibson’s reasons for stepping 
away from mechanistic explanation in the following way: 
 
Gibson (1966, 1979/1986) took aim at the mechanistic conceptions of perception and action. 
He argued that animals should not be conceived of as machines, the responses of which are 
caused by stimuli from the environment. In addition, he claimed that the mechanistic 
conception of the environment as matter in motion is inappropriate to understand animal 
behavior. In Gibson’s view, the animal’s environment consists of action possibilities, which he 
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termed affordances. (…) After all, if the environment consists of opportunities for action that do 
not cause behavior but simply make it possible, animals appear as being autonomous, making 
their way in the world. They are not mere puppets pushed by the environment like machines; 
rather, animals have agency  (p. 250).  
 
 Clearly, in these readings ‘mechanistic’ means having to do with providing 
causal explanations in terms of acting on impulses from the outside, not just having 
component parts or location. What this understanding of mechanism assumes is that 
there is a linear chain of causes and effects (stimulus-response), so a causal notion of 
mechanism cannot be what enactivists are after.  
 In short, the worry is that even if component parts and location heuristics can 
be accounted for, it seems like mechanistic explanations posit chains of causes and 
effects, whereas dynamical systems explanations do not, which is why enactive 
explanations are not mechanistic. However, in reply, it will be shown that this is not a 
worry if one follows a notion of wide and situated mechanism. The wide and situated 
mechanism addresses the heuristics of mechanisms and deals with the worry of input-
output causation. It has non-hierarchical components that engage in continuous 
reciprocal causation, and its location is extended, in the sense that the components are 
distributed in the world. Furthermore, continuous reciprocal causation is how the 
component parts stand in relation to each other; the causality is simply not linear. The 
next section will clarify how wide and situated mechanisms can be used by 
enactivists.  
 
3.4 Alternative conception of a mechanism: wide and situated 
 
It is possible to understand enactivist claims as compatible with mechanistic 
explanations, when mechanism is understood in a certain way. This is the notion of 
what I will call ‘wide and situated mechanism’. It is based on arguments of Zednik 
(2011) and Bechtel (2009) about the nature of mechanisms. 
 Zednik (2011) argues that dynamical explanations “may be uniquely able to 
describe mechanisms whose components are engaged in complex relationships of 
continuous reciprocal causation (p. 239), and that dynamical explanations “actually 
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resemble mechanistic explanations rather than covering-law explanations” (p. 245).37 
He argues that dynamical explanations “are well suited for describing extended 
mechanisms whose components are distributed across brain, body, and the 
environment” (p. 239). The structural decomposition can be made to (minimally) two 
working parts: animal and environment (see Beer 2003).38 Applied to enactivism, the 
enactive mechanism could involve taking the environment and taking the animal as a 
single whole, with no representing. For example, animal’s know-how (effectivity) can 
be said to be a component located ‘in the body’, the object’s possibility for action 
(affordance) could be said to be located ‘in the environment’, and the interaction 
between them to be located in the world (to be further explained in Chapter 4). 
Moreover, “insofar as it makes sense to talk of body and environment as the 
components of a (minimally) cognitive mechanism, that mechanism is extended; its 
components are distributed across brain, body, and environment” (Zednik 2011, p. 
256). The parts and operations of the mechanism are distributed; it could include 
social structures and the cultural environment.  
 Moreover, Zednik argues that continuous reciprocal causation implies that the 
interacting parts do not work in a linear fashion as inputs and outputs. The continuous 
reciprocal causation can be thought of as a form of coupling between the components. 
As he clarifies,  
 
Coupling is a technical term that applies whenever two or more dynamical systems mutually 
influence one another’s change over time. In the philosophical literature, such mutual 
influence is more commonly known as continuous reciprocal causation (Clark, 1997). 
Systems B and E are engaged in a relationship of continuous reciprocal causation because 
each system’s behavior is at all times determining, as well as being determined by, the 
other’s. (idem, p. 258)  
 
 Hence, a wide and situated mechanism does not posit chains of causes and 
effects, but speaks of dynamical reciprocal causation. The causation takes place 
                                                
37 “Therefore, a closer look at dynamical cognitive science will reveal that the extant philosophical 
conception of mechanistic explanation may have underestimated practicing scientists’ willingness and 
ability to describe increasingly complex and distributed cognitive mechanisms” (p. 239). 
38 Beer (2003) relies on the explanatory heuristic of structural decomposition to identify two working 
parts—the embodied brain on the one hand and the environment on the other (…). Then, he provides a 
detailed dynamical analysis to describe the operations associated with each part (see Zednik 2011, p. 
254).  
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within the whole, and as such, it could be said that it does not count as having inputs 
and outputs in the traditional sense.  However, in a non-traditional sense, it could be 
said that affordance-effectivity pairs are ‘inputs’ and banana-phone actions are 
‘outputs’ within the wide mechanism of pretence. 
 Dynamical reciprocal causation is not a problem for affordance-based 
explanations. For example, following Chemero (2009), affordances causally interact 
with each other (p. 151).39 Even understood as components of a wide and situated 
mechanism, they can causally interact with effectivities and other affordances as part 
of the wide mechanism, without being causes of behaviour in the sense of providing 
inputs, where the outputs are pretence behaviours. As mere possibilities for action, 
affordances are not causes of behaviour on their own; but when coupled with 
effectivities and contextual factors that forms the whole system, it is this system that 
is a reciprocally causal system, where behaviour takes place. Affordances and 
effectivities (as further explained in Chapter 4) can be said to form components of a 
continuously reciprocating causal system. What is clear is that affordance-based 
explanation is thus compatible with a type of a mechanistic explanation.  
 Second, I propose to follow Bechtel’s (2009) notion of a mechanism, whose 
components interact in complex ways, and which is situated in a wider context. As 
Bechtel claims,  
 
Accounts of mechanistic explanation have emphasized the importance of looking down—
decomposing a mechanism into its parts and operations. (…) But once multiple components 
of a mechanism have been identified, researchers also need to figure out how it is 
organized—they must look around and determine how to recompose the mechanism. (…) 
Researchers also need to look up—situate a mechanism in its context, which may be a larger 
mechanism that modulates its behavior. When looking down is combined with looking 
around and up, mechanistic research results in an integrated, multi-level perspective” (p. 543).  
 
 By ‘looking around and up’, Bechtel emphasises both the organisation of a 
mechanism and its situatedness in a wider context (‘larger mechanism’), where 
external factors further affect the behaviour of the mechanism. For example, by the 
original mechanism he refers to the visual system, claiming that it cannot be best 
                                                
39 “(A)ffordances and abilities (…) causally interact in real time and are causally dependent on one 
another” (idem, p. 151).  
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understood without also situating it in a context where the animal, or object in the 
environment, is moving.  To explain the mechanism of perception, the movement of 
the perceiver and of the objects in the environment should be appealed to, as these 
impact what information is received by the visual system. Bechtel (2009) claims that is 
in line with Gibson’s notion of “optic flow, the manner in which the visual scene 
changes as a result of the relative movement of the perceiver and objects in the 
environment” (idem, p. 558). Thus, he concludes that  
 
The behavior of mechanisms is highly dependent on conditions in their environments, 
including any regularities that occur there. But these are not discovered by looking inside the 
mechanism to the parts and operations or how these are organized. They must be discovered 
by examining the environment in which the mechanism operates and employing tools 
appropriate for such inquiry (idem, p. 559).  
 
 Such understanding of a mechanism (as wide and situated) is compatible with 
the explanations proposed by enactivists thus far. One example of a dynamic type of 
explanation is how Varela at al. (1991) explain colour experience. For example, 
Varela at al. (1991) discuss how colour experience comes about. To understand 
colour experience, they claim that we need to understand factors that simultaneously 
shape the experience, such as appearance of the object (structured by basic colours 
and their dimensions such as hue, saturation and brightness), illumination, retinal 
structures, neuronal structures (structures of visual pathways that participate in the 
perception of colour), the relationship between colour and motion, and other sensory 
modalities. They claim that “our coloured world is brought forth by complex 
processes of structural coupling” (p. 164), and they demonstrated that “colour as an 
attribute is intimately involved with other attributes of our perceived world” (p. 165). 
According to them, colours belong to a shared biological and cultural world. They 
conclude with a claim that to explain colour one must “locate colour in the perceived 
or experiential world that is brought forth from our history of structural coupling” (p. 
165).  
 As explained in section 3.1, Varela et al. look for ‘common principles’ or 
‘lawful linkages’ that can be generalised to all perception to explain what colour 
experience is. However, they look also at the relation of the sensory-motor systems to 
the external world, one that is perceiver-dependent. Their explanation of colour 
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experience includes the description of the physiognomy of the human eye as well as 
the influence of the colour concepts of our culture on perception. In that respect, it 
could be considered as a wide and situated mechanistic explanation. Similarly, 
Chemero (2009) speaks of component parts of the dynamical system,40 and having 
components is a general heuristic of a mechanism as explained in section 3.2. 
Chemero looks for a unified model to explain the coupling of brain-body-environment 
systems and interpersonal (social) coupling, looking for models to be applied to data 
that are “widely applicable and easily extensible” (p. 100). Again, such models could 
be interpreted in the line of a wide and situated mechanism.  
 It is clear that neither Varela et al. nor Chemero speak of mechanisms, but 
provide their explanations as covering law explanations. If dynamical explanations 
are compatible with wide and situated mechanistic explanation, why might it be a 
good idea to think of them as such? Dynamical models understood as providing 
covering law explanations describe general principles, and thus, account for a wide 
range of cognitive phenomena.41 Hence, their explanations are not restricted to any 
particular system. This may be why providing covering law explanations it is not best 
applicable to pretence, because there may not be a unique phenomenon of pretending 
that would pertain to such a law: pretence could come in various forms, as shown in 
section 2 of Chapter 1. Since there is no one unitary account of what can be covered 
by the phenomenon of pretence, it may be difficult to establish whether what we are 
trying to explain can have one law. Moreover, what follows from generalisation is de-
contextualisation. Giving laws of pretence would also imply de-contextualising 
pretence, so that the component parts of a functioning mechanism would always hold 
for any pretence case. The worry is that perhaps the phenomenon of pretence is so 
varied that we can only at best speak of exemplars, or specific tokens of pretence acts 
(such as banana-phone play as chosen for this thesis).42 However, we don’t have that 
                                                
40 “In dynamical explanations, the behavior of a system is typically explained in terms of collective 
variables (…). A collective variable describes the emergent, coordinated activity of the parts that 
compose a dynamical system, and in some cases this collective variable is causally responsible for the 
component parts” (199).  
41 As Chemero claims, “This would allow scientists to predict that other, similar behaviors would fall 
under the same covering laws, and then test that prediction” (2009, p. 85).  
42 According to Hutto (2011), a similar problem faces the study of consciousness. Hutto claims, “There 
is no utterly clean, clear and neutral account of what exactly is covered by the concept of consciousness. 
The situation reflects, and is exacerbated by, the fact that we speak of consciousness in many different 
ways in ordinary parlance. A consequence of our multifacious uses of the concept is that is impossible 
to define its essential characteristics through conceptual analysis. (…) Recognizing that attempts to 
provide a philosophically robust definition of consciousness are likely forlorn, a standard tactic for 
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worry when speaking of a wide and situated mechanism. The mechanism can be 
multiply realisable, in the sense that different environmental affordances and different 
animal effectivities, in different contexts, can form the wide and situated mechanistic 
structures of individual pretence acts, explaining individual pretence acts and 
accounting for their variety. While covering law explanations could be expressed in 
terms general enough for very varied explanations (e.g., explaining all cognition as 
dynamic interplay of affordance-effectivity pairs), mechanistic explanations certainly 
capture the multiple realisability of the affordance-effectivity pairs required for 
specific cases of pretence.43  
 
3.5 Some challenges and a conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the explanations of enactivists and cognitivists can share 
a framework. Securing this strengthens the position of enactivist explanations in the 
overall debate about what best explains pretence, allowing for enactivist explanations 
to be considered as rival explanations to cognitivist explanations. This chapter has 
shown that mechanisms could be compatible with enactivist explanations, if 
enactivists take on a liberal notion of mechanism that is wide and situated. What 
results is that an enactivist explanation could be considered as a genuine rival 
explanation to cognitivist explanations, in the sense that both would then propose a 
kind of mechanistic explanation.  
 However, one challenge a cognitivist may pose is that a wide mechanism is 
not a mechanism in the relevant sense. The worry with the wide mechanism might be 
that the entire world could count as a mechanism, and the boundaries between the 
mechanism and the environment are not clearly set. To that, it may be answered that 
only the relevant parts of the environment, causally contributing to the phenomenon 
in question, would count as part of the mechanism. Demarcating the relevant 
                                                                                                                                      
isolating core features of consciousness is to provide clear-cut exemplars as specimens” (p. 35). While 
Hutto speaks of consciousness (not pretence), and the inability to agree on one definition of 
consciousness (not account), his words speak to pretence and its available accounts as well.  
43  Multiple realisability here does not necessarily refer to the functionalist notion of multiple 
realisability. As Chemero and Silberstein (2008) claim, “The non-linear dynamics of a cognitive 
system will be multiply realizable or “mappable” with respect to a wide array of diverse underlying 
causal mechanical stories about the same processes. This is not the metaphysician’s multiple 
realizability of types, but the real world universality of dynamical patterns and the equations that can 
describe them.  If models are accurate enough to describe observed phenomena and to predict what 
would have happened had circumstances been different, they are sufficient as explanations” (p. 9).   
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environmental factors is crucial. Examples of relevant environmental factors to 
pretence will be proposed in the last three chapters that deal with pretence 
specifically. Thus, while the mechanical explanations of cognitivists and enactivists 
would be importantly different, they are both mechanical explanation in the sense that 
they both pertain to the qualities and heuristics of mechanism respected in scientific 
terminology.  
 Moreover, one may worry that true mechanisms are to be found only in the 
neural implementation levels, so speaking of wide mechanism is not a genuine 
alternative to cognitivist proposals. However, by mechanism, I do not speak of 
mechanism on Marr’s (1982) ‘physical’ level. The contrast is to the ‘algorithmic’ 
level, where mental representational structures of pretence theorists were found. 
Following Marr’s (1982) distinction, pretence could be re-described also in the 
following way: 
 
1. First level, which addresses the question “What does the system do?” 
describes the pretence phenomenon. 
2. Second level, which addressed the question “How does the system do it?” can 
have (at least) two possibilities: mental representations or affordances.  
3. Third level, which addresses the question of implementation of pretence at the 
physical level.  
 
 Applied to pretence, it can be asked what structures or capacities need to be in 
place for an animal to pretend. The ‘wide mechanism’ explanation only aims to 
provide an alternative to the mechanisms proposed by cognitivists, such as inference 
mechanism or decoupling mechanism (as per Chapter 2 section 2). However, while it 
may be that the enactive explanation does not provide explanations on the physical 
level, it is also the case that the cognitivist explanations do not provide causal 
explanations on the physical level either (for example, they do not specify how the 
unorthodox pretence representations get selected). Thus, as the theorists mentioned in 
that section do not engage in providing further explanations about mechanisms 
involved on physical or neural levels of their explanatory accounts, neither is this 
account obliged to do so. 
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 Finally, what happens to the alternative explanation if it turns out that 
mechanisms are not wide and situated after all? In the end, it might turn out that 
dynamical explanations are not mechanical explanations; such worry may be raised 
not only by cognitivists, but by enactivists as well. The rest of this section addresses 
the question of what follows in case the dynamic explanations are in the end not 
compatible with mechanistic explanations.  
 Even though decompositionality and location are agreed to be important 
features of mechanisms, it is still hotly contested what properties mechanisms have. 
There is an on-going debate about whether mechanisms can be understood as wide, 
and whether they are still mechanisms. Some think that mechanistic explanations are 
compatible with dynamical explanations (e.g., Zednik, 2011). Others challenge this 
(Chemero and Silberstein, 2008). To date, this is still a lively, evolving debate. 44 At 
this moment, the outcome of this debate cannot be controlled. It would take another 
thesis to adjudicate the question of mechanistic explanations. However, given that 
enactivists provide dynamical explanations, and their explanatory tools are, i.e., 
affordances, there can be two outcomes of this debate:  
 
1) Dynamical explanations are covering-law explanations, and these are 
compatible with mechanistic explanations. Hence, affordances can form 
mechanisms.  
2) Dynamical explanations are covering-law explanations, and these are not 
compatible with mechanistic explanations. Hence, affordances cannot form 
mechanisms.  
 
 If it turns out that 1 (that dynamical explanations can be incorporated into 
mechanistic explanations, under much wider and looser notion of mechanism), then, 
as it has been shown, there is room for two parallel mechanistic explanations of 
cognitive phenomena available, and the enactivist mechanistic explanations would 
pose direct threat to cognitivist mechanistic explanations.  
 If it turns out that 2 (that old-school dynamical explanations are in the end not 
mechanisms), then it could turn out that giving mechanical explanations of 
                                                
44 The topic of mechanical explanations in philosophy of mind is a current one, as can be seen by the 
conference topics of this year; for example ‘Modeling minds’ workshop (University of Nijmegen, 
March 2015) or “Situatedness and models of mechanisms” in ‘Situating Cognition’ conference 
(University of Warsaw, October 2015).  
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phenomena like pretence is not appropriate to begin with. To elaborate, if it turns out 
that there is some truth to the affordance-based account, it would show that 
mechanistic explanations were a miss, and so cognitivists’ mechanistic explanations 
are not good explanations of cognitive phenomena altogether. It a sense, the 
alternative non-mechanical explanation would still be a threat to cognitivists’ 
mechanical explanation, if not a greater one, as it would turn out that the notion of 
mechanism is not useful for the purposes of explaining cognitive phenomena on the 
algorithmic level of explanation to begin with; dynamical explanations go beyond 
mechanical explanations.  
 To sum up, whether dynamical systems are mechanisms hangs heavily on the 
outcome of the debate about the nature of mechanisms. This chapter cannot settle this 
debate. However, it can show what difference the possible outcome of this debate 
would make. If dynamical explanations are mechanical, the affordance-based 
alternative is a genuine alternative proposal. If dynamical explanations are not 
mechanical, and it turns out that affordance-based alternative is right, then it would 
have meant that mechanistic explanations are not appropriate to target cognitive 
phenomena like pretence. Given any outcome of the debate, proposing affordance-
based explanations is a valuable contribution. 
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Chapter 4. Getting Clear about Affordances  
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify how to think of affordances with respect to 
explaining pretence. There is an on-going debate in the affordance literature about 
how to conceive of affordances. The term ‘affordance’ has been used in multiple 
ways in the literature on ecological psychology (incl. Gibson (1979/1986, 1982), 
Turvey (1992), Reed (1996), Chemero (2003, 2009), Noë (2004), Withagen et al. 
(2012), Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014)); the concept of an affordance features in 
Gestalt psychology and phenomenology as well. The only consensus with respect to 
affordances is that they are possibilities for action. What they are (properties or 
relations), where they are located (in the environment or cutting across the 
environment-animal dichotomy), and how they work (whether they invite actions or 
not) is a matter of great debate. 
 This chapter seeks an answer to the question: how should we think of 
affordances as explanatory posits of pretence? It will clarify the possible ways of 
thinking about affordances, and on that basis suggest the most fruitful way to think 
about affordances in order to provide a coherent affordance-based explanation of 
basic pretence. This chapter does not aim at settling the issue on what affordances 
really are. Rather, it sets the stage for an analysis of how different conceptions of 
affordances impact the ways they can explain pretence. Showcasing the many 
conceptions of affordances serves to show which one in the end might do the best job 
to explain basic pretence. Overall, the analysis in this chapter serves the purpose of 
determining which of the available conceptions of affordances is best suited to 
explain pretence, specifically to be applied both in the guiding and imagining aspects 
of pretence discussed in the consecutive Chapters 5 and 6.  
 The chapter will unfold as follows. Section 4.1 begins with briefly 
characterising the notion of ‘affordance’ as proposed by Gibson (1979/1986). It 
shows the discrepancies in the original notion that lead to development of many novel 
interpretations and accounts of affordances. It also addresses an important question 
about the relationship of affordances to ‘meanings’. It clarifies the use of the notion 
‘meaningful’ with respect to affordance-based explanations, and addresses the worry 
that referring to meanings is covertly referring to mental representations. Section 4.2 
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describes some of the novel accounts of affordances available in the literature, 
creating a map of the available (and relevantly different) ontological positions on 
affordances one can take. 45  This section clarifies what follows from different 
ontologies of affordances with respect to explaining pretence; it shows that different 
conceptions of affordances come with different ontological commitments about them 
(forms of realism, idealism, and relationism).46 It also compares the ontologies of 
affordances to the ontologies of colour in order to explicate these commitments. 
Section 4.3 comments on the effect of the different pretence conceptions and their 
ontologies on explaining pretence. It builds on what the affordance theorists think 
plays more important role in explaining the phenomenon at hand (whether it is the 
environment, the animal, or whether the burden is truly divided equally), and applying 
it to pretence context. Finally, section 4.4 proposes the most fruitful way of thinking 
about affordances for the purposes of explaining pretence. It argues the point that 
conceiving of affordances as dispositional properties of the environment (inspired by 
Turvey, 1992) might best serve the explanatory function of affordance-based account 
of pretence, as it divides the explanatory burden equally between the animal and the 
environment.47 Thinking of affordances as dispositional properties of the environment 
relative to the animal asks for something else (effectivities) to act as the dispositional 
properties of the animal relative to the environment. Introducing effectivities as 
animal-relative counterparts of affordances shows the dynamic relationship between 
the environment and the animal. What their role is will be elaborated on in Chapter 7.  
 
4.1 Gibson’s affordances (incl. caveat on meaning) 
 
The coining of the notion of affordance has been attributed to ecological psychologist 
James Gibson. Gibson (1979/1986) emphasized the relational nature of affordances; 
affordances exist in the environment for the animals. As Gibson famously writes, 
                                                
45 This clarification is important to the thesis as affordances carry in this thesis high explanatory load, 
so determining what ontological positions one can take with respect to affordances is relevant to the 
extend it impacts the explanatory story. 
46 There is a room for a variation of idealism (better thought as antirealism) about affordances when 
one follows Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s (1991) enactive proposal. 
47 It should be clarified that my account is only inspired by Turvey’s, and may not be attributed to 
Turvey as such. Turvey is clear to think of affordances merely in biological terms; for example, the 
nutrients of the environment can be said to have dispositional properties of being ‘edible’. However, it 
is not likely that Turvey would apply the notion of affordance beyond basic biological functions, as 
will be done in this chapter (e.g., to phoneness of a banana).  
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“The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill” (1979, p. 127).  
 On the one hand, affordances are to be placed in the environment. They might 
be thought of as properties of the environment. As Gibson (1982) writes,  
 
The affordances of the environment are permanent, although they do refer to animals and are 
species-specific. The positive and negative valences of things that change when the internal 
state of the observer changes are temporary. The perception of what something affords should 
not be confused with the ‘coloring’ of experience by needs and motives. Tastes and 
preferences fluctuate. Something that looks good today may look bad tomorrow but what it 
actually offers the observer will be the same (idem, p. 410). 
 
 On the basis of this quote, Withagen et al. (2012) explain that affordances are 
to be thought of as mind-independent ecological phenomena. They clarify that 
Gibson’s affordances do not change as the need of the observer changes. As they 
claim, 
 
They are not properties of the phenomenological world that depend upon the state of the 
observer; rather, they are ecological phenomena that exist in the environment. (…) Hence, 
according to Gibson, affordances are opportunities for action that exist in the environment 
and do not depend on the animal’s mind (2012, p. 251).  
 
 On the other hand, Chemero (2003) clarifies that to Gibson, “an affordance 
(…) is a resource that the environment offers any animal that has the capabilities to 
perceive and use it. (…) Thus, affordances are properties of the environment but taken 
relative to an animal” (p. 182). Hence, according to Withagen et al., affordances seem 
to be properties of the environment, which exist completely independent of the 
animal, or independent of the animal’s perceiving of them in the broad sense (strong 
realism about affordances), while according to Chemero, they ‘refer’ to the animal’s 
capabilities even though they are only resources of the environment. 
 Moreover, Gibson’s notion of affordance is taken to be rather mysterious. For 
instance, Gibson’s affordances are not clearly properties of the environment; some 
quotes suggest that affordances have a peculiar ontological status. For example, in 
Gibson’s own words,  
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An affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you 
like. (…) It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behaviour. It is both physical 
and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the 
observer” (1979, p. 129).  
 
 Based on this description, affordances seem to go beyond mere animal-
environment coupling; they occupy an ontological space of their own; perhaps they 
can be considered as a relation.  Also, if it is a ‘fact of behaviour’ of the animal, it is 
difficult to understand how they can also be ‘mind-independent’, as the later Gibson’s 
text suggests. 
 The supposed inconsistency has sparked a great discussion, and many 
interpretations of what is the nature of Gibsonian affordances, and how best to think 
of them, have been proposed since (including the interpretations that will be discussed 
in this chapter, such as one of Varela et al. (1991), Turvey (1992), Reed (1996), 
Chemero (2003), Withagen et al. (2012) and Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014)). What is 
most unclear is the particular ontological status of affordances on Gibson’s picture: 
are affordances relational properties of the environment, or are they relations between 
the animal and the environment? A related question arises: what is the relationship 
between the animal and the affordances? In section 4.2 I will describe some of the 
most prominent yet interestingly different conceptions of affordances and attribute to 
them one of these ontological positions: realism, relationism, and even idealism.  
 However, before this, a caveat about the notion of meaning is in order. Gibson 
clearly intended for the affordances to be strongly related to the environment. He 
claimed that the environment is already meaningful in the sense of providing 
opportunities for particular kinds of behaviour: “The meaning or value of a thing 
consists of what it affords” (Gibson, 1982, p. 407). This equates with saying that 
whatever affordances afford can already be seen as meaningful. As Noë clarifies, 
“Gibson took this feature of his theory to be quite radical, for it suggested that we 
directly perceive meaning and value in the world; we do not impose meaning and 
value on the world” (2004, p. 105). According to Gibson, the affordances that are to 
be found in the environment are already meaningful. Hence, the notion of meaning 
does not play a greater role than suggesting that it can be used in a certain way by an 
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animal. For example, to say that the tree is meaningful to an animal that seeks shelter 
is just to say that the tree affords using it as a shelter to that animal.  
 Gibson’s notion of meaning should not be conflated with a conception of 
meaning as being anything like mental content (with respect to being dependent on 
the mind of the animal). In seeing the affordance, we do not impose meaning on it. 
We could say then that an affordance exists only in so far as it has one identity or 
another. For example, a banana affords: eating, grabbing, playing phone with; as such, 
it means all these things: it is a food, an object, a toy, with respect to the dispositions 
of the animal. There is no need to add representational contents to specify what the 
object ‘means’ in use.  
 Also, Gibsonian affordances do not have a normative value. They do not 
specify what the action is good for. Szokolsky (2006) explains that while Gibsonian 
affordances are meaningful, they do not tell us how to best act upon the objects or the 
environment, contrasting them to functional properties of the environment. As she 
proposes, 
 
Traditionally, functional properties are taken to be predetermined properties of objects that 
define what the object is good for – pillows are for sleeping, and knives are for cutting. 
Affordances, on the other hand, are defined as action potentials in relation to the particular 
actor at a more basic level of on-line coordination with the object world (2006, p. 68). 
 
 Hence, although meaningful, affordances are not normative; they are not 
‘good for’ anything, or do not lead to a ‘better action’. In that sense, they are also 
unlike mental representational contents because they do not have conditions of 
satisfaction. One cannot go wrong in acting on affordances; one just acts on different 
affordances.48   
 To conclude this section, in this thesis, ‘means’ will be equated with ‘affords’; 
instead of speaking of new meanings of objects, we can speak of their various uses 
                                                
48 There are some disagreements about how meanings enter affordance-based explanations. Not all 
think that affordances are just meanings. For example, Withagen et al. (2012) and Rietveld and 
Kiverstain (2014) suggest that affordances should be understood as solicitations, or animal-
environment relations that invite behaviours, which are normative in the phenomenological sense, 
because they more strongly invite behaviours that lead to an ‘optimal grip’. Also, on Varela’s picture, 
meaning is not what the environment affords, but what the animal brings forth in the interaction with 
the environment. These positions will be clarified in the next section. Yet, as will become clear, even 
the positions that attribute meaning not to the environment, but to the animal or animal-environment 
relation, do not require positing mental representations. 
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that are afforded in different contexts. Either way, the notion of ‘meaning’ that will 
be referred to is not representational.   
 
4.2 Different conceptions and ontologies of affordances 
 
Presently, some interpretations of affordances and their ontological statuses will be 
proposed. My task is not to settle what is the right way to interpret Gibsonian 
affordances; it is to showcase the available ontological positions one can take (such as 
realism, idealism, relationism) on affordances. Having such an overview will help to 
clarify which affordance-based account is best placed to account for the explanatory 
role of affordances in non-representational account of pretence. Firstly, however, it is 
useful to clarify what ontological positions one could take with respect to affordances. 
The case of colour illuminates how we might think of different ontologies of 
affordances.  
 
a) Ontological variations applied to colour 
 
Discussion about property realism, idealism and relationism has been prevalent in the 
literature on colour (see Maund, 2012). Colour realism holds that an object has 
objective property of colour; colour ‘red’ of an apple exists independently of anyone 
perceiving it. Colour idealism says that colour is not a property of the object, but 
belongs to the subject’s phenomenal or experiential world; a subject, then, only has 
colour experiences. The apple is not ‘red’, only my experience is that of the ‘redness’ 
of the apple. Colour relationism holds that colour is to be found in the world, but only 
in the context of an appropriate interaction. For example, the apple is red, but only 
when I am looking at it. While dependent on the subject, the colour is not just the 
experience of the subject, but it is part of the world, in the sense of being in the 
relations between subject and the world. As Maund (2012) explains, 
 
(There) are no such properties as blue simpliciter, red simpliciter, and so on. What there are, 
instead, are relational properties: blue-for-perceiver A-in-circumstances C1, red-for-perceiver 
B-in-circumstances C2, yellow-for-perceiver D-in-circumstances C3, and so on. 
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 The interesting question about these positions is whether active engagement 
on the part of the subject is required, or only potential engagement, in bringing about 
the property in question. The realist has obviously no problem for the cup to be ‘red’ 
without the subject (the realist would have a problem if the subject was relevant in 
any way in bringing ‘redness’ about). The idealist would have to accept that, without 
the subject, the apple would not be red, as the redness is just in or of the subject’s 
experience. To the relationist, the colour is there in the apple (it exists, as for a 
realist); however, as the property is relational, the colour of the apple is different with 
regard to who perceives the apple. The apple seems to have, theoretically, infinitely 
many colours: that same apple will be red to me, but maybe it would be green to 
someone else. Hence, the apple is likely to be at least red and green at the same time 
(and many infinite other contrary ways).  
 As will be shown, the last characterisation fits with affordances: there are 
many possibilities for action that objects afford to different animals in different 
situations. Hence, if understood as real possibilities for action in the environment, we 
would have to say that there is a possibility of an indefinite number of action 
possibilities one object allows. The interesting question is whether those possibilities 
are latent in the environment, in need of being actualised, or whether they only get to 
emerge in the interaction with the animal. I will show that, on the relationist view on 
affordances, affordances should be not understood as emergent properties. 
 What the comparison to colour achieves is mapping the ontological space of 
how affordances can be thought of, showing important commitments about 
affordances one can have, which are often left unsaid. While these three ontological 
positions about colour may not be exhaustive, they will serve to determine the main 
rivals for an ontological position of affordances. Hence, for our purposes, this rough-
and-ready sketch of main ontological positions of colour will suffice. Understanding 
these commitments, in turn, allows determining which conception of affordance can 
play the relevant explanatory role in a non-representational account of pretence. It 
should be kept in mind that calling the positions of affordance theorists ‘realist’, 
‘idealist’ or ‘relationist’ should be treated lightly, as they may not exactly fit the 
colour profiles. The differences will be made explicit. Presently, I turn to the main 
ontologies of affordances. 
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b) Realism about affordances  
  
One could be a realist about affordances. This is the view that affordances are 
completely independent of the animals and totally dependent on the world.  
 Reed (1996) is considered to be the most dedicated realist about affordances. 
He claims that affordances are properties of the environment that are resources of that 
environment. As resources, affordances play the evolutionary role of selecting the 
animals and their skills. It could be said that they exist in the world prior to animals.  
 Realism about affordances is also promoted by Noë (2004), who follows 
Gibson by describing affordances in the following way: 
 
Things in the environment, and properties of the environment, offer or afford the animal 
opportunities to do things (find shelter, climb up, hide under, etc.). (…) When you see a tree, 
you not only directly perceive a tree, but you directly perceive something up which you can 
climb.  
 
 There are clear similarities between Gibson’s and Noë’s statements about 
affordances in terms of where the affordances are to be found (in the environment). 
They are also directly perceptible, as Noë’s account of sensorimotor perception 
suggests; for example, one not only sees the front of the tomato, but also its back, in a 
holistic act of perception that involves sensorimotor activity (O’Regan and Noë, 
2001; Noë, 2004).49 Noë’s committal to realism about affordances is strong, as aside 
proposing that the environment has real animal-relative properties (the tree affording 
climbing), the environment is said to also have animal-independent properties.50 
   
c) Weak idealism (or antirealism) about affordances 
 
One could hold idealism about affordances. This is the view that affordances are 
totally dependent on the animals and completely independent of the environment.  
                                                
49 O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) sensorimotor account of perception will be further clarified in Chapter 5 
of this thesis, when applied to explaining the imaginative role of pretence.  
50 This can be inferred from his claim: “When you see a tree, you not only directly perceive a tree but 
you directly perceive something up which you can climb,” as if there were two types of things we can 
perceive when looking at a tree: the tree as itself and the tree as affording actions towards it.  
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 To date, no one seems to hold such a strong view. However, arguably, Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991) come close to weak idealism about affordances, where 
the affordances are not completely independent of the world, but totally depend on the 
animal. While Varela et al. emphasise the co-determination of the environment and 
the world, they seem to hold a positively idealist attitude about where the meaningful 
action comes from, even though they reject both idealism and realism in their enactive 
account of cognition. This will be explained below. 
 Varela et al. agree with Gibson that “certain properties are found in the 
environment that are not found in the physical world per se. The most significant 
properties consist in what the environment affords to the animal, which Gibson calls 
affordances” (1991, p. 203). But while they agree with Gibson that there are 
affordances, they disagree with him about how affordances are ‘picked up’. Gibson 
thinks that the affordances do not depend in any way upon the perceptually guided 
activity of the animal, whereas Varela at al. disagree (p. 203). If we follow Varela at 
al., affordances should be understood as dependent on how the animal perceives the 
world. Affordances would be contextualised in an animal-environment dynamical 
whole. This is in line with their notion of enactivism, according to which there are no 
properties of the world independent of the interaction or mutual enforcement.51 
Mutual interaction, or necessary coupling, between the environment and the animal is 
crucial. 
 It is controversial how to read Varela et al. on affordances. On the one hand, it 
is clear where they want to be placed in the ontological spectrum. They say that their 
position lies between classic realism and idealism, as both of those positions ask for 
representationalism. 52 Instead, they propose to speak of enactivism. On the other 
hand, as they place more focus on the capacities of the animal than on the properties 
of the environment in securing affordances, this may give us a cause for attributing to 
                                                
51 “(Enactivism) questions the centrality of the notion that cognition is fundamentally representation. 
Behind this notion stand three fundamental assumptions. The first is that we inhabit a world with 
particular properties, such as length, color, movement, sound, etc. The second is that we pick up or 
recover these properties by internally representing them. The third is that there is a separate subjective 
“we” who does these things” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 9).  
52 “These two extremes both take representation as their central notion: in the first case representation 
is used to recover what is outer; in the second case it is used to project what is inner” (1991, p. 172), 
and “realism infers something particular about the world, how the world is; idealism projects onto the 
world such particular properties” (1991, p. 10). 
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them weak idealism about affordances.53 Several things they say come close to 
suggesting this; for example, “the meaning of this or that interaction for a living 
system is not prescribed from outside but is the result of the organization and history 
of the system itself (idem, p.157).” This reflects Varela’s earlier stand on the origin of 
meaning of cellular organisms. Consider how Varela (1998), first and foremost a 
biologist, discusses this origin:  
 
Meaning can only arise for those systems, which assert their own identity vis-à-vis their 
environment, that is, for systems with a degree of autonomy. (…) In general, however, a 
living system brings forth its own world of relevance, and is not given in advance. The 
meaning of this or that interaction is not given by an outside designer, but is the result of the 
organisation of the system itself and its history (idem, p. 152).  
 
 Hence, Varela et al.’s enactivism promotes a view of affordances that only 
exist or come into existence when there is a self-sustaining organism present. Perhaps 
on Varela’s view we can only speak of the world affording action when it shows up 
for creatures. For example, the affordance of the tree to be sheltered under or climbed 
may only show up to subjects who can do these things and have a specific self-
sustaining organisation; the subject is the one who turns what the world offers into 
meaningful invitations for action, as opposed to, for example, the invitation being 
already present in the environment.  
 Some may think that Varela at al. do not belong to the ‘idealist about 
affordances’ camp, but to the ‘relationist’ one. However, we do not have to settle this 
issue. While global idealism (a view that the world disappears when one closes their 
eyes) or strong idealism (meaning being generated entirely by the mental capacities of 
the animal) definitely cannot be attributed to Varela et al., what can be certainly said 
is that on their account, the organism would play much more important role than the 
environment in securing meaningful interaction. While they stress the partnership 
between the animal and the environment, the partnership is not equal.  
   
d) Relationism about affordances  
                                                
53 As Chemero neatly points out, “For all the noise ecological psychologists make about being realists, 
it is not obvious at the outset that ecological psychology is not a form of idealism, in which 
perceivables exist only when they are perceived. It is a small step from this to a rather silly global 
idealism, in which the world disappears whenever I close my eyes” (2003, 193).  
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One could hold relationism about affordances. This is the view that affordances are 
equally dependent on the animals and their environments. As seen with colour 
relationism, relationism about affordances would claim that affordances are to be 
found in the world (ala realism), but what they invite in a particular circumstance 
depends on how an animal interacts with it.  
 Turvey (1992) could be considered as holding such relational view about 
affordances. He thinks that affordances are real properties of material objects, which  
are also relational: “An affordance is an invariant combination of properties of 
substance and surface taken with reference to an animal” (p. 174). He claims that 
realism about affordances is necessary; he wants to establish that “possibilities for 
action are real or factual states of affairs (i.e., they exist independently of perceiving 
or conception) that are perceived directly” in order to establish that they constitute an 
ontological category (idem). What Turvey suggests is to consider affordances as 
dispositional properties of the environment. As such, they dispose the environment to 
be in a certain way, relative to an animal. He considers a disposition to be a property 
of a thing that is latent or possible. The disposition to act is prior to the action, and it 
is actualised when “conjoined in suitable circumstances” (1992, p. 178).54 Hence, the 
dispositions of the animals pair up with, and are actualised by, dispositions of the 
environment, just as the dispositions of the environment need the dispositions of the 
animal to be actualised. To match the affordances in the environment, we need the 
counterpart dispositions of the animal, or effectivities. Effectivities are also 
dispositional properties. They are organismal complements to affordances qua 
properties of the environment. They complement the affordances.55 They also allow 
affordances to become ‘manifest’. As he claims, 
 
                                                
54 As Turvey explains, “6.1. The disposition to do Y is prior to doing Y. For example, a crystal will 
actually refract light provided that it is refractive to begin with. If it was refractive to begin with, then it 
was so regardless of whether it was exposed to light. 6.2. Dispositionals (or causal propensities) come 
in pairs. For example, (all) light rays are refracted if and only if (some) pieces of matter are refractive. 
Complementarity occurs in the very definition of a dispositional property. 6.3. Dispositionals never fail 
to be actualised when conjoined with suitable circumstances. Disposition and suitable circumstance 
equals actuality” (1992, p. 178). 
55 “Whereas an affordance is a disposition of a particular surface layout, an effectivity is the 
complementing disposition of a particular animal. An effectivity, as the term suggests, is the causal 
propensity for an animal to effect or bring about a particular action, to manifest what is needed for  (an 
action) to be realized” (idem, p. 179). 
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7.1. The circumstances actualising a disposition or causal propensity of a thing Z involve 
some thing X, other than Z, forming part of Z's environment.  
7.2. This X, the complement of Z, must have a disposition matching (in the mathematical 
sense of "dual to") Z, for Z's disposition to actualise (i.e., if Z is refractible - has a disposition 
to become refracted-then X must have a disposition to refract). (1992, p. 178-179).  
 
Hence, objects in the environment (Z) and animals (X) have certain dispositions. 
Affordances are the dispositions of the environment; effectivities are the dispositions 
of the animals. Affordances need to be complemented, or paired with effectivities in 
actualising circumstances, where the dispositions can become manifest.  
 To give an example, an object (an apple) has an affordance of ‘pick-up-
ability’, only if there is an animal that has the effectivity of ‘picking-up’. As 
dispositions, both affordances and effectivities are real in the sense of existing 
independent of each other, but they need each other to be actualised. What this means 
is that the affordance ‘pick-up-able’ of the apple does not emerge in the interaction 
with the animal; it is there, so to speak, dependent on the fact that there exist animals 
that can pick it up. So, unlike classic relationism, there is no need for the animal to be 
acting on the affordance for the affordance to be there. In fact, the affordance has to 
be prior to, or be in place together with the effectivity; it cannot emerge from the 
interaction.56 However, the action of picking it up requires at least the affordances and 
effectivities to be in place.57  
 
e) Realism about affordances understood as relations 
 
The last position I discuss is another form of realism about affordances. Affordances 
on this view are understood not as properties of environments, but as relations. This 
makes a significant difference on how affordances are said to work. This position 
does not have a clear parallel to colour.  
                                                
56 Otherwise, it would not work as a good explanatory proposal. One could postulate that the animal 
must be present for an affordance to come about. Such emergentist position about affordances could be 
appropriated. However, emergentism about affordances would be problematic for using them as 
explanatory tools of interactions like pretence, as affordances are supposed to explain the interaction, 
but could not exist prior to the interaction. The question arises: what came first, affordances or 
interactions? With emergentism, the interaction would have had to be prior to the affordance. 
57 This is not the whole story Turvey proposes about what brings about actions; more will be said in 
this chapter and in Chapter 7.  
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 Chemero (2003) proposes a new ontology of affordances. He does not 
consider them to be properties, but relations:  
 
I argue that affordances are not properties of the environment; indeed, they are not even 
properties. Affordances, I argue, are relations between particular aspects of animals and 
particular aspects of situations. (…) Affordances, which are the glue that holds the animal and 
environment together, exist only in virtue of selection pressure exerted on animals by the 
normal physical environment. They arise along with the abilities of animals to perceive and 
take advantage of them (idem, p. 184, 190).  
 
 What this means is that affordances are features of whole situations that 
involve animals and environments. It is not the object that affords, but the situation. 
Affordances belong to animal-environment system. To operationalise the view that 
affordances are relations between particular aspects of animals and particular aspects 
of the situations, Chemero explains that for a relation ‘affords Q’ to hold between a 
subject and the environment is to say that the environment affords Q to the subject, 
where Q is a behaviour (2003, p. 186-187). Thus, it is the environment (or situation as 
a whole), and not the individual object in the environment, that affords certain 
behaviours. The environmental relata of affordances are features, or aspects, of the 
environment, whereas organismal relata of affordances are animal capacities or body 
scales. 
 With regard to whether affordances exist without animals, Chemero claims, 
 
Affordances do not disappear when there is no local animal to perceive and take advantage of 
them. They are perfectly real entities that can be objectively studied and are in no way 
figments of the imagination of the animal that perceives them. So, ecological psychology is 
not a form of idealism. However, affordances do depend on the existence of some animal that 
could perceive them, if the right conditions were met (2003, p. 193).  
 
 Thus, Chemero clarifies that affordances have the quality of being lovely (ala 
Dennett, 1998). This means that affordances depend on there being a potential 
observer, not an actual act of observation. This feature can exist even if there are no 
animals present. This is a feature of affordances that is similar to the one proposed by 
Turvey.  
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 The idea of the reality of affordances being dependent on a potential animal to 
whom the affordance relates (as opposed to an actual animal that is currently 
interacting with the environment) has been taken up by the last affordance theorists to 
be presently discussed, Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014), who elaborate on Chemero’s 
account of affordances. While Chemero spoke of individual affordances as relations 
between ‘features’ of the environment and the abilities of an organism, Rietveld and 
Kiverstein take the relationship further from a potential animal into a potential form of 
life. They claim, 
 
Affordances are possibilities for action the environment offers to a form of life, and an 
ecological niche is a network of interrelated affordances available in a particular form of life 
on the basis of the abilities manifested in its practices; its stable ways of doing things. (…) (A 
form of life is formed by) “patterns of animal’s behaviour, relatively stable and regular ways 
of doing things.” (…) “An individual affordance is an aspect of such niche” (idem, p. 10).  
 
 On their view, affordances are relations between the environments and the 
whole animal species (what they call a ‘form of life’). Rietveld and Kiverstein claim 
that one should focus on what the relations are between the kind of animal (a ‘form of 
life’) and its ways of living (i.e. its practices) in the environment the animals find 
themselves in. The interaction of animals with their environment is best understood as 
following from their selective openness to available affordances and the self-
organized states of action readiness that are driven by these affordances. 
 Moreover, affordances, on their view, show up in two forms: forming the 
landscape of affordances and the field of affordances. The landscape encompasses all 
the possibilities for animal’s action, even if they are not perceptible or if they cannot 
be acted upon by the animal at a moment. The field of affordances is a subpart of the 
landscape that is available to a particular animal at a particular time. Even though they 
need not be acted upon, the affordances in the field of affordances entail the relevant 
affordances to a particular animal.58 Some call the field of affordances ‘solicitations’ 
or ‘invitations’ as the affordances in the field can solicit or invite particular behaviour 
                                                
58 The distinction between the field and the landscape of affordances could be understood as a type-
token distinction for the animal: the landscape consists of all possibilities for action (type affordances) 
and the field consists of the possibilities for action available to the particular animal in a particular 
situation (token affordance). 
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from an animal. The inviting character of affordances will be explained in more detail 
in Chapter 7.  
 The different ontologies inspire different conceptions of affordances; how one 
understands affordances will come with different ontological commitments. This is 
not a complete list of available accounts, but these accounts have been chosen as 
exemplary ontological positions one can take about affordances. What making these 
distinctions pointed to is a tension between how to think of the environment with 
respect to affordances; whether it plays a big role in explaining pretending, or is its 
role not as big as the one of the animal; finally, is the burden divided equally?59 In the 
next section, the four ontological distinctions about affordances will be applied to a 
case of pretend play, showing how these conceptions of affordances would work for 
explaining basic pretence.  
 
4.3 Why clarifying the ontology of affordances makes a difference to pretence 
explanations  
 
It makes a significant difference which notion of affordance is taken to explain 
pretence. What makes pretence an interesting, yet difficult case, for affordances, is 
that pretence adds another dimension to the story; in pretence, we respond to ‘playful’ 
sets of affordances, not the ‘typical’ ones. For example, we play ‘phone’ with the 
banana, so the banana seems to afford particular behaviour of ‘playing phone with’ to 
us. Explaining how a banana can specifically afford ‘playing phone’ with’ will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. For now, the aim is to establish what the different affordance 
conceptions will say about pretence. The question is simply, what would the 
mentioned positions have to say about how to explain ‘phone’ pretence? Answering 
this question clarifies the problems these positions may have with explaining 
pretence. Knowing these problems allows making a choice with respect to which 
affordance conception may be the best one to explain pretence with.  
 Reed-style realism would have to commit to the view that the ‘phoneness’ 
affordance of the banana exists in the banana as its property, completely independent 
of there being any subjects. Reed would further have to commit to saying that, as long 
as affordances can be used to explain pretence, even ‘phoneness’ affordance of a 
                                                
59 Chapter 7 will further specify what weight the environment and the animal have in allowing pretence 
interactions to occur. 
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banana influenced the types of animals that evolved. Those animals would be human 
beings with the capacities to respond to such affordances in the adequate phone-like 
way (grasping, placing to the ear, talking to, etc.). However, for ‘phoneness’ of a 
banana to exist independently of the animal (and its sociocultural practices of using 
phones) is just not likely. Phones are cultural developments, and would not exist 
without human animals. Hence, given that on this picture, affordances of the world 
select for animals, Reed would have to commit to saying that ‘phoneness’ affordance 
of the banana selected for there to be an animal that can respond to it.60 As this is 
highly unlikely, his notion of affordance would not make affordances good 
explanatory tools of pretence.  
 Varela-style weak idealism would suggest that for things to afford ‘phone-
play’, the subject must have a relevant capacity brought about by autopoietic 
structuring of the agent. In a sense, it is a capacity the subject possesses; the capacity 
in question would be ‘graspability’, ‘pick-up-ability’ and other capacities that amount 
to the capacity ‘playing phone with’. It would have to be said that the subject can use 
this capacity in different contexts, in the presence of different objects. Hence, the 
object would not be as important as the capacity of the subject, or what the subject 
can do with the object. On this account, perhaps ‘phoneness’ affordance could be 
considered as most independent of the actual object at hand (the banana); another 
object would seem to do just as well. On this view, a banana would afford ‘phone’ 
just as much as, presumably, a table. Again, it is not likely that this conception of 
affordance would best explain what we see about how children pretend.  
 Turvey-style relationism would suggest that the banana affords ‘phoneness’ 
only if there is a subject with the effectivity to play ‘phone’ with a banana 
(dispositions that could be shaped by, e.g., the history of interactions with phones) 
and if there are objects with right dispositions to be like phones (such as bananas, due 
to their shape and size resembling that of phones). This story depicts a dynamic 
relationship between the objects in the environment and animals, where the object is 
just as important as the animal that it interacts with. It is not a view about emergence 
of phone qualities in the direct manipulation of the banana by the animal; rather, the 
idea is that the ‘phoneness’ affordance, or possibility for action, is residing in the 
                                                
60 Most likely, Reed would say that the conception of affordance does not extend to socio-cultural 
realm, but belong solely to the biological realm. However, excluding the possibility that affordances 
(possibilities for action) can be social is unjustified.  
 76 
banana only in so far as it is matched with an agent who has latent dispositions (prior 
to the interaction) to manipulate the banana in relevant ‘phonelike’ ways. Only in 
suitable circumstances, such as play context, can the affordance-effectivity pair be 
actualised. This it is a good candidate for the best conception of affordance to explain 
pretence; I will return to it in the next section.61  
 Finally, Rietveld and Kiverstein-style realism endorses the position about the 
affordances as ‘lovely’, which is that they rely on potential, not actual, animals that 
can interact with the environment in relevant ways. What their position shares with 
Turvey’s position is that the animal does not have to be actually interacting with the 
object for that object to have an affordance. Where they differ with Turvey is that 
Turvey speaks about latent dispositions of particular animals, whereas Rietveld and 
Kiverstein speak about capacities that could be found in a whole set of animals, or 
forms of life. Hence, the ‘phoneness’ of a banana would be found in the landscape of 
affordances. This means that we do not look at dispositions of a particular animal, but 
look at practices of types of animals. In the case of pretence, they would have to say 
that there is a practice of playing ‘phone’ that is part of our ‘human’ form of life that 
shapes the landscape of affordances, where cultural niches that practice ‘phone play’ 
exist. On this story, the particular animal is not as important as the animal’s socio-
cultural context that forms the landscape of affordances. The way of using bananas as 
phones is independent on the individual, but not independent of the society the 
individual is part of.  
 However, this is what may be problematic for their account to explain 
pretence. One would have to commit to the idea that as long as there are people in the 
form of life who happen to play with the bananas as phones, the bananas can afford 
‘phones’ to any individual sharing the same form of life, even if that individual does 
hot have a personal history of interactions with bananas as phones. For example, just 
as someone who has never engaged in parkour would have to see the wall as 
climbable (because such practice exists in one’s culture or a form of life), a child 
would have to see the banana as affording phone even if it was never engaged in a 
                                                
61 One might consider my reading of Turvey as overly charitable. As mentioned before (third footnote 
of this chapter), it is unlikely that Turvey would consider ‘phoneness’ to be an affordance; his position 
was applied to unicellular organisms only. Also, one could read him to be more of a realist about 
affordances than a relativist. However, for the sake of showing clear possibilities of how to think about 
affordances with respect to pretence, I have classified Turvey’s account to be most promising to 
develop. His framework inspired the elaborations on the notion of affordances for pretence featuring in 
section 4.4.  
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context involving phones. This is also unlikely. At best, their account could explain 
how the child can see the banana as affording phone to other people in their form of 
life. Yet, if the question is how to explain individual child’s pretence, Rietveld and 
Kiverstein’s story is not the most promising.  
 Moreover, the object would not be as important as the entire environment. 
This follows from Chemero’s proposal that that affordance is not considered to be a 
property of objects (like the banana), but to be a relation between particular aspects of 
animals and particular aspects of situations. As such, the ‘phoneness’ would not be of 
a banana, but of the pretence situation as a whole. This view also endorses a dynamic 
relationship, albeit not between animals and objects in their environments, but 
between animal forms of life and whole environments, and the whole situation that 
results from their relation would be considered ‘phonelike’.  
 Yet, the distinction Chemero makes between properties and relations is not 
clear. Relations could be understood as kinds of properties of the entire situations; for 
example, ‘phoneness’ affordance could be considered as a property of the situation, 
such as of pretend playing. But then, what does it mean for the ‘phoneness’ relation to 
hold between a banana and the animal? Chemero gives an example of ‘being taller 
than’ as a relation holding between two people: “Affords-f is like taller-than in this 
respect: it is neither of the person, nor of the environment, but rather of their 
combination” (2009, p. 142). However, this example does not hold; ‘taller-than’ 
clearly refers to (a property of) the first one of the two individuals, albeit with respect 
to the other (hence, it is a relational property). The other is ‘shorter-than’ the first. 
Hence, it seems to be best to understand ‘taller-than’ as a relational property of one 
subject with respect to the other. This case also holds for pretence; affording ‘phone’ 
is best understood as a property of the environment with respect to an agent; it does 
not work vice versa. 
 Finally, if we speak of affordances as relations between the material world and 
animal’s capacities, then the worldly objects and capacities are two relata of the same 
relation ‘affordance’. As such, it would be hard to carve the animal and the 
environment up as component parts of a mechanism that involves the animals and the 
environment. But with separate components, as suggested in Chapter 3, we can give a 
wide-and-situated mechanistic explanation of pretence.  
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 For these reasons, I propose to go along with Turvey’s affordance framework, 
albeit augmented by some notions from the other accounts. This will be proposed in 
the next section. 
 From the accounts of affordances so far, we have seen that two trends are 
emerging: one, which finds the environment and objects most crucial in affording 
action, and another, which stresses the role of the animals (their biological 
dispositions or social capacities) in affording action. This raised the question: what is 
more important to explain pretence successfully with affordances, is it the 
environment, is it the animal, or is the weight of the responsibility equally divided 
between the environment and the animal? These are relevant questions for the project 
of using affordances as an explanatory tool that counters mental representational 
explanations.  
 One may worry that if the animal is doing more work, then affordances are 
tacitly mental representational and there is room for mental representational structures 
to be doing the relevant work. 62 Reliance on any mental-representational structures 
would be a problem for my account. However, importantly, all of the proposed 
affordance-based stories actively deny mental representations. That is absolutely clear 
with Reed’s account, where affordances exist independently of the animal. But even 
the accounts that depend on the animal (Turvey, Chemero, Rietveld and Kiverstein), 
or even emphasize the role of the animal (Varela), need not posit mental 
representations; what plays a relevant part on the ‘animal’ side of the relationship is 
either the animal dispositions, animal capacities, or practices found in the form of 
animal life. If that is the case, any of those affordance-based stories would already 
secure the thesis that pretence can be explained without positing mental 
representations.  
 Ultimately, all affordance-based accounts do without recourse to mental 
representations. Accepting any of them secures the possibility that a non-mental 
representational explanation of pretence that uses affordances could be provided. The 
question remains about the appropriate characterisation of affordances with respect to 
the animal and the environment in order to explain pretence. Some accounts work 
                                                
62 This worry, however, may not be entirely justified, as we can conceptualise the mind in action in 
terms different from mental representations. By contrast, if one were to focus only on the environment 
because one fears mental representations, one would be motivated by a very problematic of the mind. 
Thanks to Martin Weichold for this point.  
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better than others with respect to providing such explanation of basic pretence. What 
makes some better will be shown in this section. 
 
4.4 The most adequate affordance account to explaining pretence 
 
The purpose of this section is to extend the resources of the affordances to deal with 
pretence. To do that, we must understand what plays the relevant resource of allowing 
pretend interactions. Getting clear on the available ontologies of affordances gives us 
a better chance to suggest the best ontology for an affordance-based explanation of 
basic pretence. The best notion of affordance for explaining pretence should focus on 
how the environment as well as the animal partakes in explaining a pretend activity, 
without recourse to mental representations. The section below will explain why 
Turvey’s conception of affordance is most fruitful for explaining pretence, and how 
his conception requires certain adjustments; these are inspired by the other accounts.   
 One approach to explaining basic pretence with affordances is to use some 
aspects of the mentioned positions and their terminologies to make a new account of 
affordances and to show how they work. Some ideas are borrowed, other lost. 
Following Reed, affordances should be understood as mere possibilities for action 
that exist in the environment, independent of the animal. For example, ‘graspabiliy’ is 
an affordance of a cup in the sense that it is a possibility for grasping a cup. That 
possibility exists in the world. Realism about affordances should then be preserved.63 
Following Rietveld and Kiverstein, there is a useful notion of solicitation to be added 
to the story. Following Varela, it should be accepted that the animal is very important; 
one can speak of animal’s effectivities that turn affordances into solicitations, or give 
affordances an inviting character. How the solicitations and animal effectivities add to 
the alternative explanation of pretence is shown further in Chapter 7.  
 Mostly, however, the new approach follows Turvey and the conception of 
affordance-effectivity pairs. As mentioned, for each affordance in the environment, 
there must be a complementary effectivity in the animal. That’s what makes 
affordances relational properties of the environment. The animal does not have to act 
upon the affordances, but the affordances are there in the virtue of there being an 
                                                
63 While realism about affordances may be naïve, it is better to embrace it than not. Hence, we can 
speak of the ‘phoneness’ affordance already being there as one of the possibilities for action. This has 
some of its own explanatory problems (problem of the given), but bypasses others (problem of 
emergence).  
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animal that can interact with the environment in relevant ways. Also, both affordances 
and effectivities are dispositions. Even capacities and past histories can be considered 
as shaping the basis of current dispositions to act in a certain way. 
 Turvey proposes to consider affordances as not only relational properties of 
the environment, but also as dispositional properties of that environment. This means 
that the affordance is in the environment even when the animal is not interacting with 
the environment. The affordance is there in the sense of being disposed to be taken up 
by a particular animal when that animal becomes present.64 Turvey also introduces 
effectivities, or dispositions of the animals. Effectivities can be biological 
dispositions, like of digestion; effectivities can also be based in the animal’s 
interaction history with the object. They shape the object to have a disposition that is 
essentially connected to that animal. The animal then has such capacities or 
interaction histories, whether or not the animal acts on them. In line with this thought, 
Turvey’s notion of effectivities can be extended to involve various capacities and 
capabilities of animals, as well as moods, all shaped by histories of interactions.65 
What exactly can form an effectivity that is relevant to specific cases of pretending 
will be explained in Chapter 7.  
 Turvey’s account appropriated to pretence does not yet explain how particular 
pretending occurs. After all, there are many affordances and just as many effectivities. 
What explains which affordance-effectivity pair is actualised that would lead to 
action? Turvey (1992, p. 180) suggests a right actualising context:  
 
Let Wpq (e.g., a person-climbing-stairs system) = j(Xp, Zq) be composed of different things 
Z (person) and X (stairs). Let p be a property of X and q be a property of Z. Then p is said to 
be an affordance of X and q the effectivity of Z (i.e., the complement of p), if and only if there 
is a third property r such that 
(i) Wpq= j(Xp, Zq)possesses r  
                                                
64 Some may find conceiving of affordances as dispositions problematic. Chemero, for instance, claims 
that affordances depend on the animal’s abilities, and abilities cannot be considered as dispositions; as 
“Having the ability to walk does not mean that one will not fall down even in the ideal conditions for 
walking” (2003, p. 189). The implication is that on the dispositional account, the dispositions must be 
actualised at all time. Indeed, the nature of dispositions is that they “never fail to be actualised in the 
right circusmtances” (Turvey 1992, p. 178). Yet, dispositions can also fail to manifest for various 
reasons. In addition, capacities should be thought of as dispositional; they do not always manifest 
themselves. To deny that is to say that we are always doing everything we possibly can.  
65 Weichold (pending) suggests a new name for them, called ‘acceptances’. They can be thought of as 
subjective preconditions for acting on the affordances; necessary but not sufficient enabling conditions 
for interactions to emerge. For the sake of coherence, I will retain the name ‘effectivity’ in this thesis. 
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(ii) Wpq = j(Xp, Zq) possesses neither p nor q 
(iii) Neither Z nor X possesses r. 
Thus, a person cannot execute locomotion in the highly particular manner of stair climbing 
unless a sloped surface is underfoot composed of adjacent steps with suitable dimensions (of 
rise and horizontal extent). When it is, then the disposition to locomote in this highly 
particular way is actualised. 
 
 To clarify, something actualises an affordance and an effectivity if and only if 
there is a third property given by the context. One such property can be a sloped 
surface.   
 Applying Turvey’s conception of affordances to pretence context, we can 
explain the banana-phone pretend play using the similar structure. Let Wpq (a child 
pretend playing that a banana is a phone) be made of different things Z (the child) and 
X (the banana). Let p (phoneness) be a property of X (banana). Let q (‘capacity to 
play phone with’) be a property of Z (the child). Then, p (phoneness) is said to be an 
affordance of X (banana) and the q (capacity to play phone with) is the effectivity of 
Z (the child). The effectivity is a complement of the affordance; hence, we can 
conceive of the effectivity as the flexibility to ‘play phone with’ objects, the history of 
interactions with phones, the know-how to use phones, etc. Then, what actualises this 
affordance-effectivity pair is the right circumstance, such as being in a playful 
context, which is shaped by the presence of toys, other people playing, or narrative 
contexts (as will be shown in the following chapters). The third property can be 
another agent acting as extrinsic disposition to action; this will be explained in 
Chapter 7 section 3. In short, once the right context is in play, it solicits action.  
  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that affordances are best understood as being found in the 
environment, as being real properties of the environment, and as being dispositions of 
the environment relative to animals. As such, they can form the relevant tools for the 
alternative explanation of pretence. Regardless of the ontology of affordances 
(realism, idealism or relationism), affordance-based explanation will not rely on 
mental representations (none of the ontologies of affordances requires positing mental 
representations). However, the conceptualisation of an affordance makes a difference 
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on how well the alternative explanatory account of pretence will work; this 
conceptualisation has been said to be based on Turvey’s proposal. In the next two 
chapters, affordances will be proposed to play the imaginative role (Chapter 5) and 
the guiding role (Chapter 6) instead of mental representations.  
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Chapter 5. The Imagining Role66 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the imagining function of pretence. As explained in Chapter 2 
section 3, imagining function explains how it is possible to think or treat one thing as 
if it was another. Imaginative capacities were said to enable counterfactual thinking or 
simulating perspectives; they answered the question: how do children think of or use 
an object “as if” it is something else? Answering this question was considered as one 
of the crucial ones in explaining pretence. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 2 section 2, 
mental representations were said to explain the imagining function in pretending. The 
exemplar explanations provided were Leslie’s (1987) decoupling mechanism and 
Nichols and Stich’s (2000, 2003) inference mechanism.  
 This chapter introduces new terminology from Currie (2004, 2006), such as 
seeing one thing as another instead of treating one thing as another or thinking of one 
thing as another. All these terms refer to the same explanandum that is the 
imaginative capacity to ‘act as if’, which is necessary to explain pretence. The 
difference in the terminology points to the fact that the least representational notion of 
imagining is targeted in this chapter. Currie’s proposal is targeted because, to date, it 
is the least cognitivist description of treating one thing as another, making his position 
most challenging to object to. 67  However, even Currie’s notion posits mental 
representations in its explanatory story. Currie introduces the term decentring to 
speak of the capacity to see one thing as another that is necessarily representational. 
Decentring is the capacity to see one thing as another by representing the world ‘as 
if’, or ‘as it might be’. What makes decentring possible is ‘Recreative Imagination’ 
(Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002), which I will consider to be Currie’s proposal of the 
simulation mechanism that uses mental representations.  
                                                
66 A version of this chapter has been published (see Rucinska, 2014a). 
67 Leslie proposes that the imaginative role is achieved by a kind of thinking (of x as y), which requires 
metarepresentational structures, while Currie says that the imaginative role is achieved by a form of 
seeing (x as y). Clearly, seeing is less cognitively committing than thinking. The reason to target least 
cognitivitely demanding proposal is that strong commitments to mental representations (such as of 
Leslie) are easier to object to, while ‘seeing as’, while still considered to involve mental 
representations, is more likely to be the best story, making it harder to argue against. Many also believe 
this ‘behaviourist’ account is more plausible than Leslie’s (see, for example, Lillard, 1994). Hence, in 
fact, I take on the more challenging opponent.  
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 What this chapter will argue is that there is another way we can explain how 
we can treat one thing as another, or see one thing as another (and so, fulfil the 
imaginative role) without positing mental representations. It will argue that the 
function of imagining can be adhered to without positing mental representations; as 
such, ‘seeing as’ need not be understood as representational decentring. The enactivist 
alternative is to understand ‘seeing as’ as ‘seeing-affordances-in’. This alternative 
makes use of a relevant notion of environmental affordance and animal’s 
sensorimotor capacities (effectivities), such as sensorymotor perception (based on 
O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) Sensorymotor Theory of Perception, or SMTP), 
dynamically interacting with each other. The chapter argues that we can understand 
‘seeing as’ trough a capacity to see relevant affordances in the objects, without 
positing mental representations, which is an alternative to Currie’s decentring.  
 This chapter will be structured in the following way.  
 Section 5.1 addresses the question of why imagining is targeted. It briefly 
recaps how the notion of imagination has been used in pretence literature, and spells 
out the different roles imagination is said to play in explaining pretence. It clarifies 
why, out of other functions of imagination, the role of ‘treating one thing as if it is 
another’ (in Chapter 5) and ‘guiding’ (in Chapter 6) are targeted.  
 Section 5.2 examines the to-date weakest cognitivist account of imagining that 
appeals to mental representations to do that work, which is Currie’s (2004) capacity to 
‘decentre’. The section explicates this notion and clarifies why Currie finds it 
necessary in order to pretend. The section further explains that Currie’s capacity to 
decentre requires ‘Recreative Imagining’ (or RI in short), which posits mental 
representations. The section describes RI as a mental representational mechanism of 
simulation, and demonstrates what may be problematic with it. 
 Section 5.3 begins to build the argument that decentring need not be required 
to pretend. It explains Currie’s account of pretending, which makes room for a 
supportive to seeing-as perceptual capacity to ‘see-in’, or ‘see one thing in another’. 
The section clarifies the strategy for proposing the alternative, which is to borrow 
Currie’s notion of seeing-in and apply to it the notion of affordances, to propose the 
alternative account of how imaginative function can be accounted for. The alternative 
explanation also makes use of O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) sensorimotor theory of 
perception (henceforth: SMTP), to explain how the affordances are dynamically 
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‘seen’. Affordances and sensorimotor skills are applied to Currie’s notion of ‘seeing-
in’, allowing for ‘seeing-as’ to be reinterpreted along more enactivist lines. The 
alternative account proposes the capacity to ‘see affordances in’ (or see possibilities 
of action in) situations to explain how one pretends. I argue that this capacity replaces 
the representational capacity to decentre, as it obviates the need for positing mental 
representations. 
 Section 5.4 identifies potential cognitivist challenges to the alternative 
proposal, and suggests potential rebuttals. The first challenge has to do with 
cognitivist arguments for why imagining must involve mental representations, and 
challenges whether the perceptual capacity to see-in is sufficient to meet the job. The 
second challenge focuses on the notions of recognition and resemblance that are used 
to explicate the seeing-in capacity, claiming that they are representational in nature. 
The third challenge deals with the idea that in pretence, we deal with absence, 
therefore mental representations have to be posited. The fourth and related challenge 
has to do with the concern that meanings, or contents, play a more crucial role than 
the environment in pretence; the ‘direction of fit’ when we pretend is meaning to the 
world. The section addresses all four challenges, and proposes rebuttals in line with 
the new proposal of ‘seeing-affordances-in’, arguing that mental representations need 
not be posited in any of the explanations: seeing-affordances-in is sufficient for 
imaginative role, resemblance and recognition need not posit mental representations, 
affordances are not absent so we deal with presence, and there is no direction of fit on 
the enactivist story as affordances are already meaningful.    
 The chapter proposes a first suggestion of a cohesive, positive account of 
explaining the role of imagining, where, in the place of decentring, it is argued that 
the relevant work might be done by perceptual activities augmented by sensorimotor 
skills and certain understanding of affordances.  
 
5.1 Imagination and its roles 
 
This section clarifies how imagination is often conceived of, and what roles it is said 
to play in pretence. As mentioned in Chapter 2, some form of imaginative capacity is 
said to be necessary for pretence to occur. For example, Lillard (1994) claims that to 
pretend that banana is a phone one needs to imagine the banana as a phone. Goldman 
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(2006) claims that pretence or make-believe is a mental activity involving imagination 
that is intentionally projected onto something. Some consider pretence and 
imagination to be necessarily coupled. According to Walton (1990), pretence or 
make-believe ‘is the use of … props in imaginative activities’, where props are 
‘objects of imaginings’ (p. 25).68 It is even quite telling to see that in the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the entry on ‘Pretence’ is one shorter section of an 
entry on ‘Imagination’ (Gendler, 2011).  
 While there are many ways one can conceive of imagination (see Bennett and 
Hacker, 2003, p. 180-183), I will focus on two notions that come about most often in 
the pretence literature. These two notions form an interesting dichotomy. On the one 
hand, there is suppositional imagination that is propositional. Suppositional 
imagination is associated with having a counterfactual thought. For example, the 
command “imagine what you would do if you had wings” could be replaced with 
‘think about what you would do if you had wings,’ or ‘suppose you had wings’. On 
the other hand, there is imagistic or sensory imagination. It is to be understood as 
‘having an image’. A command ‘imagine you have wings’ could be replaced with 
‘picture yourself with wings’. Both of these forms of imagining are said to involve a 
mental representational capacity; the first type of imagining requires manipulating 
counterfactual contents, which are often made of propositions, while the second, 
arguably, requires manipulating content in the shape of stored mental images.69 The 
manipulations are said to be taking place offline, or in the cognitive mechanisms of 
the agents who imagine. Leslie (1987) and Stich and Nichols (2000, 2003) propose 
that the mental representations are propositions; Currie (2004, 2006) and van 
Leeuwen (2011) propose that the mental representations are imaginings or images, 
respectively.  
 Presently, the focus will be on the roles imagination is said to play in 
pretending, in order to assess whether those roles need playing, and if so, if they need 
to be played by a structure that posits mental representations. One role in which 
imagination plays a part in pretending is by motivating pretence. Some theorists say 
the motivation is done through some analogue in imagination of a belief-desire pair 
                                                
68 There is a conceptual difference between the notions of ‘pretence’ and ‘make-belief’, one that has to 
do with the assumption whether pretending is like belief in the first place. For the purposes of this 
thesis it is not so important to distinguish between them.  
69 Although sensory imagining need not be in principle representational, accounts that propose them do 
often insist on their mental representational nature (see, for example, van Leeuwen, 2011).  
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(e.g., having a belief-like attitude that the banana is a phone, having desire-like 
attitude to make a phone call (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1994, Velleman, 2000, Currie 
and Ravenscroft, 2002).70 However, arguably, motivation to pretend is not yet a 
current aspect of pretence (under functionalist description, it is not a ‘realiser’ of 
pretence, but its antecedent) Hence, the issue of the motivational role of imagination 
in pretence will be left for future research. For the purposes of this thesis, an argument 
whether one can have non-representational imaginings to motivate pretence is 
redundant.   
 Another role of imagination in pretence is one of guiding and elaborating 
pretence as it unfolds. To quote Amy Kind (2013),  
 
Philosophers have assigned imagination an especially central role in [engagement with 
fiction, pretence, mindreading, modal epistemology]. (…) [In a pretence context,] 
imagination is supposed to explain why we take the actions that we do when engaging in 
games of pretend. [For example,] In pretending to be a Jedi Knight, Christopher imagines that 
the tree branch in his hand is a light saber” (emphasis added) (p. 142).  
 
 Imagination plays the role of explaining what guides us when we engage in 
pretence and how we plan future actions and elaborate the pretence in the pretence 
episode. It is a relevant role to explaining pretence, and it will be discussed in Chapter 
6.71  
 The last two roles imagination plays are the role of generating counterfactual 
thoughts and enabling simulating perspectives. ‘Generating counterfactual thoughts’ 
will be bracketed as it asks for complex representational capacities to be involved in 
reasoning what is counterfactual, more complex than mere simulation. It is also 
arguably not yet present in preverbal children, whose pretence I analyse. So to take 
the least representation-hungry proposal under radar, yet one that still is said to 
require mental representations, I will discuss only the role of simulating perspectives. 
Currie and Ravenscroft claim that “pretense requires imaginatively taking up 
alternative perspectives,” and to quote from Liao and Gendler (2010), “Imagination in 
the sense required for pretend play and engagement with fictions is the capacity that 
                                                
70 There is currently a disagreement on this issue; for example, Funkhouser and Spaulding (2009) deny 
imagination the power of motivation altogether. 
71 There I will discuss how this role is played, where one of the explanatory proposals is of an 
imagination mechanism (van Leeuwen, 2011) 
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underpins our ability to simulate perspectives” (p. 1).72 As such, imagination enables 
simulation. Imagination in the sense required for pretend play is the capacity to treat 
one thing as another. Being able to treat one thing as another goes in hand with the 
ability to see things in novel ways. Such way of phrasing the role is neutral; it stays 
true to the simulationist proposals as well, but it opens the possibility for an 
alternative account of imagination. The next section discusses Currie’s account of 
imagination that gives rise to his concept of ‘seeing as’. 
 
5.2 Decentring capacity involving Recreative Imagination  
  
This section discusses one of the explanations for how one can treat one thing as 
another. Currie (2004, 2006) claims that we can treat one thing as another thanks to 
seeing one thing as another by representing, or what he calls decentring. Decentring 
can be accounted for by a reductionist proposal of Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) 
called "Recreative Imagination", or ‘RI’ in short. RI can be seen as a mechanism of 
off-line simulation of possible scenarios, which posits mental representations. Thus, 
decentring (representational seeing-as) can be best explained by the means of RI, 
which simulates perception by representing and manipulating perceptual contents off-
line. It is in line with the core of simulationist idea that imagination is off-line 
perceiving. The simulationist proposal will presently be unpacked.  
 Currie explains that “in pretense, a creature may respond to the environment, 
but as it is transformed by imagination” (2006, p. 275). His ambition in advancing his 
account of pretence is clear: “The more we can account for what we do without 
supposing we need to think about doing it, the better” (2004, p. 191). Towards that 
end he regards pretence as involving imaginative transformations that, while not 
meta-representational, require decentring. For example, he asks: what would be 
required for seeing the banana as a phone? To see-as, he says, “the pretending 
creature represents the world, not as it is, but as it might be” (Currie 2006, p. 276), or 
decentres. Hence, according to Currie, decentring is a form of seeing as that requires 
representing the world ‘as if’. 
 In earlier work, Currie (2004) describes decentring in terms of a shift of 
perspectives that involves mental representations:  
                                                
72 They clarify that this function is important for theorists of mind as it is supposed to explain later 
emerging mind-reading abilities. 
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Decentring is the capacity to view the world from another perspective: to view the world as it 
was for me yesterday, as it is for you now, as it might be for me tomorrow, as it is according 
to some story. Decentring indicates the (relative) freedom from environmental constraint and 
sensitivity to representational content we think of as part of rationality (p. 211).  
 
 To clarify, viewing the world ‘as it was’/‘as it is’/‘as it might be’ is specified 
by the mental representational contents that are part of the simulations. ‘Freedom 
from environmental constraint’ suggests that the simulation is done off-line.  
 Why do we need to decentre? Arguably we need to explain how it is that we 
are free from ‘environmental constraint’ and get to be directed at an absence, or that 
which is not perceptually present, when we are pretending.73 Decentring is said to be 
necessary to allow the basic ‘as-if’ response to the environment that does not provide 
the appropriate perceptual stimuli. As Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) claim, we need 
to explain the “ability to experience or think about the world from a perspective 
different than the one that experience presents” (p. 9). Minimally, decentring is said to 
be needed to account for having controlled experiences in the absence of appropriate 
stimuli.  
 How does decentring work? Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) propose that the 
least cognitively demanding mechanism that posits mental representations is that of 
"recreative imagination" (henceforth: RI). It is said to allow us to engage in pretence 
by enabling ‘putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes’.74 RI works by simulation of 
perception, which involves representing and manipulating perceptual contents off-
line, or to “substitute one thought content for another” (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, 
p. 140). Currie and Ravenscroft spell out their central hypothesis in the following 
way:  
 
Imaginative projection involves the capacity to have, and in good measure to control the 
having of, states that are not perceptions of beliefs or decisions or experiences of movements 
of one’s body, but which are in various ways like those states – like them in ways that enable 
                                                
73 Similarly, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) claim that “pretence is similar to false belief in that actions 
stemming from both mental states are directed at situations that do not actually obtain.” 
74 Similar role is said to be played by Goldman’s (2006) E- imaginings; they are supposed to generate 
pretend states that resemble their intended counterparts. However, as E-imagination is said to be central 
to high-level mindreading (E-imagination qualifies as instances of simulation that plays a role in tasks 
of third-person mindreading), I will bracket discussion of e-imaginings to focus on least cognitively 
demanding proposal to date, which is agreed to be Currie and Ravenscroft’s Recreative Imagination.  
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the states possessed through imagination to mimic and, relative to certain purposes, to 
substitute for perceptions, beliefs, decisions, and experiences of movement. These are what 
we are calling states of recreative imagination” (2002, p. 11).  
 
 Moreover, the imaginings are inputs of the mechanism and they give decision-
like imaginings as outputs. The mental mechanism manipulates imaginings that 
correspond to beliefs and desires. Currie and Ravenscroft specify what the mechanism 
does at a task level in the following passage:  
 
There is, let us assume, a mechanism dedicated to forming decisions on the basis of our 
beliefs and desires. ‘Mechanism’ here means a physical system, a part (though possibly a very 
widely distributed part) of the body, something that may be damaged or fail to develop. When 
it operates solely on the basis of beliefs and desires as inputs, we have practical reasoning that 
delivers decisions. This mechanism can then be run ‘off-line’, disconnected from action-
generating systems. When operated this way, it takes as inputs belief-like and desire-like 
imaginings and delivers imaginary substitutes for decisions (2002, p. 66-67).75 
 
 What is characteristic of Recreative Imagination is that it seems to be a 
mechanism that recreates content. As Currie and Ravenscroft claim: “The question 
‘To what is the subject attending during acts of imagining?' gets the answer ‘To those 
things, whatever they are, that figure in the contents of the mental states being 
recreated” (2002, p. 42).  
 To summarise, one way of explaining how decentring is done might be to 
appeal to RI mechanism, understood as an empirical hypothesis about a mechanism 
involving simulation of perception that makes use of mental representational contents. 
 Recreative Imagination as a concept has been used in various explanations 
beyond pretence. According to Hutto (2008), it is first and foremost a thesis that 
sensory imagination is a form of simulation of perception, and the most compelling 
reason to endorse recreative imaginings is that they explain 'off-line' cognition. 
According to Hutto (2008), acts of imagination, understood as perceptual re-
enactments, are likely to be the basis for the ability to re-enact and practice complex 
routines. For example, to explain how the hominids managed to make a sharp tool 
                                                
75 For example, consider the case of propositional imagining: “The idea ([behind propositional 
imaginings] is that instead of adding P as a belief I can add it ‘in imagination’, and since imagination 
preserves the inferential patterns of belief, I can then see whether new imagining, Q, emerges as 
reasonable in light of this” (2002, p. 12-13). 
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from a round rock asks for an account of how the hominids were able to ‘imagine’ or 
‘visualise’ in the rock the final form of the tool before starting to shape it. Recreative 
imagination was likely to be necessary for collection and preparation of materials of 
the early toolmaker’s craft. However, while that function of ‘visualising’ the rock for 
its possibilities is important, it is not necessary to endorse Currie and Ravencroft’s RI 
mechanism. There is an alternative, which I present in the next section. Moreover, 
below I will give reasons for not endorsing the decentring capacity or the RI 
mechanism, showing why it is not good enough for enactivist explanations of 
pretence.  
 Firstly, RI mechanism seems to heavily rely on the notion of belief, as the 
mechanism involves suspension of belief and its replacement with ‘belief-like’ state. 
Currie and Ravenscroft claim that the “accessing and controlling inputs (beliefs and 
desires) to the acts of imaginative projection underpin pretence” (2002, p. 140). 
Moreover, their mechanism is one of simulation, which requires representing the 
point of view of the one who is simulated. Simulating others, however, is problematic 
as it requires more than ‘mere’ putting oneself in someone else’s shoes; it also seems 
to involve theorizing (or making an inference) about the mental states of the other in 
order to pick out which aspects of someone’s beliefs and desires we should simulate 
to start with (see Gallagher and Zahavi, 2013). In addition, as shown above, the RI 
mechanism makes use of the notion of representational content. Currie and 
Ravenscroft claim that to have recreative imagination is to simulate by substituting 
one thought content for another: “Placing yourself, in imagination, in another’s 
position requires the capacity to make use of appropriate imaginative states; 
temporarily, one puts aside some aspect of one’s own mental economy – some belief 
or desire, say – and substitutes it for a thought content you actually don’t believe, or 
don’t want” (2002, p.147). Moreover, to Currie (2004), pretence requires contentful 
thoughts: “The child who pretends that Pig is dirty needs to have the first-order 
thought ‘the Pig is dirty’; … this thought is tokened as part of an act of decentring” 
(2004, p. 219). Currie also claims that decentring involves “acting under a 
suppositional mode”, where one can “consider an idea, draw consequences from it, 
consider the evidence for it, and compare it with other ideas” (2004, p. 233).76  
                                                
76 He even says that pretence is to pretending as truth is to believing (2004, p. 205), suggesting that 
pretending has conditions of satisfaction. 
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  To summarise this section, Currie holds that a capacity to decentre is 
necessary for pretending and he thinks that both decentring and its underlying RI 
mechanism involve mental representations. But is decentring really necessary for 
pretending? This chapter argues no. Hence, while Currie’s account of pretence is to 
date the least intellectualist one, as it does not propose metarepresenting to explain 
pretending, it will be shown that it is possible to understand pretence even without 
decentring, but with seeing-as construed in non-mental representational terms. This 
will be argued in the next section. 
 
5.3 From seeing-in to seeing-affordances-in 
 
What kind of alternative may be proposed to explain the imaginative function in 
pretence? The alternative proposal builds on Currie’s (2004) attempt to provide an 
anti-intellectualist account of pretence, but rethinks some of its central 
commitments.  Thus, it offers an even less intellectualist approach to object-
substitution pretend play of young children than Currie does. It does so by applying 
the conception of an affordance and ideas from O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) 
Sensorymotor Theory of Perception (henceforth: SMTP) to Currie’s (2004) notion of 
perceptual seeing-in, reinterpreting it along more enactive lines. The alternative to 
decentring is a sensorymotor a capacity to ‘see-affordances-in’. The section shows 
how it might be possible to account for the sorts of imaginative transformations, like 
seeing one thing as another, while bypassing the need to invoke the capacity to 
decentre that makes use of mental representations.  
Currie’s (2004) notion of perceptual capacity to see-in is a good start to fulfill 
this demand. According to Currie, seeing-in (or experiencing-in) is a perceptual basis 
for seeing-as. It is important to pretence as it plays various enabling roles in pretence. 
He says, “Seeing-in may constitute part of primitive basis of pretence, it enables 
pretence to be enacted and communicated without the necessity for full-blown 
conceptual capacities” (Currie 2004, p. 222). Take, for example, seeing a woman in 
the clouds. What kind of phenomenon is seeing-in? Currie emphasizes the perceptual 
nature of seeing-in. He claims, 
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Such seeing-in does not involve seeing a woman, nor does it involve the perceptual illusion of 
seeing one; neither is it a case merely of judging that the picture represents a woman: it is 
genuinely perceptual phenomenon (idem, p. 220).  
 
 Currie contends that the ability to see-in extends from seeing things in static 
objects to seeing things in human behaviours. As Currie claims,  
 
The next step (…) is to suggest that, just as we can see things in pictures, we can see things in 
simple mimetic acts. When someone moves in a certain way we can see in their movements 
such acts as driving a car, hitting a cricket ball, or nursing a baby (…). The movements might 
be exaggerated or stylized, but we can still see the action in the performance, just as we see a 
well-known face in its caricature (idem, p. 221-222).  
    
 To recap, Currie thinks that seeing-in is a precursor state for pretence.77 
Importantly, seeing-in is a necessary precursor to seeing-as. As it is perceptual, it 
shapes what is to be seen-as; otherwise, presumably, one could see anything as 
anything else. Seeing-in may, thus, be a kind of weak conditions that structures and 
constrains what is to be imaginatively transformed. In agreement with Currie, seeing-
in is a crucial capacity for engaging in basic pretence. But while Currie’s version of 
seeing-in is not sufficient to generate pretence, the chapter will show that seeing-in 
can be sufficient if we understand it as a form of sensorimotor activity that uses 
affordances. This section paves the way to the positive proposal of the sensorimotor 
account of seeing-as called ‘seeing-affordances-in’ (Rucinska, 2014a).   
Crucial to the account proposed in this chapter is the idea that seeing-in could 
be understood as seeing-affordances-in. To make sense of this idea, we need to firstly 
consider the notion of affordances, followed by applying O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) 
Sensorimotor Theory of Perception (SMTP) to understand how one can see 
affordances in things or situations. Drawing on the notion of affordances, it will be 
proposed that seeing-affordances-in is an activity in line with SMTP that allows 
bypassing the need for decentring.  
 As explained in Chapter 4, affordances are simply possibilities for actions that 
are found in the environment. Gibson (1982), Turvey (1992), Reed (1994), and Noë 
                                                
77 It is only a precursor as he says that “there is a sense in which pretence is a ‘higher’ mental process” 
(idem, p. 219). 
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(2004) alike describe affordances as properties of the environment that “offer or 
afford the animal opportunities to do things (find shelter, climb up, hide under, etc.)” 
(Noë, 2004, p. 105). Gibson intended for affordances to be applied to the theories of 
perception. The idea is that affordances, or possibilities for actions, can be perceived, 
both in entities and in activities. For example, in a face we could see the possibility to 
smile to it; in a banana, we could see the possibility to eat it; in the action of playing, 
we could see the possibility of joining in the play in specific ways. Hence, one is not 
just seeing an object or an action, but what one could do with them. This could be 
applied to pretence; one is not just seeing a banana, but what one can do with it. As 
bananas afford both eating and playing phone with, both actions are available to 
perception. Why this and not another affordance gets to be acted upon will be 
explained further in Chapter 7. For now, it is enough to understand that affordances 
can be perceived.  
 However, regular notion of perception, which proposes that perception is 
independent of action, cannot be applied to affordances. That would result in 
contradictions. Affordances, understood best as relational and dispositional properties 
of the environment (Turvey 1992), are closely tied to the animals that have 
dispositions to act on the environment in relevant ways. As such, when animals 
perceive objects, they perceive actins that these objects afford. Moreover, such 
perceiving does not require inferencing, but is direct, whereas in standard notions of 
perception, perceptual inputs require cognitive inferencing to allow the animal to act 
upon them. Hence, a different conception of perception is required. Such conception 
is provided by O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) Sensorimotor Theory of Perception 
(SMTP). 
 O’Regan and Noë (2001) are the promoters of a view of perception that is 
intimately linked with action; their motto is: perceiving is something we do. The big 
idea behind SMTP is the stress it lays on the role of embodied activity over thought. 
Noë has an unusual story about perception that makes it an activity (2004). For 
example, seeing a cube as a cube would, arguably, require an exercise of a basic 
sensorimotor skill that treats seeing as kind of doing. Noë (2004) claims that seeing a 
cube as a cube is a form of embodied activity:  
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When you experience something as cubical, you experience it as presenting a definite 
sensorimotor profile. That is, you experience it as something whose appearance would vary in 
precise ways as you move in relation to it, or as it moves in relation to you (p. 117). 
 
 This suggests that the cube affords acting towards it as if it were a whole (as 
‘cube that has front and back sides’), which can be picked up from the world in 
perception-action. 
 SMTP also claims that action changes what is perceived. As O’Regan and Noë 
(2001) claim, “A crucial feature of our theory (…) is the involvement of the body in 
experience. The peculiar, sensory, quality of our perceptual experience consists (in 
part) in the fact that movements of the body produce changes in our sensory 
stimulation” (p. 1016). This changes how we perceive the world, and explain how we 
get to see things in new ways.  
 Hence, SMTP allows for ‘seeing’ of affordances that is produced through 
acting upon the world, in a dynamical action-perception-action loop. One could 
consider Held and Hein’s (1963) famous ‘kitten carousel’ experiment as evidence for 
acting making a difference on how the environment is perceived or experienced, 
which further affects action. As Pepper (2014) describes,  
 
For three hours daily ten pairs of neonatal kittens were placed in apparatus resembling a 
fairground carousal: a circular box with a two-pronged rotating arm at the centre. At one end 
of the rotating arm, the ‘active’ kitten of the pair was attached to a harness with its feet in 
contact with the ground so that it could control its own locomotion. The ‘passive’ kitten was 
placed in a box with its head held in a fixed position and suspended from the other end of the 
rotating arm so that it could see the inside of the apparatus but not move around freely 
(although it could still move its own eyes). By walking, the active kitten pulled the passive 
kitten around the carousel, so while both sets of kittens were exposed to the same patterns of 
movement and visual stimuli, only the active kittens’ movements around the apparatus were 
self-initiated. Held and Hein found that the active kittens avoided visual cliffs, put out their 
paws to brace themselves when picked up and placed on a surface, and displayed avoidance 
behaviour to looming objects, while the passive kittens did not, though their responses did 
normalise within forty-eight hours. Unsurprisingly, they conclude that ‘self-produced 
movement with its occurrent visual feedback is necessary for the development of visually 
guided behaviour’ (p. 53). 
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 Thus, while we cannot be sure about the details of the visual experience of 
active kittens (whether they actually saw visual cliffs as cliffs or as ‘danger’, 
assuming they could), what the experiment does show is the clear effect of the 
animal’s acting on the environment on their consequent behaviours.  
 Perhaps in SMTP, we can find the resources for developing an understanding 
of enactive seeing-as. It is likely that the banana-phone object substitution play can 
reduce to utilisation of solely such sensorimotor abilities, at the same time being a 
paradigm case of basic pretence that more complex accounts of pretence can build on. 
For example, when dealing with a banana, the features of the object (its shape and 
size), and the children’s sensorimotor capacities, mutually interact so as to allow 
seeing new affordances in bananas (‘phone’), explaining how the child can treat a 
banana as if it were a phone without positing mental representations. The complete 
story about how the banana affords phone activities will be provided when additional 
factors such as intersubjective context and interactions are introduced (in Chapter 7); 
however, the sensorimotor capacities are the basis for such engagements to start, as 
they allow seeing of the novel possibilities for action. 
   
5.4 Cognitivist objections and rebuttals 
 
There are valid challenges that may be raised by the cognitivists, which will be 
introduced in the present section. First has to do with the sufficiency of appealing to 
seeing in when explaining pretence. Second is a worry that pretence requires seeing 
resemblances and recognizing, which are representational activities. Third challenge 
criticises the account as not genuinely perceptual, but likely to be representational, 
because in pretence as we are dealing with absences (since the phone is not present, 
representing the phone must be introduced in the account). Fourth is that in pretence, 
meaning plays more important part than the environment. In the following section I 
will explicate these challenges, and provide first suggestions for how to deal with 
them. 
 
a) Is seeing-in enough? 
 
Seeing-affordances-in is just a form of seeing in, not seeing as. An account of seeing-
in may be considered to be not sufficient to explain pretence, because it has further 
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constraints on actions. According to Currie (2004), seeing-in is “fast, mandatory, 
encapsulated, very little dependent on learning…Try not seeing a person in the picture 
next time you look at a painted portrait” (p. 220-221).78 However, in pretence, we 
have many possibilities of play. The suggestion is that seeing-in perhaps would leave 
us with a very little room for voluntariness and creative choice in how or what we 
pretend. Hence, Currie insists that decentring is required even for the simplest acts of 
pretence, as it provides the creative choice in how one pretends.  
 While Currie’s notion of seeing-in may be insufficient, the possibilities of 
seeing-affordances-in are much wider. With seeing-affordances-in, we are not limited 
to see one way of interacting with an object. That is because affordances, or 
possibilities for action, are many, almost infinite (and ‘playing phone with’ is one of 
them, just as ‘eating of’). What invites one action as opposed to another is dependent 
on the context. For example, a banana may afford various actions in the context of 
play, such as playing ‘phone’ when held to an ear, playing ‘hat’ when held on the 
head or playing ‘gun’ when pointing it at someone. However, it is important to note 
that affordances do not afford every action; that would not be very telling. In fact, 
objects can also resist some kinds of play (e.g., playing ‘human shoe’ with a banana 
would be difficult as the banana would get squashed). Thus, while there are many 
possibilities for action, there is also the limit in what can be afforded in perception 
and action that is shaped by the object.  
 This is an important point about affordances as it clarifies why it is a notion 
compatible with perception and not unstructured imagination. That is because in 
perception, there are constraints built up from material engagement with objects. 
Applied to affordances, perception of and engagement with the object (applied 
sensorimotor capacity) structures the possibilities of what can be seen and responded 
to. Imagination understood as representing, however, does not structure how to play; 
anything can be imagined as anything else.   
 But in pretence, the child does not act independently of what is seen; the 
difference is that what can be seen in terms of how to act upon it is wide.79 All this 
                                                
78 Similarly, it may be claimed that affordances are limiting. As Vygotsky claims, “(Things) dictate to 
the child what he must do: a door demands to be opened and closed, a staircase to be run up, a bell to 
be rung. In short, things have an inherent motivating force. (…) In play, things lose their motivating 
force. The child sees one thing but acts differently in relation to what he sees. Thus, a situation is 
reached in which the child begins to act independently of what he sees” (1978, 11). 
79 This is consistent with the concept of ‘forcible presence’, as explicated in the enactive theory of 
perception: “Forcible presence is the fact that, contrary to other mental states like my knowledge of 
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means is that perhaps it is little out of our present control to affect which affordance 
will be solicited from the field of the possibilities. It is most likely that it will be one 
from a routine. However, that is not to say that the banana will always afford eating it; 
in various contexts, it will afford a different action as well.  
 
b) Seeing resemblances is representational 
 
In addition, seeing resemblances between objects is considered to be a 
representational capacity. Cognitivists suppose that one is comparing what one is 
seeing to an absent object, which must take form of a mental content of this object 
stored in one’s mind. On the present story, the relationship between bananas and 
phones (and holding a banana to the ear and holding a phone to the ear) could be said 
to be one of resemblance. The resemblance allows for the object or the activity to 
look like something, without involving a concept in any robust sense of the term. The 
similarity of shape and structure of the banana to the typical phone, as well as how it 
responds to manipulation (way of holding it to the ear), could be said to be visible in 
the interaction with the object. Gallagher and Zahavi (2013) have argued that 
resemblances do not involve representations. They say that “in order for me to 
understand that x represents y by resembling it, I must have an access to y that is not 
mediated by x, so that I can compare the two in order to see the resemblance. If I 
know only the representation, I cannot know that it resembles the object represented” 
(p. 102). Their argument is that knowing that one thing resembles another requires for 
the two things to be present to the observer. They deny ‘introspectionism’ that allows 
one to know that the mental representation resembles the object in question. This 
leads them to believe that one is not comparing what is seen to mentally represented 
copies of those things. In which case it makes the mental representation redundant for 
seeing resemblances.  
A comparison of the banana to a representation of a ‘phone’ need not be made, 
as one does not need to see resemblances. What one simply needs to see is what one 
can do with the object. Why a particular object (banana) is good enough is because it 
has the right properties to be held to the ear. Why it is good enough may be because 
                                                                                                                                      
history, for example, a sensory experience imposes itself upon me from the outside, and it present to 
me without my making any mental effort, and indeed is mostly out of my voluntary control” (Myin and 
O’Regan, 2002, p. 30). 
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bananas are objectively similar to phones. One can think of the object as having real, 
objective correspondences to other objects. In the case of the banana, there is an 
objective correspondence between its shape and size, and the shape and size of a 
classic phone handle. When one is in the presence of a banana and a phone handle, 
this correspondence between them need not be seen, only acted upon. Paired with 
effectivities (dispositions stemming from history of interactions with both bananas 
and phones), these correspondences could trigger seeing in possibilities for action 
where one object can be treated as another. The objective correspondence may affect 
the banana to be more inviting to ‘play phone with’, because of the matching 
possibilities for action. Other objects that are of a similar size and can be lifted (e.g., 
cucumber, soap, etc.) would do as well.  
 Importantly, these similarities need not be represented. The properties of an 
object like a banana (shape and size) and what it affords to a child (lifting, holding by 
the ear) can broadly direct the child into what to play with it (phone). The child need 
not compare the banana with a phone, shape-wise. The correspondences are there, but 
need not be seen in terms of comparing what one sees to a mental image. All one 
needs to do is act upon the possibilities for action that are in the environment. Hence, 
‘seeing’ of the resemblances is not needed; it is replaced by seeing-affordances-in. 
Instead of seeing resemblances between the present object and a represented model of 
an absent object, it could be said that we see in the present object the affordance, or 
possibility, of playing with it in another way, a way similar to the absent object. The 
notion of absence will be discussed shortly. 
 
c) To deal with an absence we need mental representations 
 
One reason to doubt that a perceptual account can be used to explain imaginative 
transformation is that perception cannot explain dealing with absence. Even if 
perception can be understood without mental representations in basic, immediate 
cases of perception, it is generally assumed that we must have mental representations 
when dealing with absences. That is because something that is not there (‘phone’) is 
invoked when we are dealing with a banana, and so ‘phone’ must be represented. 
Representational faculties are allegedly needed for one to “be directed at situations 
that do not actually obtain” (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993) or to “stand back, 
 100 
cognitively speaking, from the immediate environment” (Currie, 2006, p. 275), for 
fulfilment of which Currie endorses making off-line simulations. If pretence is 
supposed to be directed at that which is not perceptually present, how is SMTP 
relevant for pretence? After all, the cognitivist could argue that even if we grant the 
validity of SMTP as applied to perception, it seems to, at best, only target the capacity 
to see X as X (e.g., a cube as a cube), but not X as Y (e.g., a banana as a phone). 
 Moreover, a cognitivist could object that in seeing-in, we are not merely 
seeing anything at all, but are in fact imagining, or that such seeing is infused with 
imagination. For example, in seeing a face in a cloud, given there is no human in the 
clouds present to be seen, and given there is no confusion or illusion as to what is 
occurring, it is a fair question to ask whether seeing-in is a genuine perceptual 
phenomenon.  
 In addition, a related worry is with ‘seeing-affordances-in’. We also need to 
explain the possibility of seeing an action (calling) in the object (the banana). The 
problem is that there is no affordance to ring someone on the banana or dial a number, 
so how can objects afford special ‘phone’ actions, such as, e.g., calling or dialling? 
The worry here is that the question may have shifted from ‘how is it possible to see 
objects (that are not there)’ to ‘how it is possible to see affordances (possibilities for 
actions), which are not there.  
What the worries have in common is the assumption that one requires 
representations to refer to something that is absent. Absence is seen as a referent 
similar to the one found in language. As Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) claim, “In 
Piaget’s terms, Jacqueline [who acts as if a cloth were a pillow] treats the cloth as a 
symbol – it serves as a signifier whose referent (or signified) is the absent pillow” (p. 
68).   
 One possible rebuttal does not counter the assumption that when objects are 
absent, representations are needed, which may be a live possibility (though this notion 
of representation is different than the notion of mental representation). Noë himself 
suggests that we need representations when the world is not immediately present 
(“Surely we sometimes need to think about the world in the world’s absence (when 
it’s dark, say, or when we’re blind, or not at the location we’re interested in), and for 
such purposes we must (in some sense) represent the world in thought” (2004, p. 22)). 
I will for the time being accept this, and suggest another line of thought: in the case of 
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basic pretence, there is nothing to represent because there is no absence; what one is 
directly seeing is a present affordance. 80   
 This rebuttal targets the cognitivist assumption that in pretend play, we 
encounter absence in the first place, and we must stand back from the immediate 
environment. It is not clear whether all pretend play deals with such absence from the 
immediate environment. It is highly questionable whether in the situation when the 
child acts upon a prop (like in the banana-phone game), he or she ever acts 
independently of what is seen. That is because the banana, as an object, is part of the 
immediately present world, which affords acting upon. This makes sense if we think 
of affordances not only as ‘real’ properties of objects, but also as relational properties 
(Turvey, 1994). So while ‘buttons’ property is absent in a banana, the shape of the 
banana is present in the possibility it brings to act out ‘calling’ to a human child, who 
has effectivities to place the banana to the ear. Properties of objects (Noë) as well as 
the history of past interactions (Chemero) of the child shape how the banana is 
interacted with, which make ‘calling’ (or a way in which the object in question can be 
held, placed or turned around), in some sense, present. Thus, it is likely that in acting 
upon a prop (like in the banana-phone game), the player does not act independently of 
what is seen, but is guided by the prop and perceives in action what the prop affords. 
Then, in the absence of a phone as during the pretend play, the animal, which has seen 
such possibilities with phones, can see those possibilities again with bananas and act 
on them, without having to represent the absent ‘phone’. The affordances are present 
to the animal. This way the banana can solicit ‘phone’ because of its shape and size 
corresponding to the one of a phone. 
 Thus, acting upon affordances, which allows manipulating the possibilities of 
what objects or situations afford, answers the question of how it is possible to see 
something other than what is perceptually present. How specific affordances get 
solicited to the subject in particular context is a question that involves individual 
differences. In pretence, different things can be perceptually present to one depending 
                                                
80 There is another rebuttal that could be offered. It is to argue that one can actually directly see 
absences. For example, perhaps we can directly ‘see’ the absence of a phone. As an analogy consider 
the example of Pierre in Sartre’s (1943/1957) Being and Nothingness. Sartre describes a situation 
whereby he looks in a crowded café to see if a friend, Pierre, is there, and he sees that Pierre isn’t there. 
In a way, he sees Pierre’s absence in the presence of everything else in that café. Perhaps that is an 
example of having expectations of seeing Pierre, and thereby seeing that he is not there (seeing an 
absence). With pretence, however, we do not expect things to look in certain, pretend way. Hence, this 
rebuttal is not most promising for present purposes.    
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on their background – on what they have seen in the past – as well as on the skills 
they possess at the time of pretence. As Noë claims, “What we perceive is determined 
by what we do (or what we know how to do)” (2004, p. 1). An elaboration of what is 
involved in how affordances are solicited will take place in Chapter 7, which analyses 
in grater detail the notion of affordance in playing the relevant explanatory roles. 
 Furthermore, to the proposal that the affordances might figure in our best 
explanation of pretending, a cognitivist may say that there is a possibility of ‘phone’ 
or calling being present, but only as long that ‘phone’ is represented in one’s mind 
one way or another (whether in terms of concepts, pictures, etc.). Only then, can we 
speak of ‘phone’ concept or image as present. To reply to this possible worry, I 
suggest that speaking of a notion of concept might be acceptable to an enactivist, but 
a lot has to do with the notion of concept one endorses (see Machery, 2009). While 
discussing different possibilities of conceptualising the notion of a concept is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, a relevant notion of concept could be Noë’s (2015) concept as 
skill, understood as ‘skills of access’, or ‘techniques for enabling access to what there 
is’ (p. 2).  
 
d) Meaning above environment?  
 
Finally, an objection to an account of pretence involving direct perception is that it is 
supposed to be the meaning (not the environment) that guides pretence. There is no 
denying that in object-substitution pretence, the agent uses the object differently than 
what the object usually designates; it could be said that a new meaning is added to the 
object. For example, when a banana is played as if it were a phone, in the present 
context it ‘means’ ‘phone’. According to Currie, “Vygotsky recognized (that) 
pretence is a form of decentring: the pretending creature is guided ‘not only by 
immediate perception … but by … meaning’” (Currie 2004, p. 211). Meanings, 
traditionally, are understood as ideas or thoughts imposed on reality. The 
intellectualist assumption is that without representing the meaning of what is to be 
acted out, one could not get engaged in pretence in the first place. Thus, if we were to 
borrow the jargon of Searle (1983), the direction of fit is supposed to be meaning to 
environment (adding new meaning ‘phone’ to the banana that is part of the 
environment), while the seeing-affordances-in account seems to propose a view along 
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the lines of fitting the environment to meaning, in order to see it as ‘phone’. That, 
however, would not be a good description of what the enactivist proposes, which will 
be explained below.  
 While Vygotsky may have been right in noticing that some forms of pretence 
are framed by meaning, his notion of meaning is not to be equated with decentring of 
the sort that Currie endorses. ‘Meaning’ in this context might include a wider grasp of 
active possibilities; it may be a different sense of seeing connections and possibilities 
for action. Vygotsky did not specify that meaning had to be representational or 
contentful, but notes that in pretend games young children are reliant on perceptually 
available information:  
 
Experiments and day-to-day observation clearly show that it is impossible for very young 
children to separate the field of meaning from the visual field because there is such intimate 
fusion between meaning and what is seen (1934/1978, p. 97).  
 
 Thus, there is a way to accommodate Vygotsky (but not Currie) in the claim 
that imaginative transformations are important for pretence, when Vygotsky’s notion 
of meaning is not understood in terms of decentring but through an alternative 
conception of ‘meaning’. One such alternative conception can be found in 
phenomenology, where the notion of meaning does not refer to mental contents, but to 
directly perceivable possibilities. According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), perception is 
already meaningful; it “arouses the expectation of more than it contains, and … is 
therefore already charged with meaning” (p. 4). The claim is that perception is already 
meaningful as it allows for novel possibilities to be perceived in the present object. 
Seeing a possibility is then anticipating something as happening. This is applicable to 
the pretend play in question, which can be explained not in terms of imposing new 
meanings in terms of rules for using the items on objects (such as imposing 
‘telephone’ on a banana). Instead, it can be accounted for with directly seeing the 
meanings  in terms of possibilities for action, or affordances (possibility of holding 
and using the banana as a phone).   
 Overall, the ‘direction of fit’ jargon does not fit with enactivist proposal, as 
seeing of affordances is governed by dynamical systems theory, the idea that there is a 
perpetually governing force that mutually shapes the action and its interpretation, or 
the meaning. Thus, how one acts with respect to the banana shapes how one sees it 
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(what meaning one adds to it), which in turn further shapes how one acts with it; there 
is no direction of fit. That capacity is then to be placed in wider intersubjective 
contexts and socio-cultural practices, which further shape how one gets to see-
affordances-in objects and situations, and how ‘acting as if’ comes about.  
  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have proposed an explanation of one aspect of pretence – how one 
gets to ‘act as if’, or engage in ‘imaginative transformation’, without mentally 
representing by means of decentring. The positive proposal involves active seeing-
affordances-in. What is required for imaginative transformations ceases to be an off-
line mental activity and is instead understood as an on-line perceptual activity. This 
novel approach to pretence suggests that pretence can be conceived as a way of acting 
that relies solely on embodied, perceptual (and intersubjective) skills, which is in line 
with O’Regan and Noë’s view of perception: just as they claim that perceiving is a 
way of acting, so I claim that basic pretending is. 
 Non-representational perception with regard to pretence can be exemplified in 
the following manner: one can see affordances (possibilities for action) in the 
situation through interacting with it. The relevant work might be done by sensory 
imaginings (understood as on-line perceptual activities), which are augmented by 
sensorimotor skills, which form effectivities of the animal. Sensory imaginings do not 
have to involve mental representations; this can be reasonably ruled in. If imagination 
can be understood as essentially based on perception, and considering that perception 
can be understood non-representationally (as proposed by, i.e., Gibson 1979, O’Regan 
and Noë 2001, Noë 2004), then imagination need not be understood representationally 
as well.  
 There are several advantages of this novel account of pretence as inspired by 
SMTP, particularly by its focus on activity and the role of affordances in perception. 
While it may not extend to all forms of pretence for fictional activity, as undeniably 
there are more complex ways of pretending possible that may require representing or 
making inferences, an account making perception and action do all the required work 
suffices to explain pretence of 18-month-old children. In line with known empirical 
studies, children at the age of 18 months engage in pretend games are reliant on 
perceptually available information (see e.g., Piaget 1962). As Vygotsky observes, 
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“child’s play is imagination in action … we can say that imagination in [older] 
adolescents and school children is play without action” (1934/1978, p. 93). 
Presumably, just seeing one thing as another without acting upon it comes later in life 
(Sainsbury, 2010). As the burden was on the enactivist theories to show whether any 
form of genuine pretence is possible without representing (Spaulding, 2010), this 
account has shown that there is a possible space for non-representational pretence that 
applies to basic pretence, laying groundwork for its application to further types of 
pretence for future research.  
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Chapter 6. The Guiding Role81 
 
 
This chapter will focus on another function mental representations are supposed to 
play in explaining pretending, the function of guiding how pretence is accomplished 
in a specific way.  
 As explained in Chapter 2, cognitivists posit the presence of cognitive 
mechanisms that imply mental representations to explain various aspects of 
pretending itself. For example, Nichols and Stich (2000) ask how do the pretenders 
“determine what behaviour to engage in during an episode of pretence?” Given their 
assumed framework, this question translates into ‘how do the structures underlying 
the cognitive capacities of the pretenders determine what behaviour to engage in 
during an episode of pretence?’ They propose an account of ‘mental guiders’ that are 
internal to the pretender, pushing all of the activity of guiding pretence to the 
subpersonal structures, such as the inference mechanism with the Possible World 
Box. They are not the only ones who make this move; philosophers and cognitive 
scientists posit mental representations in the form of mental plans and models to 
explain not only pretence, but various acts of cognition, from sophisticated human 
mindreading (Baron-Cohen, 1995) to basic animal dead-reckoning (Gallistel, 1998). 
With regard to pretence, as McCune and Agayoff explain, “(an) internal plan recedes 
and guides the pretend action,” and “(the) capacity to utilize (…) internal models of 
previous experience is considered to be the foundation of (…) pretending” (in 
Mitchell, 2002, p. 45, 47).  
 This chapter targets the need to posit mental representations to play the 
guiding role. The analysis below will focus particularly on the belief-based account of 
Nichols and Stich (2000, 2003) and the imagining-based account of van Leeuwen 
(2011) in order to show how mental representations have been said to come into the 
mental structures that guide pretending. It focuses on these two accounts as, although 
they both posit mental representations, they are importantly different; in Nichols and 
Stich’s account, the contents of mental representations are propositions, and in van 
Leeuwen’s account, they are non-propositional imaginings. What will then be shown 
                                                
81 A version of this chapter has been published (see Rucinska, 2014b). 
 107 
is that mental representations need not be posited to explain what guides pretending, 
as non mental representational alternatives can explain all the three roles for which it 
has been thought guiders are needed: guiding what is to be pretended, determining 
how acts of pretending unfold, and how acts of pretending are elaborated. Clarifying 
that these specific jobs are what guiders are supposed to perform is important, as it 
opens the door for both cognitivist guiders and their alternative counterparts to 
perform them. As such, they can be considered on par as realization mechanisms of 
pretence, and therefore, are genuine alternatives to each other.  
 This chapter will unfold in the following way. In line with the previous 
chapter, the strategy is to first explain why the guiding role has been targeted, 
examining whether that role needs to be played. This will be done in section 6.1, 
together with a clarification of what possible things can act as guiders. Section 6.2 
specifies how mental representations are supposed to play such guiding role. It looks 
at two significantly different cognitive accounts involving mental representations that 
have been posited to guide pretending: the belief-based account (Nichols and Stich, 
2000, 2003) and the imagining-based account (van Leeuwen, 2011). Section 6.3 
suggests an array of alternative factors that guide pretence that do not involve mental 
representations: objects (e.g., toys), other people (e.g., playmates) and narrative 
practices (e.g., storytelling). The object in play has affordances that guide pretence. 
Other people can be considered as forming the additional context shaping the 
pretending of the agent. Narrative practices can be considered as an aspect one of the 
agent’s effectivities, shaped by a history of interactions with stories. Section 6.4 
addresses some potential cognitivist worries with the alternative suggestion to what 
guides pretence, and proposes rebuttals.  
 This chapter gives further support to show how another role of mental 
representations in pretence can be played by structures that do not involve them. The 
alternative proposal in this chapter draws out the mere bones of the possible account, 
showing why it need not include mental representations. How the factors come 
together to make a coherent affordance-based alternative is left to Chapter 7.   
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6.1 Why target guiding, and what could a guider? 
   
The reason why the guiding role of mental representations in pretence is targeted is 
because that role needs to be played in order to explain pretence. Pretence always 
requires some execution; one cannot pretend in non-specific way. In a circumstance 
of pretend play, an agent performs specific actions X Y Z in order to enact A. For 
example, when pretending that the banana is a phone (A), one holds the banana to the 
ear (X); alternatively, one can hold it in front of one’s mouth (Y). Not only is the play 
specific; it is also often adequate to the situation. As Nichols and Stich (2000) assert, 
“(p)erhaps the most obvious fact about pretense is that pretenders actually do things, 
i.e. they engage in actions that are appropriate to the pretense. (…) A theory of 
pretence must explain how the pretenders determine what behaviour to engage in 
during an episode of pretence” (p. 119-120). That is why we need to ask about what 
guides the pretenders to act in these specific manners.82 If the specific behaviour was 
not present, but instead, the child engaged in a random act, then we would not be 
speaking of pretending at all. Engaging in some kind of specific, non-accidental 
behaviour is a necessary requirement of pretending. Otherwise there would be no 
difference between an accidental act and a pretence act (e.g., banging drumsticks on 
the table vs. ‘pretending to be a drummer’). Whatever it is that structures the 
behaviours to be non-accidental is the guider; it explains how the non-accidental and 
appropriate behaviour is produced.  
 This chapter focuses on the question of what guides pretence. I target the 
question: ‘how is pretence accomplished in a specific way?’ There are many 
variations of this question. Some are synonymous (for example, Funkhouser and 
Spaulding (2009) ask: “Given that the child is pretending, why does she react to the 
pretence in this manner?” (p. 14)). Other questions seem synonymous, but ask for 
different types of answers. One might be confused by the way Nichols and Stich 
elaborate on their question “how the pretenders determine what behaviour to engage 
in during an episode of pretence?,” by following up with: “How do they know that 
they should walk around making jerky movements and saying ‘Chugga chugga, choo 
choo’ when pretending to be a train, and lie still when pretending to be a dead cat, 
                                                
82 This is a different issue than what motivated engaging in pretending in the first place. It may be that 
the motivators are mental representations, but even if that is the case (e.g., a ‘desire’ to pretend play X 
motivated the play), it does not follow that the guiders are mental representations.  
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rather than vice versa?” (2000, p. 120, emphasis added). Clearly, the epistemological 
question of how children know anything about how to pretend is a different kind of 
question than how the pretending gets to happen; the latter requires only looking at 
that which enables children to pretend in a specific (and appropriate) way.83 This 
chapter targets the latter question, which asks about the mechanisms that guide 
children’s pretence behaviours. Thus, for clarity sake, the chapter will continue to ask 
‘how is pretence accomplished in a specific way?’ alongside ‘why is the child 
pretending like that?’ under the banner question ‘what guides pretending?’ A 
satisfying answer to this question will propose some explanation about how specific 
behaviours come about in pretend play.  
 But what is, or could be, a guider? Let us consider an everyday example to 
illuminate possible options of what could guide: a case of putting together a bookshelf 
that is delivered to our door in pieces. We don’t know how to put it together yet, so 
how do we go about it? Here are some options of what could guide our behaviour. 
Option 1 is to follow written instructions (if available), with rules specifying how to 
put the bookshelf together (e.g., “connect piece 4A to 4B using a screw”). Option 2 is 
to look at the image of the completed bookshelf and follow a model or diagram, 
which specifies pictorially (with arrows) how to connect pieces 4A and 4B.  
 These options are loosely representative of respectively the belief-based 
account and the imagining-based account that will be analysed below, except for the 
fact that in real life, we follow written scripts and drawn images, whereas in these 
accounts, we implicitly follow rules and models that are provided by subpersonal 
mechanisms. Nichols and Stich posit a mechanism with mental representations whose 
contents are “conditional beliefs” that instruct the behaviour (2000, p. 129, footnote 
8). Van Leeuwen (2011) posits a mechanism with mental representations whose 
contents are a combination of images and motor plans. These accounts will be 
elaborated on in the next section.  
 Importantly, the belief-based and the imagining-based accounts do not 
consider other options, for example, that the shelf pieces at hand may ‘dictate’ to us 
how to be put together in terms of how they fit (like pieces of puzzle)84, that we could 
be building the shelf with other people, following their lead, or figuring out how to 
                                                
83 I am thus setting aside the question of how pretenders know what they’re doing, because it might be 
that they do not need to ‘know’ what they are doing in the sense that requires mental representations.  
84 Our exploratory behaviour with the shelf pieces may do the trick given the internal possibilities for 
combination. 
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build the shelf together based on what we have heard about building shelves. These 
options are in line with the possible positive alternatives to what guides pretence 
behaviour that will be shown in section 6.3. 
 Therefore, so as not to foreclose on the alternative possibilities, in this chapter 
the term ‘guider’ is used the broad sense as that which determines, shapes or 
structures the behaviour of an agent.  
 There exists an account of pretence guiders that does consider factors such as 
other people or social norms in explaining what guides pretence. Such account is of 
Funkhouser and Spaulding (2009). They emphasize the role of what they call 
“external scripts” in guiding pretence behaviour, making a clear distinction between 
internal and external guiders. They consider an external script (or “script outside the 
agent”) to be “a physical script, the behaviour of another individual, or a social norm” 
(310).85 However, they argue that the external scripts guide pretence in conjunction 
with imagination, or the “internal script”. Thus, they also commit to there being 
internal guiders (which they define as ‘mental scripts’ or “maps by which we steer; 
directors; means selectors” (p. 307)) as the necessary guiding mechanism, which may 
only at times be augmented by the external one. Their internal guiders, considered as 
mental scripts, involve mental representations such as mentally represented scripts or 
maps.  
 The alternative proposed in section 6.3 is similar to the ‘external scripts’ of 
Funkhouser and Spaulding, but not exactly alike. The alternative emphasizes the 
dynamic structure of cognition, hence, guiders such as physical scripts or other 
objects, behaviours of others or social norms should not be strictly considered as 
external to what makes pretence, but as part of the animal-environment dynamic that 
forms a wide and situated mechanism of pretence.  
 
6.2 Cognitivist proposals: the belief-based and the imagining-based accounts  
  
This section describes in more detail the two importantly different cognitive accounts 
posited to explain how pretence is guided: Nichols and Stich’s (2000, 2003) belief-
based account of guiders, and van Leeuwen’s (2011) imagining-based account of 
                                                
85 Aside actual scripts, whether behaviours and norms count as a genuine scripts per se depends on 
one’s notion of a ‘script’; they can, however, be thought of as guiders in accordance with the minimal 
description given earlier in the paper.  
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guiders. This section does not aim at setting the stage for providing knockdown 
arguments against these cognitive accounts of guiders, as this is not the aim of the 
thesis. Instead, it aims to clarify how exactly these guiders work, in order to allow fair 
comparison of these accounts of guiders that posit mental representations to possible 
alternative account that does not posit mental representations. Those accounts can be 
fairly compared because in both, guiders are left to play the same functions – guiding 
what is to be pretended, guiding how acts of pretending unfold, and guiding how acts 
of pretending are elaborated – albeit by entirely different means. Presently, I engage 
in elaborating on the way guiders play their designated roles in the two cognitive 
accounts.  
 
a) The belief-based account 
 
As Meinhardt et al. (2012) explain, according to Nichols and Stich, “[pretence] is a 
form of situation-based behaviour, that is, ‘behaving in a way that would be 
appropriate if P (the counterfactual situation) were the case’ … Thus, to engage in 
[pretence], the young child needs to construct multiple models of one situation (what 
is appropriate in reality; what is appropriate in fiction)…” (2012, p. 623). Arguably, 
constructing models of appropriate situations requires the appropriateness to be 
specified by mental contents.  
 Nichols and Stich propose that guiding is done by a mechanism that posits 
mental representational contents in form of ‘conditional beliefs’, such as “if X were 
the case, then Y”. They understand guiders in terms of mental scripts, which are 
formed of conditional beliefs. They are clusters of mental contents whose role is to be 
“detailing the way in which certain situations typically unfold” (2003, p. 34). The 
clusters represent not just singular premises, but whole scripts. Nichols and Stich 
compare the scripts to plans for actions. For example, they turn to the function of 
plan-construction to account for how one can aim to pretend a ‘train’ and end up 
making ‘chugga’ sound. They claim:  
 
One of the things that the mental mechanisms responsible for reasoning and inference can do 
is to construct plans. As we envision it, plan construction is a process of means-ends 
reasoning: given a goal or a set of goals, the part of the inference system that is responsible 
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for constructing plans comes up with one or more ways to achieve these goals (idem, p. 13-
14). 
 
 The idea seems to be that when one decides to play X (e.g., a tea party), one is 
directed to the goal represented as X (enact “tea party”), which activates an inference 
mechanism in a form of a plan, specifying how to achieve this goal. The plans are 
there to specify how things unfold and to specify what is the appropriate behaviour to 
be engaging in, also in pretence.    
 As clarified in section 2 of Chapter 2, Nichols and Stich postulate a cognitive 
architecture with a set of functionally interconnected mechanisms, such as the Belief 
Box, the Possible World Box (PWB), and the Script Elaborator. By their lights, 
applied to the ‘tea party’ pretence, the mental mechanism works as follows. 
Information about tea parties is drawn from the Belief Box; as they claim, the 
pretender “must have some beliefs about what typically goes on at tea parties” (2000, 
p. 126), such as, for example, ‘in tea parties we sip slowly from the cup’. Then, the 
PWB spells out what the world would be like in the imagined counterfactual scenario. 
It then produces a counterfactual belief, something like ‘if a tea party was taking 
place, I would be sipping slowly from the cup’. Finally, they add to the cognitive 
architecture a planning mechanism called the Script-Elaborator, which determines 
how the premises in the script are to be elaborated; its job is to “fill in those details of 
a pretence that can’t be inferred from the pretence premise” (2000, p. 127), enabling 
the inference to ‘fill out’ the PWB description in relevant ways. The Script Elaborator 
accounts for novel and creative acts during the tea party play, such ‘dancing cups’. 
The idea is that, for example, one starts off with a belief that ‘in a restaurant we eat 
with cutlery’, but then, during play, the actors can elaborate on this by pretending the 
knife is a ‘sword’. According to Nichols and Stich, in that case the Script Elaborator 
should have a content of the sort: ‘the knife becomes a sword’. Hence, the PWB is to 
provide this content with on-the-spot suggestions about what the world would be like 
if the counterfactual scenario held, and the Script Elaborator is to provide further 
instructions on how to elaborate on that content. 
 While Nichols and Stich do not spell it out, conditional beliefs forming the 
initial premises (and scripts) are most likely to be propositions. Propositions are good 
candidates to act as rules or instructions. For example, the conditional belief “if I were 
in a restaurant, I would be eating with cutlery” could be understood as forming an 
 113 
instruction or rule “in restaurants eat we with cutlery”. Similarly, instructions could 
make conditional beliefs into propositions. As beliefs are propositional attitudes, their 
belief-based account should be understood as involving mental representations that 
form propositions.  
 
b) The imagining-based account 
 
 Van Leeuwen (2011) posits an internalised guiding mechanism with mental 
representational content that are images. He emphasizes the imaginative nature of the 
guiders. As mentioned in Chapter 5 section 1, imagination is important for guiding 
pretence, not just for ‘acting as if’. On Van Leeuwen’s account, it is not beliefs, but 
imaginings in the form of mental images, which guide pretence. He also augments his 
proposal by introducing motor plans to guide pretence together with mental images. 
Hence, in contrast to the belief-based account, the imagining-based account rejects the 
idea that mental representations guide through sets of beliefs. 86 There are also no 
initial premises to kick-start the pretence (only perceptual input), and its mediation is 
not done by beliefs, but by imaginings of various forms.   
 While van Leeuwen does not use the term ‘guider’, he proposes the following 
account of how imaginings direct pretence action, which he calls ‘Active Imagination 
Thesis’: 
 
Active Imagination Thesis: There exists a form of imagining that is a continuously updated 
forward model of action in the world, in which action possibilities are constructed in relation 
to a manifold of largely perceptual representations that can be veridical, nonveridical, or 
mixed – where mixed is a usual and important case. A ‘forward model’ is an internal 
representation of motor commands that anticipates the consequences of those commands on 
bodily motion. The ‘nonveridical’ perceptual representations are basically mental imagery. 
(…) What is radical about this view, in relation to other views I consider, is the idea that 
(nonveridical) mental imagery can be integrated into the perceptual field and that this form of 
imagining delivers the objects we relate to in constructing pretence action, such as make-
believe (2011, p. 56).87  
                                                
86 This account shows that cognitivism needn’t imply beliefs but can get by with belief-like attitudes 
such as imaginative states of mind (ala Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002).  
87 To clarify, on this account, imagery and non-verdical representations that predict outcomes might be 
thought to inform and guide acts of mere perceiving as well. 
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 He further claims that “the imaginings that are most immediate to the 
production of pretence are spatially rich; they are perceptually formatted or structured 
as representations of bodily movement” (ibid., p. 67, emphasis added). He also 
proposes that the imaginings he posits “are analogous to the spatial diagrams – and 
the drawings of them – while beliefs, desires, and propositional imaginings are 
analogous to comments” (ibid., p. 68, emphasis added). He highlights that this claim 
“appeals to the traditional idea of mental imagery but also emphasizes that 
anticipatory motor plans, or forward models, can be imaginative” (ibid., p. 68) 
Forward models “are implicated in the planning and performance of motor actions” 
(ibid., p. 73).  
 To summarise, Van Leeuwen’s account of ‘active imagination’ is a cocktail 
with various ingredients: forward models with motor commands and mental images 
with perceptual representations. It seems like the perceptual representations form the 
mental contents, and forward models are their vehicles. The motor commands and 
mental imagery are integrated in the perceptual field, and together enable pretending. 
But how exactly does that happen? As Van Leeuwen claims, forward models and 
mental imagery combine in guiding as follows. Mental imagery provides the object of 
pretence, which can then be imitated. As Van Leeuwen claims, “In pretence, what one 
can imitate is a mental image or other imagined content” (idem, p. 72, emphasis 
added). He discusses the game of charades as an example of imitating a mental image:  
 
What happens, for example, in a game of charades? You read a card that says ‘flying bird’. A 
mental image of a bird flapping its wings pops into your mind. So, playing the game, you 
imitate the motion of the bird that is represented onto your visual imagination by flapping 
your arms (idem, p. 72).  
 
 Moreover, “in addition to providing objects in relation to which forward-
model imagining constructs actions, [mental imagery] can set the structure of motion 
that the forward model models” (ibid., p. 72). This is how forward models come in; 
they seem to specify the movements to be made by the agent. Let us take as an 
example the banana-phone case; the idea seems to be that the mental image of a 
phone (or, more likely, someone holding a phone to the ear) sets the target of pretence 
and provides the forward commands for the motor plans that guide how to achieve it 
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(perhaps something along the lines of: ‘hold the banana to the ear like this’, which is 
at the same time not a proposition). The forward model need not be understood as a 
belief-based instruction; in the weakest sense, the forward model could be understood 
as a pictorial representation of bodily movement that indicates “an open-ended set of 
possible actions (a kind of under-specified knowledge-how)” (Cappuccio and 
Wheeler 2012, p. 27). What is important for van Leeuwen is that the forward 
commands interact with the image, not beliefs about it, which is why entities like 
Possible World Boxes need not be posited on his picture. 
 
c) Summary: specific functions mental representations are said to play in 
guiding pretence 
 
If we were to cluster the jobs mental guiders purportedly do in the two accounts 
discussed above, the following three types of jobs emerge. It is guiding  
 
(a) what is to be pretended,  
(b) how (a) is pretended, 
(c) how (a, b) get to be elaborated.  
 
 With regard to guiding (a) (what is to be pretended), on Nichols and Stich’s 
account, the Belief Box with clusters of belief-based mental contents allow the 
pretenders to have some beliefs about “what typically goes on at tea parties” (2003, p. 
126).88 On Van Leeuwen’s account, mental images are said to “deliver the objects of 
pretence” (2011, p. 56). With regard to guiding (b) (how what is to be pretended is 
pretended), Nichols and Stich propose a Possible World Box that is “detailing the way 
in which situations typically unfold” (2003, p. 34), by spelling out what the world 
would be like in the imagined counterfactual scenario. Van Leeuwen, on the other 
hand, posits perceptual representations and motor commands that achieve pretence by 
“constructing action possibilities”; they “set the structure of motion” (2011, p. 72). 
How things will unfold or develop is specified on Nichols and Stich’s account by an 
instruction; this seems more open-ended on Van Leeuwen’s image account. Finally, 
while missing from van Leeuwen’s account, Nichols and Stich attribute the function 
                                                
88 They are also said to “create multiple models of one situation to specify what is appropriate in reality 
and what is appropriate in fiction” (in Meinhardt et al., 2012, p. 623). 
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of elaborating what is to be pretended and how it is to be pretended (c) to their belief-
based structures; the Script Elaborator is responsible for novelty and creativity of 
pretence (2000, p. 127). It is likely that Van Leeuwen’s account could achieve 
elaboration without Script Elaborators, but with new perceptual contents.  
 The next section provides details of possible alternative guiders that do not 
posit mental representations. It will become clear that the alternative guiders can play 
the same three functions that the cognitivist guiders claim to play: saying what is to be 
pretended, how it is to be pretended, and how the pretence can be elaborated.   
 
6.3 Alternative guiders 
 
How else might we explain how acts of pretence are guided if not by appeal to mental 
representations? Even if we concede that mental representations could do the job of 
guiding pretence, they are not the only way to go.89 This section shows that we can 
conceive of acts of pretend play solely structured by interactions with the external 
world, interactions that explain what we play and how we play this and not another 
way, as well as how the play can get elaborated.  The section gives a possibility proof 
of providing an alternative account based contingently on some candidates of guiders 
that are considered to be ‘external’ by Funkhouser and Spaulding (2009). They are 
objects in the environment that have relevant affordances, other people in the 
environment that form the relevant context (actualising the affordance-effectivity 
pairs that afford further possibilities for action), as well as history of narrative 
practices, that form relevant effectivities. These will be elaborated on below.  
 
a) Object affordances and subject’s bodily effectivities 
 
One factor that can guide pretence is the object itself that is being used in play. Its 
affordances shape and guide play. Consider, for example, the case of object-
substitution play with a banana. Firstly, the shape and size of the banana affords 
playing with it as a phone. Bananas could afford to human beings (with right 
dispositions) holding them to the ear, placing on the head or pointing, which could 
                                                
89 It is not actually certain that mental representations are successful in performing those jobs. 
However, this section will not involve criticisms and problems with the cognitive accounts of guiders.   
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turn into ‘phone, ‘hat’ or ‘gun’ plays, respectively.90 However, object affordances 
structure due to their limitations as well; unlike suppositions and imaginings, which 
could turn anything into anything else, physical objects afford certain possibilities of 
acting with them and limit others. For example, even if one were set on pretending 
with a banana that it is a human shoe, its soft structure would not allow a successful 
shoe game as the banana would get squashed when stepped on. What would make the 
banana’s being squashed an unsuccessful shoe game is not the child’s expectations 
about how the game should go; rather, the game’s success is dependent on the 
environmental possibilities for action, or affordances, of objects, paired with the 
bodily dispositions of the child. Szokolsky (2006) rightfully insists on the crucial role 
of objects, or tools, in pretence. She claims that  
 
Tools create new opportunities for action by enhancing, extending, or restoring the action 
capabilities of the actor. Tools focus behaviors and promote the fit of actors to their task 
environments in more visible ways than actions that do not depend on tools. (…) [They] may 
help focus behaviour and this may explain why pretense without objects is more difficult than 
pretense with objects: the difficulty lies not in the lack of external cues (…), but in that there 
is no material basis that would guide and focus the activity” (p. 81-82).  
 
 Moreover, actively exploring objects can guide new pretence play. Embodied 
explorations have to do with manipulating the object in various ways; the type of 
manipulation is allowed by both the agent’s dispositions and by the object’s 
dispositions. Depending on the body of the animal (e.g., having a hand that can grip 
objects, having a functioning arm that can bend), an object like a banana can be 
grasped and brought to the head of an animal at a minimal cost, that is, without any 
effort. This combination of the dispositions of the objects and animals suggests to the 
animals how to use the objects, as for example, in play context. Consider the pretend 
‘rocket’ play with a miniature rocket toy (in Mitchell, 2002). How children play 
‘rocket’ is mostly guided by the extend of their arm movement, which makes the 
rocket toy go up in the air and then down again and to the side, similarly to how 
children play ‘airplane’. Even older children who may very well know that rockets 
only go in a straight trajectory upwards (thus, children who have a linguistic concept 
                                                
90 There is no need to assume that concepts would be involved, unless we understand concepts as skills. 
See Noë (2015). 
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of a ‘rocket’) often play by moving the rocket sideways as that is what the extend of 
their arms allow. This is how the bodily dispositions of the animal, paired with the 
dispositions of the objects, affect what kind of ‘rocket’ play the miniature rocket 
invites.  
 
b) Other people  
 
Other people can also afford certain actions to an individual agent; the possibilities for 
actions that other people bring about can also play a guiding role in pretence. Other 
people can be seen as affording pretend action to a child in two ways: first, in direct 
engagement, or interaction, with the child, and second, through their mere presence. I 
will clarify both situations below.  
 Through direct engagements, others can structure play. The structuring is 
often done by direct guidance (e.g., adults show how to ‘pretend drink’ from a cup, 
which the child imitates).91 However, it can also emerge in their interaction. When 
playing together, new affordances get solicited in the action that would not be 
available to the individual animal. For example, a banana held by a single child can 
solicit phone, but held by two children, who each hold one end of the banana, can 
solicit a little swing.  
 Novel solicitations also emerge through intersubjective engagements with 
people, such as in dialogical interactions, where, through repeated exposure, the 
interaction with others shapes seeing things in new light. As an example, consider 
dialogical therapy. Therapists help clients get out of their destructive routines or 
habitual ways of looking at and interacting with the world though sustained 
conversation (Rucinska and Reijmers, 2014). It can sometimes take years of therapy 
to be able to step away from ‘bad habits’, but ultimately, through sustained practice 
and interaction, the client is able to learn to see objects or situations in novel ways.  
 Moreover, even mere immediate presence of others (who are the spectators of 
a game, not its participants) affects and shapes the type of performance one is 
engaged in (for example, how one plays tea party). This is also a case of interacting, 
albeit not in play itself. Others who are spectators of play produce constant emotional 
feedback (such as smiling), which is responded to by the pretender who continues the 
                                                
91 Mimicry is a likely first step towards individual pretence due to its developmental priority (Stern, 
1985; Tomasello 1999). 
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game. For example, when a child is exploring ways to play ‘tea party’, the smiles, 
gestures and actions of caregivers or fellow playmates reassure the child in what he or 
she is doing. Even when not playing with a caregiver, a child at play is frequently in 
the presence of a caregiver, who approves or disapproves the play by reacting (e.g., 
with laughter and encouragement), which asserts to the child what action is acceptable 
in a game.  Negative emotional feedback can also affects the game; other people 
showing confusion makes one adjust the pretence. How the spectator shapes the play 
is especially visible in a game of charades (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).92 It could 
be said that different affordances become present to the actor depending on the 
responsiveness of the teammates. The actors tend to adjust their behaviours in relation 
to the spectators: seeing that their audience does not understand the act (e.g., ‘bird in 
flight’), the actors adjust their behaviours to accommodate the understanding of the 
spectators, and explore other means of depicting the same thing (e.g., if flapping 
hands up and down does not work, one tries something else). In that sense, the 
reactions of others make novel affordances be inviting to the pretender.93 However, as 
Myers (2002) notices, “as long as other players tolerate (the pretender’s) cryptic and 
unaccountable behaviour, [the pretender] need not explain herself or respond to 
language and so carry on in an idiosyncratic way” (in Mitchell, 2002, p. 159). Thus, 
being in a shared environment and reacting to other people guides how the game is 
being played (e.g., the participants veto certain moves in the game).  
 To summarise, social referencing is a very important factor for pretence, as 
children constantly check whether the other participants or spectators are aware of the 
situation being just a game, and whether they accept it or not. Reactions of others in 
the shared environment make further possibilities for play, or pretence affordances, to 
become present. Hence, the answer to the question ‘what guides pretence?’ involves 
factors other than the object and the agent alone; it can also involve other people as 
well. How exactly other people fit into the ‘wide and situated mechanism’ of pretence 
will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
 
                                                
92 For example, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) discuss the case of playing charades together in the 
context of Participatory Sense Making, a theory about how we make sense of others through 
coordinated interaction. 
93 This is supported by recent studies, which show that infant’s understanding of others is more robust 
in interactive contexts. These contexts indicate grave importance of second-person interactions for 
cognitive and social development (De Jaegher et al., 2010).  
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c) Routine engagements and narrative practices  
 
Finally, another possible factor in what guides pretence are routine engagements of 
the subject and narrative practices he or she is part of. Engagement in routines (e.g., 
participating in tea parties) and exposure to narrative practices (watching and hearing 
stories about tea parties) are both part of the individual’s history of interactions. As 
such, they form relevant dispositions, or effectivities, of the animal that, when paired 
up with relevant affordances, can guide pretence. I will elaborate on these two factors 
below. 
 When it comes to routine engagements, even before being a full-blown 
language user, engagement with certain types of scenarios could play the crucial role 
for children engaging in pretence. Where the history of one’s past routine interactions 
is concerned, the child may be able to apply familiar routines, such as having the 
phone placed to the child’s ear during a phone call, to new objects outside typical 
phone contexts, such as to bananas, once they are in a playful context. To have that 
ability, the child must be acquainted with how to use phones in the most rudimentary 
sense. 94 It may be enough that they have seen their mother pick up phones to their 
ears and imitated such movements. Similarly, acting out ‘being a bear’ may involve a 
routine appropriated from watching bears on the television, hearing a book about 
bears or copying the teacher from preschool who was showing how bears act, and re-
enacting what has been seen or shown.  
 Mere re-enactment of routines, however, is not sufficient for elaboration; 
narrative capacities (that rely on linguistic representations) are needed for that. It may 
be that pre-linguistic children cannot elaborate on their pretence through narratives; 
what guides them to elaborate play in a basic way are embodied explorations of the 
object and participation in intersubjective play. However, once narratives are in place, 
they can further elaborate how pretence acts develop.  
 The elaboration of social routines in pretend play might stem from 
engagement with narratives; narratives may provide the possibility of going beyond 
the immediacy of social routines and oil the wheels of elaboration, enabling possible 
counterfactual engagements. The reason why more complex role-play becomes more 
frequent in later stages of child development may be because familiarity with 
                                                
94 This is something like the ‘initial premise’, but not intellectualised as a mental representation.  
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narratives could allow children (and adults) to create new pretence scenarios while 
using a specific pre-established set of characters and settings (e.g., pretend-playing to 
be a ‘waiter’ and a ‘customer’ in a restaurant scenario), but improvising with the 
script. Narratives expand the range of acceptable or at least possible norms and 
practices. Thus, while engagement in routines lies at the heart of pretend play, which 
starts out as fairly limited, the play can get elaborated through the narrative scaffolds 
at first, and more elaborating storytelling later. For example, one can engage in a 
restaurant scenario by enacting what one usually does in a restaurant and elaborating 
the play inspired by a story about sword-fighters, or exploring, e.g., role-playing to be 
an elephant with ‘flying’ (to create ‘Dumbo the flying elephant’ play). Then, the 
social context determines whether there is a breakdown in the ‘restaurant’ play or 
whether it is accommodated by ‘restaurant where we eat with swords instead of with 
cutlery’ play; similarly, the social context determines whether there is a breakdown in 
‘elephant’ play, or whether the flying is accommodated (and can be re-interpreted as 
playing ‘Dumbo the flying elephant’ thanks to the known narrative). To take another 
example, when the child is familiar with stories about non-existing objects or entities 
(e.g., ghosts), he or she can add them to fuel his or her elaborations, which allow new 
types of play, such as highly imaginative play like having an imaginary friend. Hence, 
engaging in acts of pretence guided by narratives may allow children to frame 
pretence by creating, following and negotiating the external script.  
 In addition, narratives can create an awareness of the norms followed in the 
society, and teach about what is right and wrong. Routines also depict a status quo of 
appropriate behaviour, but with narratives, these are voiced and explained; in stories, 
we gain reasons for what is taken to be good and bad, what is moral and immoral 
behaviour. Thus, pretending that involves both enacting social routines (e.g., feeding 
a baby-doll), and narrating them (e.g., pretending to be a ‘good mother’) may lead to 
understanding and accepting institutional norms and rules of conduct in a society later 
on (e.g., the obligation of child care). Narratives, insofar as they portray unusual or 
alternative behaviours, can expand on accepted norms and increase the possibilities of 
play, as well as the possibilities of understanding others who are very different from 
us (Gallagher, 2013). They can also guide behaviour when there is no group context 
(absence), and can still structure individual, solitary play. They further allow 
conceptual blending, use of analogy and metaphors to guide the agent.  
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 In short, history of engagement with routines and learned narratives can do the 
work of guiding and elaborating pretend play that the mental representational 
structures were supposed to do. One might hold that one learns how to act as a bear 
without relying on a set of rules about what bears do based on belief-like mental 
representations that supply explicit instructions, or a set of images about bears based 
on pictorial mental representations, but only relies on acting out known routines of 
playing ‘bears’ with narratives about bears. Narrative scaffolds allow us to look for 
explanations of what guides pretence by going wide, not deep. The scaffold of 
routines and narratives can stand in for mental guiders; they allow elaboration to take 
place without invoking imaginary maps or Script Elaborators. 
  
d) Summary: alternative guiders can too play the same functions 
 
This section proposes that objects themselves, as well as other people and known 
routines and narratives, guide: what children pretend, how they pretend and how they 
elaborate on their pretence. It is the affordances of the objects, paired with bodily 
dispositions of the agents, which both make accessible and limit how the objects can 
be used. What can be done with the objects need not be pre-planned or imagined by 
mentally representing; the possibilities show themselves in interaction, also with other 
people. Finally, the routine engagements can be said to shape a specific ‘know-how’ 
of the child without requiring that know-how to be stored as a mental representational 
content (Ryle, 1949). It is rather one of the capacities, or effectivities, of the child. 
Then, narrative capacities, which require full blown linguistic capacities and not 
mental representations, can further explain how pretence is elaborated.95 This may not 
be a complete story of all possible guiders of pretence, but it is a story that includes 
likely and sufficient guiders of pretence that at the same time does not involve mental 
scripts or mental representations. As such, they are compatible with the enactivist 
alternative that introduces affordance-based explanations of pretence.96  
                                                
95 What is involved in understanding and following narratives does not need mental representations. 
Creating, following and negotiating the external script in pretence may require full blown external 
representations, which is realised by the actor using language and not subpersonal mental 
representations. 
96 More work needs to be done to articulate the affordance-based understanding of how affordances 
guide; it needs explaining if affordances can ‘dictate’ to the animals how to act. Considering they have 
many degrees of freedom and many possibilities for action are possible, what explains why this and not 
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6.4 Some possible cognitivist challenges to the alternative guiders and rebuttals  
 
a) Pretence requires following rules  
 
There is a strong intuition that pretence is guided by strongly internalised rules; that is 
to say that the rules are implicit and coded into mental representations. For example, 
Rakoczy (2014) follows Walton (1990) in suggesting that “social pretence games are 
characterized by implicit constitutive rules: When two actors set up a pretence 
scenario together (e.g., pretending that a stone is a soap), this defines the normative 
space of the game: the stone counts as a fictional ‘soap’ in the context of the game 
and is to be treated accordingly” (p. 12). Yet, there is no argument for why the rules 
should be understood implicitly.97 In what follows I will engage in brief critique of the 
standard proposals to show why an alternative is desirable. 
 To speak of constitutive rules of pretence is to re-describe all pretence acts as 
being rule-based. Rakoczy et al. (2005) propose that all pretence is inherently 
structured by a rule X counts as Y in a context Z. This rule is constitutive of the game 
itself, just like in the game of chess, its rules are the game. However, even if all 
pretence were constitutively rule-based, it would not follow that one has to apply 
them, or engage in rule-following. These are different claims with regard to applying 
rules, as made by Mitchell (2004): “applying imagination to objects requires that 
children use rules of behaviour, such that pretence is acting out those rules” (p. 31), or 
even Vygotsky (1934/1978): “The child imagines himself to be the mother and the 
doll to be the child, so he must obey the rules of maternal behaviour” (p. 94). With 
regard to explaining what guides pretence, the use of rules is relevant, not the 
characterization of all pretence as a rule-following activity. Hence, we should only be 
considered with the question of whether using rules is necessary in order to pretend. 
 To that end, both ‘initial premises’ of the belief-based account and ‘forward 
models’ of the imagining-based account were proposed. They reflect the strong 
                                                                                                                                      
another affordance was acted on? This can be explained by an account of why only some affordances 
are inviting. This will be explained in Chapter 7.  
97 Rakoczy et al. (2014) found that children strongly object to deviations to pretence behaviours; these, 
however, are children with developed linguistic skills, who have been told what the pretence rule is 
explicitly. Hence, they would object to its violation.  
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internalisation stance. This is the idea that one has to form stand-in mental 
representations of the situation when one learns a skill.  
 If there are rules of pretence, they need not be mentally represented by being 
coded into mental plans and models, but can be simply voiced. Moreover, one can 
still be following certain norms even if there is no rule-following in play. For 
example, we can conceive of the Belief Box as our ‘background knowledge’ (e.g., of 
tea parties), but why should that knowledge be seen in terms of propositionally 
represented beliefs (in the format, “tea parties consist of XYZ”) is not explained. How 
such beliefs were formed is presumably by watching people engage in tea parties, or 
learning about tea parties through norms. Such norms, for example, may be re-enacted 
when engaging in pretend play, but there is no argument on the part of Nichols and 
Stich as to why they should be strongly internalised as propositional representations, 
such as, e.g., ‘in tea parties we sip slowly from the cup.’ Representing propositions 
seems like an unnecessary step when we can rely on a theory of background 
knowledge to do that job. 
 Moreover, it is unlikely that rules guide behaviour; too many rules would have 
to be specified to do that job. For example, if we take Nichols and Stich’s 
propositional account to provide instructions, we are confronted with a frame 
problem: too many rules would have to be specified about what is to be acted out, and 
this leads to an infinite regress; every rule would require a further rule for its 
application. To return to the tea party example, every single manoeuvre of holding a 
tea cup would have to be specified as a condition (e.g., ‘if I want to look like I’m 
drinking, I should bring my hand to my mouth at this angle,’ and then ‘to bring my 
hand to my mouth, I do …’), which would still need to be specified further. Aside the 
problem of being “forced to posit bizarre, incoherent, or simply unlikely beliefs in 
order to explain ordinary pretence” (Van Leeuwen 2011, p. 60), the mechanism would 
require an infinite number of conditional beliefs to specify how they should guide 
pretence. Thus, if conditional beliefs guide through creating potential instructions, 
they would have to specify even the most basic instructions.  
 In addition, even if all rules could be specified, there would not be enough 
room for flexible adjustments during play. The ‘tea party’ script would normally be 
based on a real tea party where there is real tea in the real cup. Part of the script rule 
in such a case would be something like: “When the tea cup is empty, do not take a 
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sip.” That rule would have to be altered to say, e.g., “except in cases of pretence.” So 
there would have to be rules stating when it is appropriate to pretend to take a sip. 
Somewhere down the line the script would need to be specified in more detail to 
distinguish between pretend and non-pretend scenarios, which invokes yet another 
layer of complexity.98 Thus, the worry is that positing such propositional machinery is 
explanatorily too costly and does not adequately explain the richness of pretence acts. 
 Nichols and Stich try to bracket the infinite regress problem by introducing 
soft constraints on what is being pretended, thereby committing themselves only to a 
rough set of behaviours being represented. They claim that: “(While mental) scripts 
can provide the general structure for many pretence episodes, they leave many aspects 
of the pretence episode unspecified. (…) So, within the script constraints, there are a 
variety of choices that the pretender has to make. (…) (The mental) script constraints 
themselves are only ‘soft’ constraints” (2000, p. 34-35). Perhaps, then, we needn’t 
speak of conditional beliefs as instructions at all. Or, if they are like instructions, 
perhaps a high level of specificity is not required; for ‘tea party’ pretence, for 
instance, the rules of behaviour can be more general (e.g., ‘pick up the pot and make a 
pouring gesture’). However, if that is the case, then it is unclear how conditional 
beliefs function as scripts of behaviours, where the propositions are supposed to be 
like plans, “detailing the way in which certain situations typically unfold” (ibid., p. 
34). The mental scripts seem to allow many choices, which implies that many things 
are not actually specified by the pretence script propositions. Of course, Nichols and 
Stich can make that move, but if they cannot give their mental scripts a more specific 
coding, then it does not seem to make much sense to invoke a complex propositional 
mechanism to guide behaviour in the first place. 
 
b) Are imaginings mental representations? 
 
Another solution is to posit non-propositional models with higher degrees of freedom. 
This is where Van Leeuwen’s weaker proposal of ‘active imagination’ as a guider 
                                                
98 Of course, the same point can be made about following physical scripts like screenplays; even a 
command “and now sight” does not give one all the details of how to act out a sigh – the actor must 
already possess embodied skill of sighing, and the actor is guided further (e.g., by the director showing 
or describing further how to do it). However, invoking subpersonal structures like belief boxes to 
explain how one’s behaviour is guided from the ‘inside’ through internalised rules of behaviour 
demands these rules to be more specific. 
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comes in. However, it is not clear whether his account needs to posit mental 
representations at all.  
 When it comes to understanding how behaviour is guided, there are certain 
aspects of the model account that should worry its supporters. For example, Van 
Leeuwen claims that “In pretence, what one can imitate is a mental image or other 
imagined content” (2011, p. 72, emphasis added) One worry concerns the idea of 
‘imitating a mental image’. While a person can be adjusting his/her own movements 
‘online’ to the observed behaviour of the bird, it is far from clear how one imitates an 
‘offline’ image. Imitating is usually understood as copying (the means of) an action 
one has observed or is observing. When one is not actually observing a flying bird, 
there can be a delayed imitation (understood as re-enactment) of an actual bird in 
flight one once saw, rather than an imitation of the mental representation of the bird. 
However, we should put into question whether imitation is the right mechanism 
underlying a pretend activity in the first place; playing a ‘bird in flight’ might also be 
simply an act of embodied recreating (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002).  
 Importantly, acting out of imagination may not be a representational activity 
in the first place. Re-creating can have novel and creative elements to it, and there is 
no way of telling whether it ‘matches’ what actually has been seen, such as the ‘bird 
in flight memory’. Considering also that one can imagine anything about the bird one 
wishes, there would be nothing constraining whether the imitation was done correctly 
or incorrectly. So, as there are no conditions of satisfaction to be kept, there is no 
representing going on. 
 Consider the thought-experiment of Langland-Hassan (2014): Joe wants buy a 
new couch. Joe imagines a new couch to fit through the front door. However, when 
the couch arrives, it does not fit. As Langland-Hassan summarises, “The imagining 
was a failure. Our conception of its correctness conditions should reflect that fact” 
(2014, p. 405). As Hutto (2015) comments,  
 
In being far too open, (…), imaginings are almost always correct, and hence their putative 
contentful properties are quite disconnected from most uses to which they are standardly put. 
(…) The root problem is that if the content of basic imaginings is construed as only 
answerable to what is possible, (…), then the correctness conditions for sensory imaginings 
are so unconstrained that they turn out to be almost always successful” (p. 75). 
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 Thus, an argument has been made that imaginings do not have 
appropriateness conditions (conditions of satisfaction) to count as mental 
representations in the first place. Without some kind of semantic description, the 
models allow ‘anything’ to go. Hence, images alone are not enough, it is what one can 
do with them that accounts for how one can pretend. 
 Also, it is not clear why Van Leeuwen’s model requires mental 
representations to begin with. For example, when discussing the nature of the ‘mental 
images’, Van Leeuwen claims that his account “is not a ‘pictures in the mind’ view; 
rather, however the brain encodes percepts, it can encode imaginary representations in 
the like manner” (idem, p. 73). Such claim leaves a great room for interpretation; 
there is no argument that mental images must be realised by mental representations; 
they can be done by whatever will do the job.  
 If imaginary representations are both encoded and can guide, but are neither a 
proposition nor in any sense a ‘picture’, then how are we to understand them and their 
explanatory functions? Van Leeuwen does introduce ‘forward models’ as the second 
part of his story; perhaps they are supposed to take care of how one is directed at the 
image at hand. Yet, it is not clear what Van Leeuwen makes of the nature of the 
forward models; he does not specify how percepts are ‘encoded’ by the brain. 
Moreover, forward models can be interpreted in many ways (for example, as 
efference copies), and it is certainly possible to understand them non-
representationally as well (as covariant correlations). In other words, invoking 
forward models in an explanatory story does not justify a representational 
understanding of them, and more work has to be put to show what role, if any, they 
play in guiding pretence. 
 To summarise, both proposals of Nichols and Stich and Van Leeuwen have 
difficulties; belief-like structures forming rules of behaviour are too rigid to guide, 
whereas imaginings could guide, but they need not be mental representations at all.  
 
c) Question of appropriateness 
 
Another challenge a cognitivist may raise is that what guides us in pretence must 
guide us to play appropriately. The pretenders do not just act in a way that is random 
to the situation; their play is usually adequate to the situation. What cognitivists 
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would say is that what determines this appropriateness of play (that the guiding is not 
done towards just any specific outcome, but one that is appropriate) is the mental 
representation. For example, to play ‘elephant’ game appropriately, the belief-like 
content ‘this is how elephants act’ (which also relies on the concept of an elephant), 
or the imagining of the behaviour of elephants, guide pretence.  
 To address this worry, it can be argued that in social pretence, appropriateness 
conditions are determined (and updated) by the social engagements, whereas in 
individual play, there simply are no appropriateness conditions at all; what the child is 
targeted in play is play that is ‘good enough’ to fulfil the goals of the child, such as 
having fun. These points will be elaborated on in turn.  
 Let us stick to the ‘elephant’ game example. Imagine a boy and a girl playing 
‘elephants’ together. The boy is walking heavily, slowly lifting his feet. The girl, 
however, is stretching her arms and running around. Arguably, her play could count 
as ‘elephant’ pretence as well, as long as the boy she is playing with accepts this play 
as ‘elephant’ play. What could fix his acceptance is the ‘Dumbo the flying elephant’ 
narrative. In this context, both acts are done purposefully, but it is not the case that the 
behaviour of the boy is objectively ‘accurate’ (as guided by his mental representation 
of the elephant), and the girl’s is not (due to a ‘misrepresentation’ of what elephants 
do that confused her play). That is one interpretation of the situation, but another one 
is simply that both acts are appropriate as appropriateness is specified by a social 
agreement (I play elephant like this, you play elephant like that), not the mental 
representation. The social context can render both pretence acts as appropriate.99  
 To this answer, the cognitivist may object to by saying that some acts of 
pretence can occur in solitary settings; children are known to pretend play alone, and 
so the correctness of their play need not be set by the social context. However, in the 
situation of solitary play, it can be questioned whether there are any correctness 
conditions to be fulfilled in the first place. Is the boy who is playing ‘elephant’ by 
walking heavily playing accurately? It might be that in solitary play, there are no 
accuracy conditions to begin with; the boy can change his play to stretching his arms, 
in which case the play could be both ‘inaccurate’ (misrepresenting the elephant as a 
bird) and ‘accurate’ (playing ‘Dumbo the flying elephant’ game). Saying that it is his 
                                                
99 Also, even when not engaging in play, a caregiver can approve or disapprove of the play with smiles 
or encouragement, determining what is acceptable as a game, which would again make the 
appropriateness of play socially-established. 
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intention that specifies this accuracy is post hoc; the boy could first play in a novel 
way (due to wanting to stretch his arms) and then ‘update’ his intention accordingly.  
 Hence, it is not good enough to claim that the content of the intention of 
children to play ‘elephants’ before the game determines the appropriateness of the 
game (pace Rakoczy et al., 2004, 2005). As shown in section 3, engagement in 
intersubjective context can affect the intention of the player to be reset, as in the case 
of the charades. Why intention could not do the requisite guiding job is because 
intentions change in action. As Szokolsky (2006) argues,  
 
Recontextualization in pretense is a dynamic process of relating the affordances of the object 
to the demands of the pretend intention. The interplay between the pretend intention and the 
affordances of the object involves the use of affordances that may support the pretend action 
to various degrees; it may also involve the changing of the affordances in case they are not 
ideally supporting the pretend action. It may also be that, upon perceiving or conceiving a 
new possibility for action, the original intention is quickly dropped and replaced by new 
intention (p. 82).  
 
 The alternative Szokolsky suggests is that (solitary) pretend play is not 
correct, but it can be good enough. She claims that the affordances of objects need 
only allow the pretence to be ‘good enough’ to fulfil the child’s goals. She suggests 
that a better understanding of pretence will “stem from viewing pretend object play as 
the proper use of available affordances. Certainly, the available affordances of object 
differ in their appropriateness to be used as the target object. But children are satisfied 
with using a good-enough affordance and fine-tune the action accordingly” (2006, p. 
69). For example, while a miniature tiger toy may seem to be more appropriate for 
‘fighting the tiger’ play due to their resemblances, a pillow may be ‘good enough’ for 
the same purpose (playing ‘fight the tiger’), which is why such objects are also used 
in pretend play. Pillows, due to their affording punching, may even be better suited 
for ‘fighting the tiger’ play than the miniature tiger toy. As Szokolsky (2006) clarifies,  
 
(P)retend objects need to support pretend acts, not real acts; a pretend knife does not need to 
afford cutting, it only needs to afford pretend cutting which is a much less definite act than 
real cutting. The task of the child is to select an object that is good enough to support the 
enactment. As long as the object functionally fits the pretend act well, the action looks very 
 130 
much as it would with the real object. When the object is functionally less fit for the pretend 
act, the child compensates for the deficiency by making the best possible use of the object 
(…) In neither case is the pretend object ‘standing for’ the target object as a detached 
representation. Rather, the pretend object is integrated into the action as a partial embodiment 
of the target object, supporting the pretend act” (p. 67-68). 
 
 There is no pre-determined appropriateness condition for both social play and 
individual play; what guides play can be goals that are constantly updated by what 
possibilities for action objects and others allow, or by what the social context 
determines. Games are spontaneous, so even if one has a goal to ‘project making a 
phone call with a banana’, there are different ways to act it out: dial a number on it, or 
talk to it holding it on one’s head as headphones (guided by the narrative ‘Skype 
call’), or even holding it to a foot. This suggests there are no accuracy conditions for 
‘pretending to be making a phone call’; the accuracy depends on the content of the 
voiced elaboration, which often does not occur in solitary pretend play or in preverbal 
play at all.   
 
d) Recognising situations  ‘as play’ is representational 
 
Finally, a cognitivist may challenge the enactivist by claiming that to participate in 
pretence, the child must first recognise (and so, represent) the situation as playful, and 
represent behaviours of others as part of a game. So how is the difference between 
non-playful and playful context known?   
 This can also be explained without positing mental representations. For 
example, the understanding could come from attunement to other people. According 
to Reddy and Morris (2004), developmental findings suggest that playful moods can 
be easily picked up on by the children through neo-natal imitation. They conclude that 
the best explanation of their findings lays in playfulness being directly experienced 
rather than inferred thanks to mindreading and script-following skills.100 On the 
                                                
100 As Reddy and Morris (2004) write, “Communication presents a major problem for the theory-theory 
and for all cognitive-developmental views, which see it, first, as a primarily mental activity, divorced 
from (or only incidentally related to) the body and its actions, and, second, as the activity of one 
individual subject towards another rather than as something that emerges between them. For example, 
intentional communication has been described in the developmental psycho-linguistic literature as the 
intentional transfer of information by an agent who is aware of the information she wishes to send and 
aware of the receiving agent’s ability to receive it and understand it and understand the intention to 
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alternative view, ‘the ‘playfulness’ of the situation is visible in the immediate 
interaction with another.  
 Playfulness is sensed thanks to constant attunement of children to their 
surroundings and to sharing of emotional space. Children do not need to ponder or 
question ‘is this still play?;’ they are capable of stepping out of a pretence context the 
moment the play does not feel fun any more. In addition, the findings that children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder do not join in pretence could be explained better by 
the attunement theory than the lack of Theory of Mind. According to Fuchs (2010), 
autistic children’s deficits in social and emotional development is best explained by 
what Fuchs calls a disorder of their ‘primary’ or ‘embodied’ intersubjectivity: 
 
From a phenomenological approach, autism should rather be conceived as a disorder of 
primary or embodied intersubjectivity. This includes basic disturbances of embodiment found 
in children with autism, namely of (a) sensory-motor integration, (b) imitation and affect 
attunement, and (c) holistic perception (2010, p. 563). 
 
The disorder of their intersubjectivity is what affects their lack of engagement in 
pretend play, and not a result of lack of ‘Theory of Mind’, as proposed by Baron-
Cohen.101  
 Moreover, there is no reason to suppose such knowledge of playful context is 
based on recognising play ‘as’ play. Again, there is no correctness condition of what 
form the playful context must take. 102  Rather, such context is pretender- and 
environment-dependent and created on the spot in dynamic interaction.  
 Thus, the intuitions that promote the idea that recognition 'must be' 
representational do not hold up. Instead of recognising the activity by representing it 
‘as play’, I could be said to see in the activity an opportunity for play, without having 
the concept of play, recognising the play ‘as’ play. 
                                                                                                                                      
send it (…). Such definitions presume the existence of a prior script, the isolation of the communicator 
from the receiver, and a separation of the act of communication from its content, and make the 
loneliness of the subject almost insurmountable (…)” (p. 653).  
101 In fact, autistic children show very heightened abilities to rationalise and follow rules. If that was 
enough to engage in pretence, autistic children should be very good pretenders.   
102 For example, Ramsey (2007) has argued that representing is not necessary for recognition; he claims 
that if a response to stimulus (in this case, response to a banana in a phone-like way) is one of mere 
recognition, then is not enough to count as representation. A truly representational skill would imply a 
possibility of success or failure, but such success condition is not present in recognising the banana ‘as’ 
a phone, or recognising the situation ‘as’ playful. Hence, recognition that it not representational could 
take place.  
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Conclusion 
  
This chapter first clarified why we engaged in discussing the question of what guides 
pretending, arguing that it is an important question in proposing an explanatory 
account of pretending. It then focused on two exemplar accounts to guiders, belief-
based account and imagining-based account, both of which posit mental 
representations in their explanatory proposals. The chapter then suggested a possible 
alternative proposal to understanding what guides pretence that does not posit mental 
representations. To conclude, while in need of development, the alternative proposals 
that involve affordances, effectivities (such as attunement to others), as well as social 
and narrative practices, form a possible alternative explanation to the guiding role in 
pretence. This is a tenable account that does not posit mental representations. It 
prepares the ground for a novel positive account of pretence. More details of how the 
various factors (affordances, effectivities, and social context) connect in the 
alternative proposal will be presented in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7. Elaboration of the Alternative Story  
 
 
This chapter elaborates on the affordance-based alternative proposal of how to explain 
pretence that does not involve mental representations. Its purpose is to clarify how 
environmental affordances work (which is by soliciting actions) and how they only 
get to work when animal effectivities are involved. It will identify the various factors 
that play a role in explaining how affordances invite specific actions. This chapter 
asks the following questions: 1) What is a solicitation with respect to an affordance 
and why do we need it?; 2) What needs to be in place for an affordance (one of the 
possibilities for action) to solicit action (to invite particular behaviours that are 
relevant to the situation)?; 3) What makes specific behaviours inviting that make us 
act upon one and not another solicitation? Together, answers to these questions 
provide a tentative answer to how affordance-based account can explain pretence. The 
chapter supplies a proof of concept that basic pretend activity like playing banana-
phone can be explained without recourse to mental representations.  
 Section 7.1 clarifies what solicitations are with respect to affordances and 
what they add to the affordance-based explanatory toolkit. This section shows that 
affordances on their own do not explain why certain actions are taken; explaining that 
requires further specification of what makes affordances inviting. These are firstly 
animal’s dispositions (effectivities), shaped by history of interactions, and secondly 
context, which includes other people. These are discussed in the next sections. Section 
7.2 explains what factors form effectivities (animal’s dispositions). What shapes the 
animal’s dispositions are various historical factors such as biological setup, cultural 
shaping, or training. These factors influence which affordances are inviting. Section 
7.3 explains what actually forms the invitations for specific actions that drive acting 
upon them. It addresses the question of how the specific affordance-effectivity pair 
comes about. It discusses the option of primary and canonical affordances in driving 
specific behaviours, but dismisses this option as adequate explanation for how 
pretence actions get invited. It then turns to consider how socio-cultural norms and 
practices make certain acts of pretence possible, and how others who form the 
intersubjective context shape and influence what and how we pretend. Section 7.4 
concludes the chapter by showing that what explains actions like pretending involves 
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object affordances, subject effectivities and the social context, considered as 
components of a wide and situated mechanism in which people are parts. The section 
addresses final worries that cognitivists may have with the alternative account, one of 
the worries being whether or not the alternative account covertly makes use of mental 
representations.  
 Although the account of non-mental representational pretence is not complete, 
this chapter lends support to the idea that an explanation of pretence that does not 
posit mental representations can be achieved.  
 
7.1 What is a solicitation (with respect to an affordance) and why we need it? 
 
To set the ground for the argument that affordance-based explanations can explain 
how pretend play is, for example, guided, this section first clarifies the additional 
notion related to affordances: solicitations. As explained throughout the thesis, 
affordances are mere possibilities for action. Solicitations can be introduced into our 
theoretical vocabulary as those affordances that invite action. This section is about the 
inviting affordances (solicitations). It asks the following question: how should we 
understand the idea that the affordance (a mere possibility for action) solicits (or 
invites) particular behaviours that are relevant to the situation? The section begins 
with describing some philosophical accounts that speak of solicitations in order to 
frame this analysis.  
 Rietveld and Kiverstein’s (2014) account serves as a good starting point to 
discuss the concept of solicitation. Rietveld and Kiverstein make a useful distinction 
between affordances for ‘all’ animals of a certain form of life and affordances 
relevant to particular individuals in specific situations. As shown in Chapter 4 section 
2, the affordances in the ‘landscape of affordances’ exist for animals of a certain form 
of life. They need not be in any sense noticed by or responded to by a particular 
animal; they simply exist as possibilities for action for a particular kind of animal. 
Conversely, the ‘field of affordances’ consists of the affordances that are relevant to a 
particular individual animal. Their idea is that the field of affordances could as well 
be thought of as a field of solicitations; these are the affordances that are relevant to 
the animal’s concerns and solicit (or invite) particular behaviour (Rietveld and 
Kiverstein, 2014, p. 342). For example, when one has to walk into a building, the 
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doors of the building afford using them, but between open doors and shut doors, the 
open doors invite walking through more than the shut doors (even though the latter 
could be pushed open as well).  
 In Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014, p. 2), we find a description of what a 
solicitation is: 
 
This enormous richness [in the landscape of affordances] raises the question how an organism 
can be responsive to only the relevant affordances in a given situation. Phenomenologically, 
some of the affordances around us do not leave us cold but move us. In earlier work (…) we 
have suggested that an affordance can “invite” or “solicit” behavior dependent on the current 
concerns of the organism and the situation it is in (Withagen et al., 2012). The metaphor of a 
field is useful here: some affordances stand out more than others. Some are experienced as 
soliciting immediately, others are experienced as soliciting on the horizon and still others are 
completely ignored (only the latter do in fact leave us cold). We can distinguish between an 
affordance, i.e., a possibility for action available in our form of life at a certain location, and a 
solicitation. A solicitation is an affordance that stands out as relevant in a specific situation 
lived by an animal (idem, p. 2).  
 
 As seen on their story, solicitations look like a special class of affordances, 
which are experienced by the animals in specific contexts as inviting; when they are 
experienced as such, they can even ‘move us’.  
 Withagen et al. (2012) also speak of solicitations. They endorse the notion of 
affordances as opportunities for action, but they elaborate their story by giving 
affordances the quality of inviting (or, of soliciting) behaviour. They say:  
 
(We) think of affordances as action-relevant properties of the environment that are defined 
with respect to the animals’ action capabilities but exist independently of their needs and 
intentions. However, by suggesting that affordances can also invite behavior, we move 
beyond Gibson’s original conception of affordances as mere action possibilities. (…) (We) 
conceive of affordances (…) as action possibilities that can invite (p. 255).  
 
 Thus, on both Rietveld et al. and Withagen et al.’s accounts, all affordances 
relevant to a particular animal are in fact solicitations.  
 To Withagen et al., introducing the term ‘solicitation’ is supposed to account 
for the agent’s motivations for actions. They further claim that without some 
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soliciting role, one has to give an account of how the relevant affordances are 
selected, and selecting affordances has been characterised as “an ubiquitous and 
continuous process” (p. 253). Withagen et al. worry that we would need to propose a 
theory of intention to explain how affordances are selected. Trying to avoid that 
move, they attribute to the affordance the capacity to become a solicitation. Soliciting 
may be deemed as an equally mysterious process; the next sections will expand on 
what makes affordances inviting. However, the basic idea is that when affordances do 
invite or select particular behaviours, we can think of this selection process as based 
on the world and partly on the way the organism has developed to respond to certain 
aspects of it.103 Introducing solicitations is an important contribution to the field, as it 
shows that this selection is not just mind-to-world that cries out for mental 
representations; rather, there is no direction of fit, as the animal capacities and 
environment mutually affect each other in dynamical interaction.  
 Let us consider an example to clarify the relationship between the landscape 
of affordances, the field of affordances and solicitations. Imagine a situation that 
involves a tree, a cat with a broken leg, and a storm. The tree, in general, has many 
(almost an infinite number of) affordances to a form of life. For example, to a form of 
life ‘cat’, the tree’s affordance landscape entails, i.e., ‘hiding under’, ‘climbing’, 
‘peeing on’ (but not ‘chopping down’, which would be included in the human form of 
life but is not included in the cat form of life). For the particular cat with a broken leg 
that found itself in a storm, the field of affordances (or what is relevant to it) would 
include both the tree’s hide-under-ability and climb-ability, as both are relevant to its 
situation where it needs to find shelter from the storm (hence, ‘pee-on-ability’ would 
not form its field of relevant affordances). But because the cat’s leg is broken, the 
cat’s disposition to climb trees is temporarily impaired and so ‘hide-under-ability’ is 
solicited, and once solicited it can drive the cat’s behaviour to hide under the tree. 
Hence, the context of the storm and the impaired disposition (broken leg) affect which 
action is solicited. 
                                                
103 This fits with Withagen et al.’s understanding of solicitations as referring to the animal-environment 
dynamic. They claim: “How are we to understand these invitations? Are invitations environmental 
properties, mental properties, or do they, like affordances, “cut across the dichotomy of subjective–
objective” (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 129). We are inclined to a mutualist perspective on invitations – they 
depend on the relation between the physical properties of the environment and the agent” (2012, p. 
255).  
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 There are some clear worries with the solicitation account that need to be 
addressed. One is that it is unlikely for the affordances in the ‘field of affordances’ to 
all be solicitations. As the solicitation for action is supposed to be phenomenologially 
present, an actual animal that can be solicited is required. However, affordances, on 
Rietveld and Kiverstein’s (2014) account, are lovely; that is, they exist latently, 
regardless of there being an animal present (as explained in Chapter 4). Hence, if the 
solicitations ‘move’ the animal to action, the animal must definitely be present. It 
seems like not all affordances in the field of affordances will be solicitations.  
 Also, it is strange to speak of solicitations as a special class of affordance, 
making their metaphysics unclear. If solicitations require the interaction of the animal 
and the environment, solicitations would have to be understood as constituted by the 
environmental affordances and animal effectivities, making their own special 
ontology. But then, solicitations could not be a class of affordances, which is what 
they are also said to be. Hence, it is clearer to speak of affordances in the Gibsonian 
sense as possibilities for action, which are properties of the environment relative to 
the animal, and speak of these affordances as sometimes soliciting, or inviting, action, 
when relevant factors are in place; what these factors are will be proposed in the next 
sections.  
 Finally, the potential of affordances to invite action does not mean that the 
affordances always invite behaviour, and just as solicitations are affordances that can 
invite, solicitations are those possibilities for action that can drive specific behaviour, 
but they do not always do. It is possible for an animal not to respond to a solicitation, 
which is why solicitations should not be thought of as necessarily causing action. 
Solicitations only drive behaviour when, arguably, the animal is in the right ‘frame of 
mind’. This calls for the work of mutual animal-environment engagement, not just 
affordances with special qualities of soliciting. Hence, the notion of ‘solicitation’ does 
not suffice to be an explanation of behaviour. We still need to explain how the 
relevant inviting affordances are taken up from all the possibilities for action, and 
explain how they literally get to ‘move’ the animals, or what makes the animals act 
upon them.  Something else than solicitations will need to be proposed to explain 
what actually causes one to move, as solicitations do not cause action. What needs to 
be in place for there to be solicitations, and what determines that specific actions are 
invited, will be addressed in the sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively.  
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 To clarify, why we need solicitations in the explanatory story to begin with is 
because affordances alone, understood as mere possibilities for action, are not where 
the explanatory action lies. We need to add to the story certain responsiveness to 
affordances. What can account for the responsiveness to certain affordances are the 
dispositions and capacities of the animal; paired up with affordances, they give some 
of the affordances an inviting character. The effectivities of the animal paired with the 
affordances of the environment suffice for solicitations to occur, though are not yet 
sufficient for solicitations to ‘move’ the animal – this is where the additional 
contextual factors come in. Nowhere in this story mental representations or any 
structures that imply them need to be posited. As will be shown in the next section, 
even when the animal and its history of interactions are involved, the explanation 
need not require mental representational structures. The next section attempts at 
further clarifying the role of the animal effectivities in soliciting actions.  
 
7.2 What needs to be in place to make affordances inviting? Matching of 
affordances with the right effectivities  
 
There are many possibilities for action (affordances) that are relevant to an animal in 
the situation it has found itself in. This section addresses what animal capacities 
(effectivities) need to be in place to pair up with the affordances in order for the 
affordances to solicit or invite action. This section considers the factors that are 
relevant for solicitations to come about. How affordances (possibilities for action) 
become solicitations (possibilities for particular action to a particular animal that 
invite actions) is via a set of dispositions and capacities of an animal, considered 
under the heading of ‘effectivities’. As explained in Chapter 4, the notion of 
‘effectivities’ used in this thesis is broad, in the sense that apart from ‘dispositions’ 
narrowly construed (such as mere bodily dispositions), they also encompass all sorts 
of moods, capacities, biological setup, cultural history and individual history 
(including training) of the animal that shape up the animal’s dispositions. The section 
first discusses these factors in detail, after which it explains why these factors need 
not be seen as mental representations. 
 Firstly, evolutionary or biological set-ups determine what the animal is 
naturally disposed to do. Consider the case of a fly. It affords ‘mate’ to another fly of 
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the opposite sex, but it affords ‘food’ for a frog. The frog is likely to be fixed in its 
repertoires, or at least, not as flexible as other animals; frogs are likely to be 
responsive to the ‘food’ affordance of a fly in ways selected by evolution. A sub-set 
of dispositions will be naturally selected for, fixing what the frog should do. It doesn’t 
mean that the frog will always eat the fly; the frog might be disposed to eat the fly but 
that disposition will not always get actualised (consider a situation where the frog is 
fed). But, all else being equal, the frog is likely to be unable to respond in any other 
ways to a fly but to eat it; the fly would not only afford, but also solicit ‘food’ to a 
frog when it’s hungry. It might be a difficult task (if not an impossible one) to teach a 
frog to ‘do something else’ with a fly than eat it or leave it alone. What this shows is 
that natural selection can put processes into play that make it the case that creatures 
are initially responsive to only certain affordances.104 
 However, through training, an animal can develop new dispositions and so 
expand its initial habitual repertoire. Hence, training is just a special case of a history 
of interactions that shapes current dispositions. Consider the following case of 
monkeys using ‘reverse pliers’ (Umilta et al., 2008). Experimenters were successful at 
teaching the monkeys to use a counter-intuitive plier (one where the monkey needs to 
grip the tool to ‘open’ the plier and let go of the grip to ‘close’ the plier) to pick food. 
After 6-8 months of training, the monkeys were able to do it. How did the monkeys 
learn how to use the new pliers? They responded to the only possibility the new pliers 
allowed relevant to picking food up, which was to work with them in counterintuitive 
way. The experimenters concluded that “The capacity to learn tool use appears, 
therefore, to be based on two elements: the goal-centered organization of primate 
motor cortex and an appropriate interaction with the external world” (p. 2211-2212). 
The organisation of the motor cortex of the monkeys can be considered as one of their 
effectivities, and the reverse pliers as the environmental affordances, which in pair 
allowed the monkeys to develop the capacity to use the reverse pliers. This 
explanation allows us to understand the monkeys’ behaviour without having to 
attribute to the monkeys the capacity to manipulate mental contents. 
                                                
104 With regard to evolutionary set-up, Withagen et al. (2012) claim that certain affordances were also 
selected for humans. Consider their example of the solicitation to ‘flight’ when encountering a lion on 
a safari: “(Affordances) that are crucial for survival and reproduction (e.g., objects or animals that 
afford danger, shelter, or nutrition) are likely to attract or repel the agent. For example, a human that 
encounters a lion on a safari is likely to flee into his car as soon as possible. Such an affordance will be 
acted upon immediately, irrespective of the intentions of the actor at that moment in time (e.g. to take a 
picture, to pee)” (p. 256). 
 140 
 What is really different between human children and monkeys is the speed 
with which the child can shift between affordances; that can be due to the inherent 
human flexibility. The human child maintains the capacity to learn fast, and switch 
fast between contexts thanks to a more flexible make-up; perhaps the plasticity of the 
brain can account for this. In addition, the speed with which new behaviours can be 
learned can be accounted for by, for example, action readiness potentials in the neural 
networks.  
 However, often, mere flexibility is not enough to account for more expert 
pretence; some training is required as well. That pretend play also needs to be 
practiced is exemplified by the professional stand up comedians, who can act with the 
same object as if it is routinely something else.105 Their innovative pretending is an 
on-the-spot, embodied activity of switching between many affordances. The object 
solicits to the actors many strange behaviours, and bringing them forth needs to be 
practiced. Through repeated exposures to and manipulations of these objects, such 
creative responsiveness to object’s affordances can be developed by the actors.   
 With regard to the cultural history of the animal in explaining how 
affordances become solicitations, engaging in culturally shaped routines influences 
how one responds to the environment. For example, a chair is often perceived as 
something to sit on, even though it affords many other types of behaviour too. In that 
sense, cultural history is a factor in delimiting and shaping which affordances we 
respond to. Culture is part of the animal’s history of interactions; what participation in 
patterned practices shapes are one’s abilities and concerns (what one cares about). 
Consider a mailbox; it canonically affords posting letters. That is its purpose, and that 
is what we have learned to use it for. Although, technically, as a box with a slit it 
affords treating it as a garbage disposal, not many would act on that affordance, as we 
were shaped by the society that putting anything else in a mailbox but letters is 
inappropriate. The history of social interactions disposes us to act in a culturally 
appropriate way. What follows from the history of cultural interactions is that the 
objects can present themselves as explicitly and exclusively good for a specific, 
culturally established purpose, at the same time appearing to be unsuitable for other 
purposes.  
                                                
105 See, for example, the comedians of the show ‘Whose Line is it Anyway?’ 
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 Finally, personal history affects what one is attracted to; clearly, an object 
may solicit different actions to individuals who are of the same culture, or may solicit 
different actions to the same individual at different times. Consider Withagen et al.’s 
(2012) examples: 
 
Indeed, members of the same culture are often attracted to different objects or are invited by 
the same object to do different things. As an example, although chocolate may afford eating 
for the vast majority of people, there is substantial variation in whether and how people are 
attracted to it. Some people are almost addicted and cannot wait to eat it; others might not like 
it and prefer to eat something else. It is important to note that the invitation can also vary over 
time and might change on a moment-to-moment basis. For example, a person who initially 
liked chocolate but had suffered from gastroenteritis after eating it is likely to be repelled by 
its affordance for some time (2012, p. 256).  
  
 To summarise, the animal dispositions gained from the history of interactions 
(either biological or cultural) or from training and exposure, explain why certain 
affordances are seen as inviting. Importantly to the account of non-representational 
pretence, there is no reason to think that these factors or the effects of these factors 
need to be mentally represented. It is particularly the cultural and personal history of 
interactions that are often thought to involve mental representations (for example, by 
forming mental ‘traces’ in the animal, which could be mental representational 
contents).106 But as Withagen et al. claim, the fact that an affordance stands out by 
result of culture (like a chair’s affordance to sit on it),  
 
(Does) not mean that the inviting character is a mental product. (…) Instead, cultural 
variations are better thought of as variations in perceptual-motor skills (…) giving rise to a 
particular responsiveness to certain affordances in the environment. (…) Like cultural 
variation, individual differences in perception can also be explained in terms of variation in 
what information is exploited or in the bodily responsiveness to such information (2012, p. 
256). 
 
                                                
106 Often traces are understood as mental representations, but this does not seem to be a necessity; 
traces are simply indications of former existence or presence of actions, and as such, they can take 
many forms. One of such forms could be understood as ‘know-hows’ (Ryle, 1949); history of 
interactions could be considered to leave a ‘trace’ on the animal in terms of their new capacities and 
know-hows they acquired. To properly demonstrate that traces do not involve positing mental 
representations is beyond the scope of this thesis, but this is one way it could be done. 
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 To conclude this section, the affordance-based alternative explanation 
necessarily involves the concept of effectivity for action, which explains how certain 
possibilities for action can come about to invite or solicit specific animal behaviours. 
Affordances of the objects do not, on their own, invite action; animal effectivities 
have to be matched, as they do an important work relevant in explaining why certain 
behaviours can take place. The story is not complete without understanding what it is 
about the animal that needs to coexist with affordances to bring about solicitations for 
action and explain the animal’s responsiveness to solicitations.  
 Importantly, there is no choosing of any kind done by the animal to which 
affordances it will respond. Such choosing is usually associated with deliberation, and 
is explained by positing mental contents. There is simply a mutual attraction of 
affordances to effectivities. Paired together, the effectivities allow the affordances to 
be inviting.  
 Thus, the story can be cast in terms of animal-environment mutuality: just as 
the objects we shape have a pull on us with respect to how to engage with them 
(Malafouris, 2008), so the affordances of the environment can invite specific 
behaviours when the right effectivities are in place.  
 Yet, this is not the whole story, because solicitations do not necessarily bring 
about action, and there are still many relevant solicitations that can encourage 
different behaviours in the same situations. So what actually drives the animal to 
respond to one solicitation rather than another one? What makes specific behaviours 
(like pretend behaviours) inviting? These questions will be targeted in the final 
section, where further contextual factors that explain why this and not that solicitation 
is acted upon will be introduced. The section will refer to pretence cases specifically. 
 
7.3 What makes specific pretence behaviours inviting? Considering canonical 
affordances and other people  
 
From the last section it should be clear that affordances have no soliciting power on 
their own; it is our histories of interacting that form our dispositions, or effectivities, 
that allow affordances to invite actions. Thus, our dispositions make it such that in 
some or even many situations certain affordances are dominant. However, affordance-
effectivity pairs alone are not enough to explain the special kind of responsiveness 
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needed to explain specific behaviours, such as pretend play. There are still many 
affordance-effectivity pairs that can invite various behaviours. Consider Turvey’s 
(1992) claim: 
 
X and Z have multiple dispositions - m and n, respectively. To actualize Wpq, the 
juxtaposition function j must be such as to filter p and q from the array of m x n dispositions 
possessed by X and Z (p. 179).  
 
 Applied to a situation involving pretence, the agent (X) and the banana (Z) 
have multiple dispositions, such as ‘softness’, ‘foodness’, ‘phoneness’ of the banana 
(‘m’ collection of affordances) and ‘disposition to grab’, ‘eat’, or capacity to play 
phone with’ of the agent (‘n’ collection of effectivities). To actualise the pretence act, 
there must occur a juxtaposition of specifically the ‘phoneness’ of the banana (‘p’ 
affordance from the ‘m’ collection), and of specifically the ‘capacity to play phone 
with’ of the agent (‘q’ effectivity from the ‘n’ collection). 107 Only this juxtaposition 
can filter other affordances and effectivities out. Hence, what determines that the right 
affordance-effectivity pair comes forth?  
 This section will discuss in detail two answers to this question from the many 
possible answers. First is that some affordances naturally strongly invite; these are, 
for example, canonical affordances (Costall, 2012). Second is that it is the presence of 
other people in the immediate context that specifies which affordances strongly invite. 
While these are not the only possibilities for what can actualise pretence affordances, 
both canonical affordances and other people are clear examples of factors that do not 
posit mental representations. 
 
a) Canonical affordances 
 
What makes specific behaviours inviting can be a set of special affordance-effectivity 
pairs. The idea is that perhaps there are more basic affordance-effectivity pairs, which 
                                                
107 For the banana to afford ‘phone’, it may look like the matching effectivities have to be ‘phone-like’ 
as well. After all, how can a child have the requisite effectivities, without positing that the child has 
‘phone-like’ history of engagement with the banana? The worry is that positing ‘phone-like’ 
effectivities would be presupposing what we are trying to explain. To address this worry, a solution is 
that early forms of interaction with the banana do not have to be 'phone-like' per se. It is enough that 
the child has a history of playing with the banana and using the banana not in a typical to the child 
‘banana-like’ way (such as eating it). With other contextual factors in place (to be discussed in the next 
section), ‘phone-like’ behaviour with the banana can occur.  
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strongly invite. As mentioned in the last section, there might be affordances and 
effectivities that stand out because of the cultural engagements. These can be thought 
of as canonical affordances (Costall, 2012). Such affordances are the first to strongly 
invite, or solicit action. For example, an animal’s cultural practices set up the bananas 
to canonically afford ‘eating’, at times of winter, it can set them up for ‘storing’. The 
canonical affordances are independent of the present context, but are shaped by wider 
socio-cultural context, such as past practices.108 
 Canonical affordances can explain some pretence. One way to think about 
pretence being canonical is thinking of it as stepping into another practice, such as 
from ‘banana-eating’ practice to socially established ‘banana-phone game’ practice. 
Being part of such practice would require being enculturated in a ‘phone’ practice, 
which would amount to having a certain know-how to use the bananas as phones, etc.,  
acquired through, for example, interaction with and exploration of the banana, or 
imitating others who have used the banana as a phone. Just like narrative practices 
guiding some pretend play (as discussed in the previous chapter), canonical practices 
of banana-phone game affect that it is the ‘phone’ affordances of the banana that are 
solicited. The ‘phone play’ invites more strongly because the ‘phone’ narrative 
practice is an established practice that forms the play context.  
 However, the canonical ‘banana-phone’ practice cannot be the whole story; 
after all, children play in creative ways, such as playing with a banana that it is a hat 
or a gun, without entering into an established practice. Do all these pretend play 
scenarios with a banana amount to canonical practices? If so, then we would have to 
assume that almost all ways of using a banana in play are canonical to that play. Thus, 
while it is likely that with respect to banana-phone itself, there is a canon of placing 
the banana to the ear (as this is the most quoted example of pretence in philosophical 
and psychological literature), referring to canonical affordance of ‘phone’ for bananas 
in play context does not explain how children pretend something else with a banana 
just as easily.  
                                                
108 As Costall (2012) explains, “The concept of “canonical affordances” itself alerts us to those 
important cases where the affordances of some thing are not simply shared between people but also 
normatively predefined. Yet the affordance of any artifact is not confined to that object in isolation, but 
depends on a “constellation” (…) of not only other objects but also events. The affordances of artifacts 
are not usually self-contained but depend upon a wider context of other artifacts (as in the case of a 
toolkit) but also upon the encompassing practices in which they go together” (p. 91).  
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 Moreover, acting on pretence affordances often requires stepping away from 
what one is often or normally solicited to do. Pretence acts are not likely to be 
canonical acts, because in pretence, one treats an object differently than what it 
usually (or canonically) affords (banana as ‘phone’).109 As Vygotsky (1934/1987) 
notices, in play, children step away from what objects usually mean and make it into 
something else. This requires explaining how the child inhibits the primary or 
canonical solicitations of objects when they do something unusual with the objects in 
pretence. As typically non-pretence behaviours are solicited, this may require a 
bypassing mechanism to be in place in order to step away from banana’s ‘eating’ 
affordance. On the standard story, the ‘stepping away’ from original meanings is 
explained by a mental representational mechanism like decoupling (Leslie 1987; see 
also Chapter 2 section 2).110 Similarly, one would have to explain how the stepping 
away from the canonical affordances occurs so that alternative affordances can be 
acted upon. The worry for the present account is that only mental representational 
structures have been proposed so far to be able to allow the ‘stepping away’. (I will 
call this the ‘stepping away’ worry).  
 There are two ways to address this worry. The first is to argue that canonical 
affordances need not to be stepped away from, as they do not exist in the first place. 
There are good reasons to think that there are no special kinds of affordances. It may 
be a mistake to think of canonical affordances as continuously phenomenally present 
in the first place. Considering affordances are just possibilities for action, they exist 
equally; bananas equally are possibilities for grasping, eating or pretend phoning with. 
As all affordances can be said to be equal, canonical affordances, if they exist, should 
only be seen as one of many affordances, and not special affordances that often 
solicit. They are just different possibilities for action one can take, like different paths 
in a forest; we simply take one path as opposed to another. What this move allows is 
diffusing the worry of ‘stepping away’. As there are no canonical affordances in 
                                                
109 Unless they are toys or objects, which primarily afford the pretence play (e.g., toy phone for ‘phone’ 
pretence, or bear costume for ‘bear’ pretence). However, having specified toys is not a requirement for 
typical object-substitution play found in early pretence engagements of young children, and it does not 
explain banana-phone game.  
110 The meaning is understood as provided by and stored in mental representational content. This 
mechanism then ‘inhibits’ the original content to make space for new content, which is achieved by 
mentally representing both contents. Leslie speaks of the ‘primary representations’ and ‘pretence 
representations’ as their copies. Alternatively, Nichols and Stich (2000) propose that initial premises 
with primary representations are manipulated in the Possible World Box to make them fit for pretence. 
See Chapter 2 section 2 for details. 
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pretence, no decoupling needs to be done; inhibiting the object’s ‘original’ or ‘true’ 
affordance is not necessary, because objects don’t have such ‘original’ or ‘true’ 
affordances in the first place.  
 However, one may insist that some affordances may still be responded to in a 
stronger way, due to, for example, our personal history of interactions. They may not 
be canonical to our practices, but are still primary to us. It is possible that from 
constant exposure to similar types of engagements with objects in similar contexts 
(routine engagements), objects tend to invite first and foremost a certain kinds of 
behaviours. For example, we may have a habit of eating bananas for breakfast, and as 
such, this habit most often drives us to ‘eat’ the banana, because we find ourselves 
and bananas most often in an ‘breakfast’ context.111 Thus, to get back to the example 
of taking the pathway in the forest, there are factors that do influence which path we 
take; often the sunnier and wider path would solicit walking it instead of the dark and 
narrow one, (unless one knows and has a habit of walking the dark path). Some 
affordances are the first candidates for solicitation. Clearly, the pretence situations 
will be less common or unorthodox, so pretence affordances are not likely to solicit.  
 Thus, even if some form of inhibition of affordances were needed, it is not 
settled that the inhibiting must it be achieved by a procedure that involves mental 
representations. We seem to have certain culturally shaped tendencies, and even if 
these do not form canonical affordances or are in any way set in stone, we may still 
need to answer how we ‘step away’ from these tendencies in pretence. Importantly, if 
‘stepping away’ needs to be accounted for, it does not require intellectual choice in 
the way cognitivists presuppose, whereby one represents the banana as a ‘banana’ and 
then has to create a new representation of the banana as a ‘phone’. This echoes the 
problem with characterisation of the phenomena (as discussed in Chapter 2). Unless 
one buys into the cognitivist characterisation of the phenomena, the story that posits 
mental representations does not look very attractive here.  
 The second way to address the ‘stepping away’ worry is that it can be context 
(including other people in it) that an individual has found him-/herself in, which 
shapes which affordances are inviting. The way one interacts with things shapes 
his/her dispositions such that the pretence affordances become more salient or more 
                                                
111 This is not a canonical affordance, but one based solely on individual’s history of interactions. For 
example, to a person who grew up with banana trees outside their windows, banana could afford first 
and foremost  ‘decoration’, even though ‘food’ is its canonical affordance. 
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inviting, and, in turn, solicit further interactions. When affordances solicit, they do so 
in a context (they are relevant to a particular animal in a particular situation). One can 
say that there is no decontextualized situation where a banana affords ‘first and 
foremost’ eating; in the right play context, the banana does not solicit eating at all, but 
only phoning. It is the context that influences and sets the stage for our various ways 
of acting on things. To make a comparison, consider an example of being in a 
situation that involves chairs. On their own, chairs canonically afford sitting on; 
however, in the context of play, that may not be the action they invite; they will 
instead invite jumping on or piling up to make a fort. So in the right play context, the 
chair will not invite what it culturally specifies in the first place. The present context 
one finds him-/herself in with objects will dynamically bring forth new possibilities 
for action with those objects.  
 
b) Other people as part of the context  
 
Other people can also influence the relevant affordance-effectivity pairs to be acted 
upon. They enable the ‘stepping away’ from canonical practices, forming the 
immediate context where pretence affordances can be inviting.  
 Chapter 6 has spoken of the role of other people in pretence who directly 
engage with the individual in interaction; in acting together new forms of actions can 
emerge. It could be said that other agents form a ‘self-world-other’ structure, or an 
animal-environment-other dynamic (Froese and Di Paolo, 2009), where in creating an 
intersubjective context, they directly affect the actions of the individual through 
immediate interaction. The mutuality effect of individual player and other players on 
shaping their pretence is clear. 
 However, what has not yet been proposed it to speak of other people who are 
not directly engaging in interactions, but are simply in the background, as making an 
important contribution to the animal’s actions on objects in their environments. They 
can form the actualising circumstances that explain why some affordances, like the 
pretence ones, are found inviting. For example, the ‘phone’ action is invited from the 
matching of the banana’s affordances and the player’s effectivities; the matching then 
needs to be done in the right context. Something in the immediate context, as other 
people, completes an explanation of how pretence actions come about. For example, 
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one is strongly disposed to play phone with the banana when the circumstances are 
inviting, and such a disposition is brought forth by mere presence of other people who 
create playful contexts.  
 To clarify the role of the others in shaping the animal-environment dynamic, 
consider an analogy to being vulnerable. McKitrick (2003) discusses how objects like 
sensors can make a city less vulnerable to an attack, or how the presence of 
bodyguards can make someone who walks in a park alone (let’s call her Joan) feel 
less vulnerable in a dark park.112 It is the dynamic between the city and its attackers 
(not between the city and the sensors) that is changed by the sensors; similarly, it is 
the dynamic between Joan and the park that is affected by the presence of the 
bodyguards, not the dynamic between Joan and the bodyguards. Joan is less 
vulnerable because an entourage of bodyguards surrounds her. She is not less 
vulnerable with respect to the bodyguards themselves (Joan might be scared of or shy 
with respect to the bodyguards), but is less vulnerable with respect to her 
environment, the dark park (where someone could attack her). The mere presence of 
bodyguards ‘switch on’ Joan’s disposition to be less vulnerable in the park. The point 
is simply that other people (just as objects) can influence the dynamic between the 
environmental affordances and animal effectivities without being the focus of that 
dynamic themselves.  
 Also, which particular individual is in the context makes a great difference to 
which affordance-effectivity pairs are activated. Consider a case of a basketball player 
(let us call him Kobe) who has the capacity to slam-dunk the ball during high-profile 
games. Kobe is very confident and secure with his skill. In normal game context (in 
the presence of known defenders), the hoop invites slam-dunking (as Kobe likes to 
establish his superiority over these defenders). However, the presence of one 
particular defender in a game (let us call him LeBron), who, as Kobe knows, is often 
successful at blocking Kobe’s dunks, affects the hoop as uninviting the dunk to Kobe. 
                                                
112 As McKitrick explains, “A military target, a city, is protected by a Star Wars-like defense system. 
The system has sensors that bring out defenses when there is a threat, rendering the city invulnerable. 
However, the sensors and anti-craft weapons are all located outside the borders of the city and are built, 
maintained, and staffed by a foreign country. Should the defense system be disabled, or should the 
foreign power withdraw its protection, the city would change from being invulnerable to being 
vulnerable. However, the city may remain intrinsically the same, or internally the same in all ways that 
are relevant to its vulnerability. (…) Changing a thing’s environment can make it vulnerable. By 
adding the defense system, the city changes with respect to its vulnerability. Walking alone in Central 
Park at night, Joan would be vulnerable. Accompanied by an entourage of bodyguards, she would be 
less vulnerable” (idem, p. 161).  
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Mere presence of LeBron could be considered as the relevant change of context that 
actualises new hoop affordance-Kobe effectivity pair: in the presence of LeBron, the 
hoop becomes more inviting from afar, inviting shooting three-pointers to Kobe (who 
also has this skill), but no more dunking in.  Importantly, it is not necessarily the hoop 
itself and Kobe’s skills that invites slum-dunking (what I called affordance-effectivity 
pair), it is the additional presence of any defender but LeBron (context).  
 Similarly, the mere presence of others can drive pretend ‘phone’ play with a 
banana. Others influence the context in which the children play, making the context 
playful. For example, the parents of a child interacting with a banana could make the 
child’s acting on ‘phone’ affordances more likely by smiling and approving the 
various ways the child explores the banana. Playing with a banana is certainly not 
afforded when they parents look angry or seem disapproving. 
 To conclude this section, calling on other people in the immediate context of 
play is just one possible way to explain why certain affordance-effectivity pairs 
strongly invite and drive our actions. This is not the only way to step away from one 
practice to another; we respond to affordances all the time and so we could switch 
about even without the presence of others, but due to some new occurrence in our 
contexts. Also, we may change our moods or attitudes about what practice we take 
ourselves to be in, and that change could bring about different affordances as inviting 
as well.113 Yet, the fact that factors that are not individual’s concerns, moods, 
intentions or explicit choices can also affect the context to be playful needs to be 
stressed. Such factors are, for instance, other people. They are the ones to make the 
darker path in the forest inviting; not only if they go with us (and participate in the 
activity), but also if they watch our backs from afar (and shape the context we interact 
in). Elaborating on exactly when these factors do the relevant explanatory work, and 
to what extent they alone or together explain pretence, requires looking at specific 
acts of pretence of specific individuals.  
                                                
113 For example, moods or ‘current concerns’ (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014) could be referred to in 
shaping the playful context. They are also likely to affect which affordances present themselves as 
inviting. For example, they determine the perception of the amount of effort that would have to be put 
by the agent to act on the affordance. In a situation of having to go to the top floor of a building, an 
agent feeling lazy would feel no inclination to climb a steep staircase if the lift was also present. 
However, if an agent is feeing active and seeks a challenge or an exercise, such steep staircase would 
solicit climbing. In the example of taking a path in a forest, a current melancholic mood may bring out 
the darker path as inviting to an agent who would not otherwise find this path inviting. To refer to the 
play context, the child must be in the right playful mood to find the banana inviting ‘phone’ play.  
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7.4 Addressing final worries 
 
This section addresses final worries that cognitivists may raise with this explanatory 
story of basic acts of pretence. 
  The first worry may be that the affordance-based story does not clearly 
explain why a specific pretence action (like banana-phone play) is taking place. For 
example, the ‘pickupability’ affordance of a banana only affords lifting the banana 
and placing to one’s ear, but does not yet exclusively guide to play ‘phone’ with. 
Banana could invite numerous things still, such as 'playing that it is whispering to me', 
or 'playing that it is a radio'. Cognitivists attribute to mental representations the role of 
determining that the play is in the end ‘phone play’: there seems to be a need for 
content to specify why my action is this action.  
 To address this worry, this chapter has shown that an affordance-based story 
involves many different factors such as environmental correspondences, animal 
flexibility or presence of other people. Specifically, the child’s inherent flexibility as 
well as training (possibly through exploration of objects during intersubjective 
engagements) can explain how the child can do something else with a banana than 
what it usually solicits. These factors taken together are sufficient to explain acts of 
basic pretence. However, it is not necessary for them to be all taking place at the same 
time. To explain banana-phone pretence of a particular individual, the relevant factors 
that could be playing the role are: objective correspondences between bananas and 
phones (their shape and size), matched with relevant capacities of the agent (based on 
past interactions with bananas and phones), and situated in a context of playfulness 
shaped by other people (encouragement to explore and toy with the objects). Then, 
the bodily engagement of the subject with the banana (such as holding it in a hand and 
bending an elbow) explain why we play ‘phone this particular way’, by bringing the 
banana to the ear. These factors can explain why it is particularly ‘phone’ play that 
the banana solicits to one particular child, at a particular play moment. In other play 
contexts, the roles could be played by other factors or by the same factors to a greater 
or lesser extent.  
 The second worry is that affordances just invite, but not cause action. 
Speaking of affordances inviting actions is not an explanation of what causes our 
actions, causation understood in a rigid way. We can still stop ourselves from acting 
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even on most strongly inviting affordances. For example, Koby could still decide to 
try a slum dunk on LeBron; presence of LeBron does not always cause Koby to shy 
away from slum-dunking, even if in the presence of LeBron the hoop does not 
particularly invite such action to Kobe. To address this worry, indeed it must be 
clarified that affordances are not mechanical causes in the strict sense. In fact, 
traditionally, affordances are not efficient causes at all, as they do not make us do 
things (Gibson 1979, Costall 2012), even though some affordance theorists claim that 
they phenomenologically ‘move us’ (Bruineberg and Rietverd, 2014). It is clear that 
we do not have to take up invitations. It is possible to decline, refuse or ‘block’ an 
invitation. We still need to distinguish between solicitations that we accept and the 
ones that we do not. We might be refusing one solicitation because we find another 
one more compelling, or because we can control it purposefully.  
 To that worry, it might be said that the difference between being invited by 
affordances to action and being moved by affordances to action has to do with what 
level of explanation, or what kind of mechanism, we speak of. The wide and situated 
mechanism, on par with the types of mechanisms proposed by cognitivists as 
described in Chapter 2, reflect the ‘algorithmic level’ explanation as proposed by 
Marr (1982). Hence, a further explanation of what makes one literally ‘move’ to 
action could still be provided; that would be an explanation of the ‘physical level’. 
The present account does not propose the right kind of explanatory mechanism 
needed to explain what causes pretence on the physical level. Indeed, one may have to 
go deeper into the workings of the human body, including the human brain, to 
propose such causal explanations. For example, Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) 
propose to explain how affordances ‘move’ us by referring to action readiness 
potentials of the human brain. Hence, should a further explanation of the ‘deeper’ 
causes of pretence behaviours be necessary, the enactive account is open to 
accommodate a variety of neuroscientific findings. 
 The final worry is that, for all that has been said, diehard cognitivists might 
still object to the alternative developed here in the following way: the affordance-
based account described covertly relies on mental representations. For it makes free 
use of notions such as absence, recognition, resemblance, imitating, memory, traces, 
concepts, know-hows or goals (intentions) in its explanations, and these cognitive 
phenomena, in the end, require mental representations. Analysing pretence requires a 
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range of capacities supported by mental representations to be in place, and if these 
require mental representations, so does pretence in the end (like a house of cards, built 
on mental-representational scaffold).  
 To respond to this objection, it must be admitted that in a lot of available 
literature these concepts are defined representationally, although rarely is positing of 
mental representations to explain these concepts justified. While it has been suggested 
how to deal with the notion of ‘seeing resemblances’ and ‘acting in absences’ 
(Chapter 5) as well as with ‘recognising’ the situation as playful (Chapter 6), many 
other notions that may be seen as covertly representational were left alone. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to demonstrate that an understanding of each of these 
phenomena does not, on close analysis, require positing mental representations. It will 
have to suffice, for now, to note that non-mental representational accounts of these 
phenomena are being actively developed, e.g.,: the sensorimotor account of presence 
in absence (Noë, 2004), imitating as a tool of mindshaping (Zawidzki, 2013), 
concepts as abilities (Noë, 2015), or the extensive account of memory (Myin and 
Zahidi, 2014). In the light of these new developments it cannot be safely assumed that 
the standard cognitivist accounts of the mental phenomena mentioned above will turn 
out to be best characterised in mental representational terms.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown that an affordance-based story can be provided to explain 
basic engagements in pretend play. The story involves objects, animals, and context 
(where we find other people) that make it dynamic.  
 In bringing about the right pretence solicitations for action, what does the 
filtering of affordances are the animal effectivities. We are not responsive to all of the 
possibilities for action that the world affords. Some affordances can invite behaviours. 
However, they only do so when they are matched with the right effectivities. To 
understand why an animal finds some affordances inviting requires understanding 
how features of the item and the animal's dispositions have become mutually 
connected. The animal both creates and responds to the solicitation; in that sense, the 
explanation involving solicitations is dynamic.  
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 It should now be clear that there is a possible way of understanding the 
mutuality of affordances and effectivities without having to posit mental 
representations. The objects afford many ways of acting upon them; they remain 
flexible enough to allow variety of interactions. However, objects can also potentially 
invite specific behaviours, when relevant agential factors, or effectivities, are in play. 
Importantly, the agent does not have to ‘control’ what gets solicited; it is the 
relationship between individual dispositions of the animal and engagement with the 
environment that can solicit new pretence action, especially when contextual factors 
contribute to determining which possibilities for actions are found inviting.  
 It should now also be clear what role intersubjective engagements play, among 
other contextual factors, in shaping pretence. Once we recognise the need for 
affordance-effectivity mutuality in dynamically bringing forth, or inviting, responses, 
we can accept that the relevant explanatory work is done by multiple agential, 
environmental and social factors. What filters the affordance-effectivity pairs is the 
context. To explain why specific affordance-effectivity pair is acted upon, we can 
refer not only to the canonical practices with objects or right moods of the subjects, 
but also to the intersubjective context, where other people can influence the way 
certain actions strongly invite, and potentially drive, behaviours.  
 It is convincing that objects and others play a part in the larger dynamics. If 
dynamical systems turn out to be mechanisms (ala Chapter 3), than this can be 
construed as a ‘wide mechanism’: both animals and environments (or objects in it) are 
likely to form component parts in the overall wide (involving other people) and 
situated (in a context) mechanism of pretence, which explains why pretence takes 
place. If not, the dynamical features are still the ones to focus on, and in the best case, 
might explain pretence in a non-mechanical way. These considerations reveal how 
understanding the dynamics of interactions and the involvement of others in such 
dynamics can adequately do the relevant explanatory work of understanding the 
cognitive basis of pretence without having to posit any mental representational 
mechanisms.  
 Overall, this thesis has argued that the affordance-based explanations of 
cognitive phenomena can be used by the enactivists to explain basic pretending like 
banana-phone pretend play, without the need to posit mental representations. The 
affordance-based story is complex, more complex than cognitivist story that only 
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posits mental representations: it introduces many different factors such as 
environmental affordances, animal effectivities and contextual factors, all of which 
are in need of further explication and development. While more work needs to be 
done to secure that the enactive explanation (positing affordances as explanatory 
tools) is the best explanation of pretence, the initial sketch provided in this thesis is 
certainly a viable alternative to the cognitivist proposals. Also, the enactive 
framework is so far only applied to explaining early forms of pretence. More work is 
needed to show whether or not it can scale up to explaining more complex pretence of 
older children and adults. This thesis sets the stage for scaling up the enactivist 
framework to include more complex pretence. Importantly, this thesis is nontrivial as 
with the possibility proof that pretence can be explained without positing mental 
representations, the thesis opens the door to further research on enactive, dynamical 
and intersubjective explanations of cognitive phenomena, as well as to research on 
pretending, imagining and make-belief. The promise and impact of the enactive 
account of pretence are high, and its application has already been shown in therapy 
(see Rucinska and Reijmers, 2014, 2015).  
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